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To End War and Poverty: The Media Strategy of Martin Luther King, Jr. 
January 1, 1967, to April 4, 1968 
 
Stephen Gordon Foster Smith 
 
Through 1967 until his assassination on April 4, 1968, American civil rights leader 
Martin Luther King, Jr. focused his internationally-recognized authority as a moral and 
religious leader against America's war in Vietnam and the values that he saw perpetuating 
the poverty of an estimated 40-million Americans. King’s so-called “new radicalism” 
presented the difficult challenge of trying to win favourable news coverage for views that 
challenged those of the news media and mainstream America. Through the transcripts of 
an FBI wiretap on the home phone of King's most trusted strategist, Stanley D. Levison, 
and other archival documents, this thesis seeks a better understanding of the media 
strategy that went into advancing King's antiwar views and his efforts to rid American 
society of poverty. Positioning himself between go-slow moderates and go-for-broke 
radicals, King promoted a compelling “militant middle” that wedded radical idealism and 
pragmatic realism into a dramatic message that the news media could not ignore. Such a 
strategy was not without its risks and left King facing media coverage that was often 
critical of his refusal to drop his opposition to the war and adopt a more moderate 
approach in his fight against poverty. Yet media coverage also provided a crucial forum 
for his “new radicalism” that King deliberately sought out and used to warn America that 
its tolerance of war, racism and poverty was leading to social catastrophe and the nation’s 
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The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. we see represented in today’s mainstream news 
media is not the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. whom Americans were familiar with in 
1967 and the first four months of 1968. King’s modern media representation is limited to 
his campaigns in the Southern United States between 1955 and 1965 and emphasizes his 
belief in the possibility of racial reconciliation and harmony in American society, a belief 
immortalized in his famous “I have a dream” speech at the Lincoln Memorial in 
Washington on August 28, 1963. Deleted from the frame are the growing doubts about 
his country that characterized the following four and a half years of King’s short 39-year 
life. Notably absent is his conviction that a “radical reordering of national priorities” 
(King, 1968, p.100) was needed to cure the racism, extreme materialism and militarism 
that he believed were leading America toward her “spiritual death” (219). Forty-four 
years after he was silenced by a sniper’s bullet on April 4, 1968, America’s news media 
continue to direct our popular memory of Martin Luther King, Jr. away from the 
inconvenient prophecies of his last years. 
In his essential profile on the civil rights leader in the August 1967 issue of 
Harper’s magazine, journalist David Halberstam described this evolution as King’s “new 
radicalism” (Halberstam, 1967, in Reporting Civil Rights, 2003, p.564). As Halberstam 
observed, radical thought was nothing new for King, only that “in the decade of 1956 to 
1966 he was the radical America felt comfortable to have spawned” (563).  King’s use of 
nonviolent direct action in the Southern states, with its tactical emphasis on disobeying 
laws that supported racial segregation, was accepted by America’s white majority because 
of his skill for swaddling civil disobedience in Christian principles and the patriotic 
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language of the U.S. Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. While King’s 
tactics remained largely unchanged in 1967, what was new and discomfiting was their 
targets – the war in Vietnam and America’s economic class structure – and the climate of 
heightened racial tensions in cities across America that lent his “new radicalism” a 
threatening edge. As Halberstam wrote of the spring of 1967, “it was a time when the 
Negro seemed more than ever rebellious and disenchanted with the white; and the white 
middle class – decent, upright – seemed near saturation with the Negro’s new rebellion. 
The Negro cities seemed nearer to riots than ever; the white, seeing the riots on TV, 
wanted to move further away from the Negro than ever before. A terrible cycle was 
developing” (565). 
Given such circumstances, the news media more than ever needed King as the 
symbol of “respectability and moderation” that over the years he had come to represent in 
their pages and broadcasts, and thus to millions across America (August Meier, 1965, in 
Reporting Civil Rights, 2003, p. 456).  More importantly, white America and the news 
organizations that represented it needed King to be what historian August Meier 
described as their “good friend” (ibid) who put them at ease when it seemed black 
dissatisfaction with the status quo was threatening to develop into open hostility towards 
them. By 1967, however, King could no longer provide the kind of mellifluous hope that 
the news media wanted and expected of him. Though he continued to preach 
nonviolence, King’s preoccupation from 1965 onwards with the moral ramifications of 
America’s war in Vietnam and the economic class structure that kept millions of its black 
citizens in poverty changed his outlook on his country and consequently the tone with 
which he addressed its white majority. As David Halberstam observed, King had decided 
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to work and speak for the ghettos, but the voice of the ghettos was “harsh and alienated. 
If King is to speak for them truly, then his voice must reflect theirs, it too must be 
alienated, and it is likely to be increasingly at odds with the rest of American society” 
(578). A press statement composed for King by his principal advisor and speechwriter, 
Stanley D. Levison, in response to an uprising in Detroit’s black community in July 1967 
echoed Halberstam’s observation: “I regret that my expression may be sharp but I believe 
literally that the life of our nation is at stake here at home. Measures to preserve it need to 
be boldly and swiftly applied before the process of social disintegration engulfs the whole 
of society” (FBI, 7/24/67, 7/0442).1 
King’s increasingly discordant views, however, did not result in a consequent decline 
in media interest in what he had to say. If anything, his outspoken opinions drew more 
media coverage than ever before precisely because of his “new radicalism.” While 
journalists like David Halberstam lent King’s views increasing weight, others began to 
cover him with heightened skepticism if not hostility. In a private conversation with King 
recorded by a Federal Bureau of Investigation wiretap, Stanley Levison offered one 
explanation for the heightened media interest attending to his views: 
You’re not just the man who’s saying you must love them – they’re getting 
the other part of the message, [that] there are certain sacrifices involved... 
You’re going through something of a metamorphosis. They can’t quite 
place you as conveniently as they used to be able to. And I think you’ll be 
getting a lot of attention, not all of it necessarily favorable.  You’ll 
command attention, because they know where to put most of the [civil 
rights] leadership... But I think they don’t know quite where to put you. 
And until they do, they’ve got to keep watching you (FBI, 3/25/67,6/0864). 
  
 
                                               
1 The referencing system that I employ for FBI transcripts in this study represents the date (M/D/Y) of 
the original recording followed by the microfilm reel number and the first frame of the date in question 
(ie 7/0442 is frame 0442 of Reel 7). 
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“A great media problem” 
This thesis examines Martin Luther King, Jr.’s strategic response to news coverage of his 
“new radicalism” and in particular his positions on Vietnam and economic justice for 
America’s poor in the last 16 months of his life, from January 1967 to his assassination 
on April 4, 1968. According to historian Adam Fairclough, King’s opposition to the war 
and his shift toward more radical social and economic policies during this period 
presented a “great media problem” for him and his circle of advisors, known as the 
Research Committee (Fairclough, interview with the author, recorded March 14, 2011). 
King and the committee members were very aware of the fact that King could only go so 
far to the left of the mainstream – “Going too far to the left in America gets you labeled 
as a radical or a Communist or a Socialist,” Fairclough said (ibid). Accordingly, Stanley 
Levison and King’s other key advisers worked more closely with him than ever during 
this period to develop and frame his positions in ways that would protect him from 
allegations of extremism and Communist influence. Levison, who was older than King 
and whose past affiliations with the American Communist Party had led to a subpoenaed 
appearance before the anti-Communist House Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC), was especially determined to protect King from being smeared and “consigned 
to oblivion” like so many other critics of America’s Cold War Establishment (ibid). 
Levison outlined his understanding of America’s distaste for extremism in an 
April 1965 letter to King, who sought Levison's views on the strong media backlash that 
had recently greeted his proposal for a nationwide economic boycott of products made in 
Alabama. Leading the criticism was an editorial in the New York Times that called King’s 
proposal “wrong in principle” and contrary to the “orderly, lawful methods” that would 
best serve his stated goals of ending police brutality against civil rights workers in 
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Alabama and increasing the number of blacks registered to vote there (“Boycott,” 
1965/3/30). In his letter, Levison cautioned King that American society would not 
embrace revolutionary alterations of the economic and social order in the pursuit of racial 
justice and equality. 
America today is not ready for a radical restructuring of its economy and 
social order. Not even the appeal of equality will weld all into one fighting 
unit around a program that disturbs their essentially moderate tendencies... 
This is a subject for careful study because the movement can head into a 
cul-de-sac if it can see no real progress without radical alteration to the 
nation... It is certainly poor tactics to present to the nation a prospect of 
choosing between equality and freedom for Negroes with the revolutionary 
alteration of society, or to maintain the status quo of discrimination. The 
American people are not inclined to change their society in order to free the 
Negro. They are ready to undertake some, and perhaps major, reforms, but 
not to make a revolution (King Papers, 1965/4/7). 
 
Levison saw in the media’s harsh response to his boycott proposal a new fear 
within the Establishment regarding King, who in April 1965 was riding an unprecedented 
wave of national popularity among both blacks and whites for his leadership of the civil 
rights movement's dramatic campaign for voting rights in Selma, Alabama. 
Selma... made you one of the most powerful figures in the country, a 
leader not merely of Negroes but of millions of whites in motion... You are 
one of the exceptional figures who attained the heights of popular 
confidence and trust without having obligations to any political party or 
other dominant interests. Seldom has anyone in American history come by 
this path, fully retaining his independence and freedom of action... 
Whenever one attains a commanding position of power he also evokes 
fear... What are they afraid of? There are some who fear you are hitting at 
sacred structures of economic interests when you embrace the weapon of 
boycott. There are others who may not fear this, but are apprehensive that 
with your unique independence and influence you can err in judgment. So 
strong is your appeal, they are concerned that major, irreversible error is 
possible even though your motives may be sound (ibid). 
 
 Levison’s advice was in part a response to the views being promoted by King’s 
other key advisor at this juncture, Bayard Rustin. Rustin, a pacifist, labour activist and 
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expert in the tactics of nonviolent direct action, believed that the civil rights movement 
was evolving into nothing short of a revolutionary human rights movement whose goal 
was now fundamental equality for America’s blacks. Bringing an end to racist Jim Crow 
laws in the Southern states did not end the de facto discrimination against blacks 
embedded in America’s socio-economic order. Rustin saw racism as above all an issue of 
class that could only be addressed by a fundamental reformation of America’s economic 
and social policies. Whereas Levison tried to work within the moderate tendencies of 
middle-class Americans, Rustin believed this moderation to be “immoral” (Rustin, 1965, 
p. 28) and the white majority’s acceptance of a fundamentally racist status quo something 
the evolving civil rights movement now had to challenge head-on through an emphasis 
on developing political power and a program of radical reforms. As Rustin wrote in 1965, 
“It is institutions – social, political and economic – which are the ultimate molders of 
collective sentiments. Let these institutions be reconstructed today, and let the ineluctable 
gradualism of history govern the formation of a new psychology” (ibid). 
While Levison emerged as King’s primary confidant and adviser by 1967, King’s 
“new radicalism” is clearly more in tune with Rustin’s thinking on race and class and the 
necessity of fundamental economic and social reforms. The result is a creative tension 
between Levison’s realpolitik pragmatism and King’s determined belief that a consensus 
of conscience could be built around the need for radical social change. As King came to 
see it, he had no choice but to try to use his influence to mould a national movement 
against war, racism and poverty – and key to this effort was a media strategy that 
emphasized his belief that these “giant triplets” were imperilling America’s survival. This 




We are going to Washington on the urgent business of reform before it is 
too late. We must have a de-escalation of the war in Vietnam and a massive 
escalation of the war against poverty and racism… It is time to re-order our 
national priorities. All those who speak of good will… now have the 
gravest responsibility to stand-up and act for social changes that are 
necessary to conquer racism in America. If we as a society fail, I fear that 
we will learn shortly that racism is a sickness unto death (SCLC, 1968/4/3). 
 
Any effort to assess how King and his Research Committee approached the 
inherent challenges of promoting his radicalizing agenda in the mainstream news media 
through 1967 until his murder on April 4, 1968, is made difficult by the fact there is very 
little documentary evidence of the discussions that went into the development of media 
strategy. As a result, this thesis is founded on evidence derived almost entirely from the 
transcripts of an FBI wiretap on the home phone of Stanley Levison. It also relies heavily 
on original documents from both King's papers and the records of his organization, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), housed at the Library and Archives 
of the King Center for Nonviolent Change in Atlanta, Georgia. More information on all 
these sources can be found in the Methodology section below and the appended notes on 
my approach to researching this study.  
 
Research Questions 
This thesis approached these original sources with two basic questions in mind: 
1) What did Martin Luther King, Jr. and his advisers see as the main challenges in terms 
of media coverage resulting from his opposition to the war and his economic justice 







Answering these questions requires an appreciation of the historical context in which 
King and his advisors were operating and the circumstances to which they were 
responding. Such a perspective reveals that Martin Luther King’s “new radicalism” was 
by no means out of place in 1967 and its harsh tone reflected the extreme and even 
desperate situation facing American society at this time. The following pages will serve 
to introduce the three main contextual elements that informed King’s outlook and 
strategy: Ghetto uprisings, Black Power, and white backlash. Before we get to this 
discussion, however, we will first turn to an introduction to King’s two main initiatives in 
this time period: The pursuit of peace in Vietnam and the Poor People’s Campaign.  
Vietnam 
The period between March 1965 and the start of 1967 saw America’s military 
involvement in Vietnam escalate into a full-scale if undeclared war involving almost 
400,000 American soldiers. In the spring of 1965, King – then the world’s newest and, at 
36, its youngest ever Nobel Peace Prize winner – began to assert what he believed was 
his moral responsibility as a Nobel laureate and a Christian minister to promote 
nonviolence in international affairs.  His opposition to the war in Vietnam proved 
profoundly divisive both within the civil rights movement and without, not least of all 
with President Lyndon B. Johnson's Administration. King’s position on the war was also 
roundly denounced by many of his traditional civil rights allies in the mainstream news 
media. In essence, King was accused of stepping outside the (accepted) bounds of his 
civil rights turf into foreign policy concerns that his critics alleged either did not mix with 
civil rights or were too complex for him to understand. By September 1965, the intensity 
of these combined political and media attacks against his calls for peace in Vietnam 
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forced King to withdraw from the peace debate out of concern that the attacks were 
damaging his civil rights leadership. King expressed this fear in a conference call with his 
advisors recorded by the FBI on September 12, 1965: “I have come to the conclusion that 
I can’t battle those forces that are out to defeat my influence,” he said. “I’m convinced 
that the press is being stacked against me on this position. I have gotten unkind editorials 
on what I said. The criticism that affects me more is the one that says I am power drunk 
and I feel I can do anything because I got the Nobel Prize and it went to my head, that I 
am stepping out of my bounds. The true motive of my statements is never revealed” (FBI, 
9/12/65, 5/0201). 
Despite his withdrawal from the nascent peace movement in 1965, King only 
grew more convinced that opposition to the war was fundamental on both moral and civil 
rights grounds. Behind its rhetoric of protecting freedom and democracy, King saw U.S. 
policy in Vietnam forcing poor to fight poor in the service of a corrupt military regime in 
South Vietnam and America’s overseas business interests. Furthermore, while economic 
discrimination against black Americans ensured their disproportionate representation 
among the conscripts in the front-lines and the casualty lists of Vietnam, King believed 
the deprivation facing their families and communities back home was only being 
deepened by the war’s diversion of funds and political will from the poverty-fighting 
programs that were central to President Johnson’s domestic “Great Society” agenda.1 As 
King stated in the speech that returned him to the fore of the antiwar movement on April 
                                               
1 The concept of the "Great Society" and its accompanying “War on Poverty” were central to Lyndon 
Johnson's 1964 Economic Opportunity Act. The Act put in place more than $1-billion in programs that 
aimed to reduce poverty and effectively end what the Johnson Administration perceived as cyclical 
disadvantages of poor education, inadequate housing, and un or underemployment passed from 
generation to generation of poverty-stricken Americans. Among other features, Johnson's War on 
Poverty included proposals for rebuilding America's slums, improved health and social services, a 
broader food stamps program, and higher minimum wage. 
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4, 1967: “I was increasingly compelled to see war as an enemy of the poor and attack it 
as such” (King, 1967, in The Lost Massey Lectures, 2003, p. 178). Such a position, 
however, did not make the editorial boards of the nation’s major newspapers and news 
magazines any more inclined toward accepting his renewed involvement in the peace 
movement. Their attacks on King’s antiwar views would prove especially cutting in the 
spring of 1967. These attacks, and efforts by King and his Research Committee to 
counter them, are the core interests of Chapter One. 
The Poor People’s Campaign 
 The fall of 1967 found America reeling from a summer of major rebellions in the ghettos 
of Newark, New Jersey, and Detroit, Michigan, and their deadly suppression by National 
Guard and U.S. army troops. With a reactionary Congress refusing to “reward riots” with 
the funding needed to address the desperate conditions behind the unrest, King 
announced plans to channel ghetto anger into a constructive, nonviolent direct action 
movement in Washington the following spring that became known as the Poor People's 
Campaign (PPC). Among King’s policy objectives for the PPC were government 
programs providing for a fundamental redistribution of America’s wealth including 
guaranteed jobs and, for those who could not work, a guaranteed annual income. King’s 
plan called for thousands of poor Americans of all races to descend on Washington and 
stage a massed "camp-in" in the shadow of the Washington Monument in order to 
dramatize the unemployment and deprivation that was sparking the rebellions in 
America’s ghettos. King believed that this public display of the destitution in which an 
estimated 40-million Americans lived would force the middle-class majority to see what 
author Michael Harrington had famously called “The Other America” and stimulate their 
vital support for the PPC’s goals. If Congress continued to resist this public outcry for 
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reforms, King threatened to escalate the Poor People's Campaign into massive civil 
disobedience targeting government operations. King’s assassination in Memphis on April 
4, 1968, came two weeks before the scheduled launch of the Poor People’s Campaign. 
Chapter Two looks at the strategic development of the campaign and the imposing media 
challenges King faced in his efforts to defend massive civil disobedience as an effective 
nonviolent solution to the fearsome cycle of summer uprisings in America’s inner-cities 
and their armed suppression by police and U.S. military. 
Ghetto Uprisings 
 As radical as King’s Poor People’s Campaign and the reforms it advocated may seem by 
the standards of today's United States, he was by no means alone in his thinking in 1968. 
His economic agenda responded to the widely held view that social and economic 
conditions in America’s ghettos were desperate and increasingly untenable and required 
massive federal investments to improve. Fuelling this belief in the necessity of radical 
anti-poverty measures was a wave of summer uprisings against police, white-owned 
property and businesses and other symbols of white authority and privilege in ghetto 
neighbourhoods across the United States. Starting in 1963, every summer through 1968 
saw the ghettos of major American cities erupt in anarchic spasms of arson and looting 
and their suppression by police backed in many cases by units of the National Guard and 
the U.S. army. The year 1967 would prove especially tumultuous, with a total of 164 
“civil disorders” in its first nine months, including major outbursts in Detroit and Newark 
in July that left a total of 66 people dead, most of them black civilians shot by military 
personnel, and hundreds more injured (National Advisory Commission on Civil 
Disorders, 1968, p. 6). They amounted to “the most widespread and destructive disorders 
in peacetime up to that date in American history” (Lentz, 1990, p.248) and produced talk 
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in Congress and the mainstream news media of an imminent “organized insurrection” 
(ibid: 266) led by armed black revolutionaries. Such exaggerations only fuelled the 
“terrible cycle” that Halberstam depicted above, of white America turning away from the 
desperation and legitimate grievances of its black compatriots. The National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, which President Johnson established in July 1967 to 
assess the causes of the unrest, described this reality in no uncertain terms: “Our nation is 
moving toward two societies, one black, one white – separate and unequal” (1). Media 
coverage of the unrest, the Commission concluded, was one of the chief causes of this 
widening chasm. Not only were their exaggerated reports feeding the “fear and 
apprehension of racial unrest and violence deeply rooted in American society” (365), but 
they were perpetuating basic ignorance and indifference in the white community about 
the root causes of the disorders and the measures required to stop them: 
By and large, news organizations have failed to communicate to both their black 
and white audiences a sense of the problems America faces and the sources of 
potential solutions. The media report and write from the standpoint of a white 
man’s world. The ills of the ghetto, the difficulties of life there, the Negro’s 
burning sense of grievance, are seldom conveyed. Slights and indignities are part 
of the Negro’s daily life, and many of them come from what he now calls “the 
white press” – a press that repeatedly, if unconsciously, reflects the biases, the 
paternalism, and the indifference of white America. This may be understandable, 
but it is not excusable in an institution that has the mission to inform and educate 
the whole of society (366). 
 
Black Power  
The ghetto uprisings lent new weight to an emerging challenge to the traditional, 
nonviolent civil rights movement and one that would heavily influence the news media’s 
coverage of King in his final sixteen months: Black Power. 
Popularized by Stokely Carmichael, the young, charismatic chairman of the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC or “Snick”), a key organization in 
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the Southern civil rights struggle, Black Power embraced the spirit of revolutionary 
nationalism and self-determination that was fuelling social movements worldwide. In an 
interview with the celebrated civil rights photographer and journalist, Gordon Parks, 
Carmichael said the Black Power ethos was essentially interested in developing black 
consciousness and political power: “Black Power doesn’t mean anti-white, violence, 
separatism or any other racist things the press says it means. It’s saying, ‘look, buddy, 
we’re not laying a vote on you unless you lay so many schools, hospitals, playgrounds 
and jobs on us’” (Parks, 1967, in Reporting Civil Rights, 2003, p.560). The media 
representation of Black Power to which Carmichael referred fed on the Malcolm X-
influenced rhetoric of black nationalism and armed self-defence that characterized early 
expressions of Black Power, along with its mockery of King’s love ethic and his 
emphasis on racial reconciliation. Mainstream news media coverage of Black Power 
often emphasized its “anger,” Carmichael’s “fiery” invective, and its slogan-cum-warning 
to white America “move on over, or we’ll move on over you.” As journalist Paul Good 
wrote of the first cries of “Black Power!” in June 1966, “It knifed into the moderate, the 
liberal white (and sometimes Negro mind), interpreted as both threat and insult, seeming 
to undo past efforts at understanding and raising the spectre of violent nights under 
bloody southern moons” (Good, 1966, in Reporting Civil Rights, p.496). By July 1966, 
the New York Times was claiming that Black Power had “shattered” the unified front of 
the nonviolent civil rights movement, pitting the movement’s older, more conservative 
organizations, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
(NAACP) and National Urban League, against the younger, more militant SNCC and the 




King was certainly no stranger to the revolutionary yearnings at the heart of Black 
Power. As he wrote in his last book, 1967's Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or 
Community?, “All over the world like a fever, freedom is spreading in the widest 
liberation movement in history. The great masses of people are determined to end the 
exploitation of their races and lands” (198). Though he was greatly troubled by the 
connotations of nationalism and black domination that he saw in the term Black Power, 
not to mention its advocates’ derogation of nonviolence, King sympathized with the 
impatience of its mostly young adherents and did not join the NAACP and the Urban 
League in their outright condemnation of the Black Power doctrine. King understood its 
roots in Carmichael and SNCC’s experiences trying to organize and register black voters 
in some of the most viciously racist regions of the Deep South. He saw the bitterness of 
Black Power as hopes hardened by “false promises... deferred dreams... acts of 
unpunished violence toward Negroes” (King, 1968, p. 30). King especially understood 
what Donald H. Smith described as the appeal of Carmichael and Black Power for the 
“dispossessed” youths of America’s ghettos: 
Stokely talks of black unity and black pride in an effort to counteract a system 
that made the Negro believe he is inferior… The message of Stokely is that 
black is beautiful, and that black people must form political and economic 
blocks to buy and vote in their interests. Most importantly, black people must 
take charge of their ghettos and determine their own destinies, and they must 
protect themselves and their own against a predatory society” (Smith, 1968, 
p.182). 
 
While King understood the psychological appeal of Black Power and even 
incorporated elements of it into his work promoting nonviolence in ghetto communities, 
he could not help but see Black Power as fundamentally “a slogan without a program” 
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(21). This lack of a firm program left the news media to surmise if not manipulate the 
meaning of Black Power and, as King wrote in Where Do We Go From Here, magnify 
and amplify its divisive effect within the civil rights movement. 
Every revolutionary movement has its peaks of united activity and its 
valleys of debate and internal confusion. [The Black Power] debate might 
well have been little more than a healthy internal difference of opinion, but 
the press loves the sensational and it could not allow the issue to remain 
within the private domain of the movement. In every drama there has to be 
an antagonist and protagonist, and if the antagonist is not there the press 
will find and build one (37). 
 
This media-created drama would prove especially challenging for King’s leadership 
through 1967 until his death on April 4, 1968.  
White backlash 
King saw at the heart of the ghetto uprisings and Black Power an intensifying and 
legitimate anger with America's fundamentally racist status quo.  A decade of civil rights 
ferment had produced a new sense of dignity and consciousness in the black community 
and fuelled the growing call for full equality for blacks in the economic and social 
opportunities enjoyed by white America. Full equality for black Americans, however, 
meant the white majority would have to surrender its traditional monopoly on privileges 
like employment, housing and education. The threat of such a reconfiguration of the 
status quo engendered the so-called “white backlash” against the rapidly progressing 
demands of the civil rights movement. To black leaders like King, however, the white 
backlash in 1967 was really an age-old response to racial progress in America. “[The 
white backlash] is the surfacing of old prejudices, hostilities and ambivalences that have 
always been there” (King, 1968, p.80). While white apologists sought to justify this 
backlash in 1967 as an understandable reflex to the violence of the ghetto uprisings and 
the media-inflated hostility of Black Power toward whites, King pointed to roots that ran 
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back to when “the black man landed in chains on the shores” of the United States. “The 
white backlash is an expression of the same vacillations, the same search for 
rationalizations, the same lack of commitment that have always characterized white 
America on the question of race” (81). In 1967, it was the inevitable counter-revolution to 
the achievements and progressive demands of the civil rights movement. However, unlike 
previous periods when white backlash resulted in renewed black submission to the status 
quo, in 1967 it met with a vigorous and widening sense of black pride and consciousness 
cemented by the civil rights struggle and encouraged by a new and dauntless generation 
of black leaders like King and Stokely Carmichael. 
  While the ghetto uprisings and Black Power erased some of the white guilt that 
King knew was essential to progress on equality for America's blacks, he believed the 
white backlash could not withstand a massive nonviolent dramatization of the economic 
effects of racism that played on their inherent contradiction of the American Creed and its 
core values of equality, freedom, justice and humanity. Key to this effort, King believed, 
was the support of white liberals, not least of all those populating the ranks of the 
mainstream news media. The media, after all, had played a central role in promoting the 
rights of black Americans in the first decade of the civil rights movement. By 1967, 
however, King saw the news media contributing to the growing sense of alienation in 
America’s black community: 
When Negroes looked for the second phase [of the civil rights movement], 
the realization of equality, they found that many of their white allies had 
quietly disappeared... The Negroes of America had taken the President, the 
press and the pulpit at their word when they spoke in broad terms about 
freedom and justice... The word was broken and the free running 
expectations of the Negro crashed into the stonewalls of white resistance. 
The result was havoc. Negroes felt cheated, especially in the North, while 
many whites felt that the Negroes had gained so much it was virtually 
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impudent and greedy to ask for more so soon  (4-5). 
 
Methodology 
 One of the key challenges to analyzing King’s media strategy is the fact that King and his 
advisors had a vested interest in not documenting their media strategy. As David Garrow 
wrote in his 1978 analysis of SCLC protest strategy, “at no point in any of his writings or 
public statements did King fully admit just how important news coverage was to the 
movement” (226).  This, he says, was due to the strategic belief that admitting any such 
dependence “would leave King and the SCLC open to the charge that they were seeking 
to manipulate the media” (ibid).  Such a charge, and the idea that King and the SCLC 
were “considerably more ‘calculating’ than they wanted to seem” (227), would have 
affected the civil rights movement’s image for being motivated primarily by moral and 
religious concerns, says Garrow. “The SCLC leadership quite likely presumed that any 
such acknowledgment would lend a somewhat negative hue to the movement’s image, 
and they quite wisely avoided any such self-inflicted wounds” (ibid). 
This presents a fascinating methodological dilemma: how does one go about 
researching a subject for which there is little if any documentary evidence? For answers, 
my research focused in part on King’s papers and those of his organization, the SCLC, at 
the archives of the King Centre for Nonviolent Change in Atlanta, Georgia. It should be 
noted here that Adam Fairclough expressed serious doubts about the utility of this line of 
research. As he put it, “there are no smoking guns in terms of media strategy in the SCLC 
papers” (interview with author: March 14, 2011). However, given the fact Fairclough’s 
research interest was not media strategy, I gambled that there was a reasonable chance 
that he had passed over documents that could still be of value to my research interests. 
This suspicion was supported by my preliminary examination of SCLC-related archival 
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material at the New York Public Library in May 2011, which turned up useful evidence of 
organizational media strategy. I went ahead with my visit to the archives of the King 
Center, where I spent eight working days between September 12 and September 21, 2011. 
My interview with Adam Fairclough revealed that media strategy between 1965 
and King’s assassination on April 4, 1968, was mainly developed orally, over the phone 
for the most part, in conversations between King, Stanley Levison and other members of 
SCLC’s Research Committee. Fairclough told me this was the “operating procedure” 
with regard to positioning King in the media, whether it was discussing the wording of a 
speech, a statement or a press release. 
[King] was very conscious about consulting with colleagues about getting the 
wording just right. Often he would get four or five people on the line in a 
conference call and they would hash out what position they were going to 
take. Often it was very fine nuances – that became increasingly important. 
For example, how to respond to ’Black Power.’ They would have very long 
conversations about whether they should come out and attack it, what their 
position should be. And, of course, that was with an eye toward the media 
(ibid). 
  
FBI wiretap transcripts 
Transcripts for many of these conversations are available to researchers thanks to a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation wiretap on Stanley Levison’s home phone, which was 
released to the public in the early 1980s as a result of David Garrow’s research. As 
Garrow revealed, the FBI justified the wiretap as a matter of national security, citing 
Levison’s past involvement with the American Communist Party as evidence that King 
was potentially being advised and influenced by a covert Communist operative. 
Information gleaned from the wiretaps kept both the administrations of John F. Kennedy 
and Lyndon B. Johnson abreast of King’s every move for almost six years, between 1962 
until his murder on April 4, 1968. 
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I was able to examine microfilm copies of these transcripts at the New York 
Public Library on a visit to Manhattan in May 2011, and then again via Inter-Library 
Loan at Concordia University’s library in Montreal. While the quality of the 
transcriptions is inconsistent and seems to vary according to the FBI employee who was 
transcribing that day’s conversations, they nonetheless provide a wealth of detail and 
insight on media strategy. The documents themselves range from verbatim transcripts of 
conversations to paraphrased summaries. Despite numerous typos, moments of obvious 
FBI subjectivity and the odd illegible passage, the transcripts on the whole capture the 
spirit of the discussions and the anxieties and complexities of the issues at hand. King’s 
confidence in the older Levison is absolute and Levison speaks with King as a protective 
friend and mentor, providing him with the strategic advice and perspective afforded by 
Levison’s extensive experience in America's left wing movements. As Garrow notes in 
the introduction to the guide to the microform transcripts, “since Levison was one of the 
few individuals to whom King could truly speak his mind – as well as voice occasional 
doubts and despair over the progress of the civil rights movement – these files shed light 
not only on King’s many civil rights activities and his involvement in related causes, but 
on his personal feelings toward and reactions to the events that marked the last six years 
of his life” (Garrow, 1987: v).  
A word on news sources 
While this thesis is primarily interested in the response by King and his advisers to news 
coverage in his last sixteen months, it cannot avoid looking at the coverage itself. Doing 
so also provides a compelling point – counterpoint format that structures and drives the 
narrative in the pages that follow. 
I have opted to limit my research of news coverage primarily to the New York 
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Times and the Washington Post for one key reason: the conversations between King and 
his advisers, and with Levison in particular, that deal with media coverage reveal a 
primary preoccupation with King’s coverage in the New York Times, which was widely 
regarded as the era’s de facto newspaper of record for white, liberal, middle-class 
America. The Washington Post ranked a distant second. The principal news magazines of 
the era – Time, Newsweek and the U.S. News and World Report – rarely factor into the 
conversations. The only other medium whose coverage is discussed at any length is 
television. However, there only exists haphazard archived news programming prior to 
August 1968, when CBS introduced a more systematic approach to archiving its 
newscasts. That said, my research in the archives of the King Center in Atlanta did reveal 
correspondence from producers and typed transcripts of King’s appearances on broadcast 
current affairs and talk shows during the period, including CBS’s Face The Nation, the 
syndicated Merv Griffin Show and NBC’s The Tonight Show and The Arlene Francis 
Show.  
Media strategy: Vietnam 
Based on the research outlined above, Chapter One of this study posits that King’s 
decision to return to the peace debate in 1967 led to the development of a media relations 
strategy featuring three key components: 1) Establish whom you are with; 2) Retain your 
support, move them along; and 3) Assert the militant middle to neutralize criticism and 
radical optics. The first element stemmed from Levison’s conviction that King’s priority 
should be developing the crisis over Vietnam within America’s political Establishment by 
building alliances with prominent dissident doves like Senators Robert F. Kennedy and J. 
William Fulbright. Levison was keen to avoid a repeat of what happened to King in 1965, 
when he came out alone on peace and was quickly isolated and overwhelmed by his 
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opponents. Appearing shoulder to shoulder with Senators Kennedy, Fulbright and others, 
Levison believed, would position King so that an attack on him became “an attack on a 
lot of other powerful people” (FBI, 4/12/1967, 7/0047). Speaking alongside such men, 
Levison believed, would also amplify King’s views on the war and give them greater 
resonance in Washington and throughout the country. 
At the same time, both Levison and especially King were keenly aware of the need 
to retain King’s support within his primary constituency – the black community – and 
move them along to more outspoken opposition to the war. Retaining King’s base meant 
his involvement in the peace movement could not supplant his primary identification 
with the civil rights movement, which both he and Levison knew was the basis of his 
authority and national leadership. They also both understood that King’s leadership on 
civil rights was the source of his standing with the news media and, as they learned in 
1965, this standing did not transfer automatically to issues considered outside the civil 
rights box, and to the war in Vietnam least of all. King believed, however, that the war 
and civil rights were inextricably linked and used his influence to develop them as such 
and mobilize the black community against the war. 
The “militant middle” position that was key to King’s civil rights leadership also 
proved an effective position from which to promote peace in Vietnam and generate the 
kind of critical tension over the war that Washington could not ignore. King used his 
position between those passively concerned about the war and the peace movement’s 
more radical, New Left wing to activate the participation of the moderate masses in peace 
activities and bring the movement’s radicals around to a more pragmatic approach to 
ending the war. And he did so to great effect, with Levison noting in May 1967 that the 
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response King was getting was even greater than the “best point of the civil rights 
movement” (FBI, 5/16/1967, 7/0214). Such a position, however, also left King 
vulnerable to efforts by both the peace movement’s more radical elements to push him 
toward more extreme opposition to the war and by opponents in the media eager to 
portray him keeping such radical company. For this reason, Levison believed King’s 
efforts to organize from the militant middle had to be accompanied by developing 
alliances with the influential doves of America’s political establishment and retaining his 
base in civil rights. 
Media Strategy and the Poor People’s Campaign 
King’s efforts to bring public attention to the intolerable conditions of America’s ghettos 
took new and urgent expression following deadly uprisings in Newark, New Jersey, and 
Detroit, Michigan, in July 1967. These efforts saw King adapt his militant middle 
positioning toward winning public support for immediate federal initiatives to end 
poverty through, among other measures, full-employment and a guaranteed income. As 
he told journalists in October 1967, “I think we’ve got to find a kind of middle road 
between riots and timid supplications for justice” (King Papers, 1967/10/23, p.4). King's 
Poor People's Campaign would thus serve two vital purposes: channel the anger that was 
fuelling the “self-defeating” ghetto violence into a constructive and creative force; and 
bring the poverty crisis to the fore of public consciousness in order to get national 
opinion working toward federal job creation initiatives and other economic rights for 
America’s poor. 
As Garrow noted in his 1978 analysis of SCLC’s protest strategy, “publicity in the 
form of news coverage is essential to the socialization of a conflict,” which in turn is 
crucial to the “stimulation of government action” on the issue being protested (234). With 
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news media representatives already focused on the evolving tone and character of his 
leadership, King used this media attention to socialize the moral implications of the war 
and poverty in an effort to broaden popular support for redirecting America’s national 
priorities from war and profit toward an emphasis on economic rights and a better quality 
of life for all her citizens. 
SCLC’s media strategy around the Poor People’s Campaign continued this 
emphasis. Chapter Two examines the three key elements to this strategy, as determined 
through the FBI transcripts and original documents from both King's archives and the 
records of the SCLC: 1) Downplay the disruptive and emphasize the constructive; 2) 
Emphasize the urgency that justifies disruption; and 3) Assert King’s leadership. 
King’s belief in the necessity of a massive federal job creation program became 
clear in the days immediately following the ghetto rebellion in Newark, New Jersey, on 
July 19.  Levison thought that King’s best approach would be to put forward “something 
constructive, some programs that may have a dramatic quality” (FBI, 7/19/1967, 7/0426). 
From this conversation emerged the idea of a massive federal employment program along 
the lines of the Works Progress Administration created under President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in 1935 to provide jobs for Americans put out of work by the Great 
Depression. The outbreak of unrest in Detroit on July 24, 1967, gave new and urgent 
impetus to King’s call for jobs, with Levison going so far as to draft a statement for him 
that said “If our government cannot create jobs, it cannot govern” (FBI, 7/24/67, 7/0442). 
This combined assertion of constructive job creation proposals and unguarded 
condemnation of Congressional inaction became central to SCLC’s media messaging 
around the Poor People’s Campaign in the months that followed. 
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The drama inherent to King’s job creation initiative was enhanced by the PPC’s 
dramatic threat of mass civil disobedience, which left King facing two major media 
challenges: 1) Reassure wary middle class whites and blacks that the potential dislocation 
of government operations was a legitimate and necessary tactic; and 2) counter the news 
media’s preoccupation with its potential for turning violent and sparking riots in the heart 
of Washington. King approached these challenges by turning the media’s frame on its 
head and promoting the PPC and its objectives of jobs and income as the solutions to the 
unemployment and economic deprivation that were provoking unrest across America. 
Bringing thousands to camp-in in Washington and, if necessary, engage in mass acts of 
civil disobedience was made necessary by the refusal of Congress to take the initiative to 
alleviate the frustrations and miseries causing the ghetto uprisings. As King told 
journalists in October 1967, “We have to do something to get national pressure, national 
opinion working toward it and I think you’ve got to have some massive act of 
nonviolence to do this... I think the civil rights movement has a responsibility to bring 
about the pressure and the power so that Congress can no longer elude our demands” 
(King Papers, 1967/10/23, p.3). 
With the media questioning King’s ability to maintain nonviolent discipline among 
rebellious, Black Power-inspired ghetto youth in Washington, King and Levison also 
became increasingly preoccupied with getting positive media coverage that highlighted 
King’s influence in America’s black community, including his herculean efforts 
organizing black voters in Cleveland’s mayoral election in the fall of 1967.  As Levison 
counselled King, “You have to fight for recognition, not out of immodesty but out of 
necessity” (FBI, 10/9/67, 7/0662). As media scrutiny of preparations for the Poor 
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People’s Campaign mounted, the pressure found King and Levison becoming more 
preoccupied with avoiding mistakes that could be used to discredit the campaign and, by 
extension, King’s leadership. As Levison observed, “there isn’t any margin for having it 
go wrong, all the publicity will be on the period of floundering” (FBI, 3/23/68, 8/0242). 
Five days after this remark, on March 28, 1968, the outbreak of violence on a King-led 
march in Memphis resulted in just such a situation. With the media using the violence to 
question King’s influence and his ability to bring off the Poor People’s Campaign 
peacefully, Levison and the SCLC staff united to convince a stricken and doubtful King 
to continue. The SCLC stated its response to the negative publicity about its leader in a 
press release issued April 1, 1968, three days before King’s murder: “The nonviolent 
movement will not be intimidated by violence. And we will not be stopped by those in 
positions of power who have failed to deal with poverty and racism” (SCLC, 1968/4/1, 
p.1). 
 Behind the media strategies for Vietnam and the Poor People's Campaign was 
King and Levison's shared belief that elements in the news media were actively working 
to oppose King and undermine his influence in the last sixteen months of his life. Despite 
this concern, King knew he needed media coverage in order to popularize his evolving 
vision for America and its priorities of international peace and a radical redistribution of 
America's wealth. This dichotomy is a central preoccupation of the study that follows. As 
King and his advisors knew well, the mainstream news media are essential tools in the 
struggle to alter the status quo that these very media tend to embrace. As we explore in 
more detail in the concluding chapter, King's success in this regard was founded on his 
skill at recognizing and exploiting emerging ideological tensions in American society, 
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tensions to which journalists were by no means immune. King sought and used the news 
media's heightened interest in his “new radicalism” to develop the fractured ideological 
consensus on the Vietnam war and the treatment of America's poor into a national crisis 
of conscience. By inserting his concerns for the moral implications of both war and 
poverty into the national mainstream via the national, mainstream news media, King 
worked to bring the legitimacy of the status quo into popular doubt and realize a radical 
reorientation of America's priorities away from militarism and winner-take-all capitalism 



















AIN’T GONNA STUDY WAR NO MORE 
 
Napalm, and its more horrible companion, white phosphorus, liquidize young 
flesh and carve it into grotesque forms. The little figures are afterward often 
scarcely human in appearance, and one cannot be confronted with the 
monstrous effects of burning without being totally shaken. Perhaps it was due 
to a previous lack of direct contact with war, but I never left the tiny victims 
without losing composure. The initial urge to reach out and soothe the hurt 
was restrained by fear that the ash-like skin would crumble in my fingers. 
(William Pepper in Ramparts, January 1967, p. 55) 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s decision to renew his public condemnation of U.S. policy in 
Vietnam was influenced by a photo essay and accompanying article entitled “The 
Children of Vietnam” in the January 1967 issue of Ramparts magazine. The article 
chronicled the experiences of author William F. Pepper during a six-week fact finding 
mission in orphanages and hospitals around South Vietnam’s conflict zones. King was 
left especially shaken by the accompanying photos detailing the horrific effects of 
American weaponry, and in particular napalm, on Vietnamese children. At an SCLC staff 
retreat five months later, King described the effect of “The Children of Vietnam:” 
[A]fter reading that article I said to myself, ’Never again will I be silent on 
an issue that is destroying the soul of our nation and destroying thousands 
and thousands of little children in Vietnam. I thought about the criticism. I 
thought about the abuse. I thought people were mean when we stood up on 
civil rights. But they threaten me a little more now when we go into a city. 
The security is greater now, because the threats have increased. I thought 
about all that. So I was prepared for everything that came. And I decided 
that I couldn’t be silent (King Papers, 5/29/1967). 
 
King’s return to the public debate over the war in Vietnam in 1967 brought to an 
end a frustrating 15 month period of keeping his public comments on the conflict to a 
cautious minimum. This period of restraint was the result of King’s initial public forays 
against the war between March and September 1965 and the hostile response that met his 
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pleas for peace in both Washington and the news media, with the possible exception of 
the New York Times. King’s forced withdrawal from the peace debate as a result of such 
intense opposition was a bitter yet formative experience. Most troubling to him was the 
fact that much of the opposition aroused by his peace proposals accused him of arrogance 
for believing that he had the authority or even right to address issues of foreign policy. 
According to David Halberstam, this response “stunned” (p. 584) King, who went into 
the peace debate at the height of his influence as the world’s newest and, at 36, youngest 
ever Nobel Peace Prize winner. Adding to this prestige was King’s media-fed status as a 
national hero for his leadership of the SCLC’s dramatic voting rights campaign in Selma, 
Alabama, in early 1965 and the consequent signing of the Voting Rights Act into law by 
President Johnson five months later. Given such achievements, the widespread 
condemnation and paternalistic derision that greeted his pronouncements on peace left 
King shocked and deeply troubled by the implications of the attacks. “They told me I 
wasn’t an expert in foreign affairs, and they were all experts,” King told Halberstam 
about his experiences in 1965. “I knew only civil rights and I should stick to that” (ibid). 
The attitude of editorialists and commentators in America’s major news media 
would change little with the renewal of King’s public pronouncements against the war in 
1967. King’s former advisor, Bayard Rustin, saw in the news media’s attacks on King’s 
pro-peace position in early 1967 the racist paternalism that had long defined white 
America’s attitude toward its black citizens: 
One of the undertones of the attacks in the white press on Dr. Martin 
Luther King’s recent statements on Vietnam may well reveal that America 
really does not believe that Negroes, as citizens, have yet to come of age. 
Like children, we should be seen and not heard. I say this because 
criticism of Dr. King was not limited to an evaluation of his proposals and 
his strategy for ending the war. It was, by and large, an attack on his right 
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to debate, or even discuss, Vietnam. In substance, many editorials seemed 
to be asking, ‘what is Dr. King doing discussing Vietnam?’ or ‘Who gave 
him the right to make proposals about our (meaning white America’s) 
foreign policy?’ (Rustin, 1967, p.169). 
 
Riverside 
The news media’s condemnation of King’s antiwar position reached fever pitch in the 
wake of his address to an overflow crowd of more than 3,000 people at Riverside Church 
in Manhattan’s Upper Westside on the evening of April 4, 1967. Over the course of its 55 
minutes, King detailed the reasons behind his decision to renew his public opposition to 
the war in no uncertain terms. King said his conscience left him no other choice than to 
speak out that night and concurred with a recent statement by the evening’s sponsoring 
organization, Clergy And Layman Concerned About Vietnam, which began “A time 
comes when silence is betrayal” – “And that time has come to us in relation to Vietnam,” 
King said (King, 1967, para. 2). Framing his speech as a “passionate plea to my beloved 
nation” (ibid, para.7), King asserted his right and even patriotic duty to freely express his 
views on the war. While this was “often a vocation of agony,” it was also a reason to 
rejoice, “for surely this is the first time in our nation’s history that a significant number of 
its religious leaders have chosen to move beyond the prophesying of smooth patriotism to 
the high grounds of firm dissent based upon the mandates of conscience and the reading 
of history” (ibid: para. 4). This calling was also commissioned of him by his Nobel Peace 
Prize and his duties as a minister of Jesus Christ, both of which took him “beyond 
national allegiances” and “beyond the calling of race or nation or creed” (ibid, para.15). 
“The Good News,” King said, “was meant for all men – for communist and capitalist, for 
their children and ours, for black and for white, for revolutionary and conservative” 
(ibid). King admitted to being “greatly saddened” by those criticizing his pleas for peace, 
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for their accusations only confirmed that they “have not really known me, my 
commitment or my calling. Indeed, their questions suggest they do not really know the 
world in which they live” (ibid, para.5). 
When they weren’t standing to applaud, the congregants at Riverside listened 
closely as King decried the war’s “cruel manipulation of the poor” (ibid, para.10) and 
especially poor black Americans, whom he said were being sent “to fight and die in 
extraordinarily high proportions relative to the rest of population” (ibid). King 
underscored the inherent hypocrisy of “taking the black young men who had been 
crippled by our society and sending them eight thousand miles away to guarantee 
liberties in Southeast Asia which they had not found in Southwest Georgia and East 
Harlem”(ibid). He pointed to the futility of calling on the “desperate, rejected, angry 
young men” in America’s ghettos to put down their weapons and embrace nonviolence 
when America was employing “massive doses of violence to solve her problems” in 
Vietnam (ibid, para.11). “I knew I could never again raise my voice against the violence 
of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first spoken clearly to the greatest 
purveyor of violence in the world today – my own government,” King said (ibid). 
This last claim, and King’s excoriating depictions of the cruelties and deceit of U.S. 
policy through the eyes of Vietnamese peasants, the National Liberation Front (Vietcong), 
and even North Vietnamese leader, Ho Chi Minh, provoked a flurry of scathing editorials 
in the mainstream news media including the New York Times and the Washington Post. 
On April 6, a Washington Post editorial entitled simply “A Tragedy” lambasted King’s 
Riverside address, describing it as both “filled with bitter and damaging allegations and 
inferences the he did not and could not document” and “sheer inventions of unsupported 
 31 
 
fantasy” (p. A20). The Post refuted King’s claim regarding the unjust proportion of black 
American casualties in Vietnam and attributed it instead to “higher Negro enlistment for 
elite corps and the higher rate of Negro re-enlistment” and also to “the zeal and courage 
of Negro soldiers” whose contributions were for the first time “not limited to work 
battalions” (ibid). The Post did, however, acknowledge as an aside that limited “civil 
employment opportunities” available to young black men left them few options other 
than re-enlistment. However, noting the Johnson Administration’s record on poverty 
programs and civil rights legislation, the Post concluded with the contention that King’s 
Riverside speech did 
a grave injury to those who are his natural allies in a great struggle to 
remove ancient abuses from our public life; and he has done an even graver 
injury to himself. Many who have listened to him with respect will never 
again accord him the same confidence. He has diminished his usefulness to 
his cause, to his country and to his people. And that is a great tragedy (ibid). 
 
The New York Times followed the next day with a lead editorial entitled “Dr. 
King’s Error” (p. 36)1. The war and equality for black Americans were “two public 
concerns that are distinct and separate,” the Times wrote, “by drawing them together, Dr. 
King does a disservice” that “could very well be disastrous for both causes” (ibid). The 
civil rights movement’s shifting focus to the more advanced and difficult goals of jobs, 
open-housing and better education required King’s “full leadership, dedication and moral 
inspiration” and Vietnam was a “wasteful and self-defeating” distraction (ibid). The 
Times also refuted King’s belief that the conflict in Vietnam was slowing the war on 
poverty in America. Defeating poverty was “at best the task of a generation” that faced 
deeply-rooted domestic obstacles including “local political machines, the skepticism of 
conservatives in Congress and the intractability of slum mores and habits” (ibid). Peace 
                                               
1
 See Appendix B, p. 166 for the full text of the “Dr. King’s Error” 
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would not change this reality, nor would it “automatically lead to a sharp increase in 
funds” (ibid). The Times saved its harshest criticism for the end by describing as 
“slander” King’s equating of the U.S. military’s testing of new weapons on the 
battlefields of Vietnam with Nazi medical experiments on death camp inmates (ibid). 
King’s obligation to “explore the ethical implications of the war in Vietnam” as a 
Christian minister, the Times concluded, was equalled by his responsibility as “one of the 
most respected leaders of the civil rights movement... to direct that movement’s efforts in 
the most constructive and relevant way” (ibid). Like racism, there were no “simple or 
easy answers to the war in Vietnam.” Both were “hard, complex” issues whose linking 
could only lead to “deeper confusion” (ibid).   
The New York Times 
This editorial assertion by the New York Times that the war in Vietnam and the civil rights 
struggle were distinct and separate issues is contradicted by former Times staff writer, 
Gay Talese, who wrote that early 1967 found the newspaper preoccupied by one major 
concern: “the American crisis over Vietnam and the Negro” (1968, 465). These were not 
“distinct and separate” crises, but an all-encompassing, inter-connected crisis of national 
significance. While King had long been front page news in the Times on the ‘Negro’ half 
of this issue, his return to the peace debate assured the Times’ undivided attention. In the 
three month period between February 25, when King gave his first public speech against 
the war in Los Angeles, and May 30, King’s antiwar activities were either the subject of 
or mentioned in at least 53 articles in the New York Times, including the lead editorial 
described above and 15 front page stories. 
A look at the total coverage of King’s antiwar stand in the New York Times during 
this three month period suggests that he was contending with an overall unfavourable 
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frame, a conclusion that may seem obvious from its editorial response to his Riverside 
speech. However, the New York Times had a strict policy dictating the total separation of 
its news and editorial departments. This policy ensured that editorial positions did not 
influence news coverage, and vice versa. This was further assured by a firewall of 
professional pride that saw this separation on terms equal to that of church and state. 
Harrison Salisbury, an executive editor at the New York Times during this period, went so 
far as to write, “If, as occasionally happened, there was concordance of editorial 
comment and a correspondent’s dispatch, the chances were that it was accidental and that 
neither of the great fiefdoms of the Times, the news department or the editorial, was 
aware of it. If they were aware they probably were made vaguely uneasy” (Salisbury, 
1980, p. 43-4). Therefore, the Times’ editorial condemnation of King’s opposition to the 
war cannot necessarily be seen as representative of the overall tone of the paper’s 
coverage of King’s antiwar activities. It also cannot be overlooked that, despite the 
unfavourable frame for his peace stand, King’s views on Vietnam did often benefit from 
fair coverage in the paper’s news section, notably from reporters like John Herbers. 
The Times’ interest in King’s peace stand escalated noticeably on April 2, when its 
popular Sunday edition lent itself to both a full-page verbatim transcript of a Herbers 
interview with King that started on the front page and an abridged version of King’s 
address to a Chicago peace rally on its editorial pages. Such seemingly generous 
coverage of King’s antiwar views was not without its frame, however. This was evident 
in the desk-written front page headline and introduction to the Herbers interview that 
played-up to the point of exaggerating King’s “weighing” of civil disobedience as a tactic 
to protest the war. This King-as-troublemaker frame was made all the more ethically 
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suspect by the fact the question that elicited King’s comments on civil disobedience was 
clearly leading and framed to get the response it did: “If the war continues and worsens 
despite peaceful demonstrations against it in this country, do you think the peace 
movement should engage in civil disobedience of the kind the civil rights movement has 
used with some success in the past?” King’s response to Herbers was above all cautious 
and non-committal: “I have not yet gone that far. But I wouldn’t say it won’t be 
necessary. It depends on developments over the next few months... If our nation insists on 
escalating the war and if we don’t see any changes it may be necessary to engage in civil 
disobedience to further arouse the conscience of the nation and make it clear we feel this 
is hurting our country” (Herbers, 1967, p.76). 
The Times’ treatment of King was symbolic of an organization struggling with its 
own deep internal divisions over the war. The leading voices among the staffers opposed 
to U.S. policy in Vietnam by 1967 were, for the most part, the very correspondents whose 
names had become synonymous with the war. One of them, Neil Sheehan, put his 
thoughts to paper in a New York Times Magazine article in the fall of 1966, entitled “A 
Correspondent Who Has Reported on Vietnam Since 1962 Sums Up: Not a Dove, But No 
Longer A Hawk” (Sheehan, 1966, p.27). In words reminiscent of those King would later 
express at Riverside Church, Sheehan wrote: 
For its own strategic and political ends, the United States is thus protecting a 
non-Communist Vietnamese social structure that cannot defend itself and 
that perhaps does not deserve to be defended. Our responsibility for 
prolonging what is essentially a civil conflict may be one of the major 
reasons for the considerable amount of confusion, guilt and soul-searching 
among Americans over the Vietnam war... I can only conclude that the 
Vietnamese will die more willingly for a regime which, though Communist, 
is at least genuinely Vietnamese and offers them hope of improving their 
lives, than for one which is committed to the galling status quo and is the 




Harrison Salisbury was another. Just two months before King returned to take his 
place, Salisbury himself was at the vortex of the public debate on Vietnam as the first 
American journalist to report from North Vietnam in December 1966. As Talese wrote, 
his stories “landed like bombs on Washington” (1969, p.446). Salisbury’s accounts of 
civilian areas in Hanoi and Namdinh devastated by U.S. air strikes forced American 
officials to admit that U.S. warplanes had indeed missed their military targets and hit 
civilian neighbourhoods, a fact they had long denied. Ironically, much of the resulting 
criticisms that Salisbury faced –  that he was “politically naive,” that he was being 
“duped by the Communists,” that he did not “properly attribute” his sources (ibid, p.448) 
–  were almost word for word the same accusations levelled at King by his critics, 
including the editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post. Yet a Times 
editorial defended Salisbury, who returned to a hero’s welcome from his colleagues. As 
Talese wrote, “His stories had gotten a fantastic reaction around the nation and the world, 
and the criticism of his reporting, so very trivial in view of the achievement, was now 
forgotten within the Times” (449). 
The New York Times’ editorial backing of Salisbury and its criticism of King 
reflected what Talese described as the paper’s “never entirely predictable” tone on 
Vietnam (444), and such dissonance resulted in equally discordant assessments of the 
Times’ position on the war. While insiders like Salisbury asserted that his paper’s 
“increasingly strong stand” against the war from early 1965 onwards “heartened those 
voices... that began to speak out against Vietnam”(46), journalist Paul Good, writing in 
The Nation on May 1, 1967, saw the Times’ rebuke of King’s efforts to join those very 
voices as the culmination of an “internal struggle on the paper” that was producing the 
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“subtle but sure erosion... in the Times’ once outspoken censure of America’s Vietnamese 
role” (Good, 1967, p. 551).  
“A frustrating and very lonesome road”  
King’s conversations with Stanley Levison from late March through April 1967 reveal 
that both were more inclined toward Paul Good’s take on the editorial position of the New 
York Times on Vietnam. Levison and King sensed the paper’s cooling support for King in 
its March 24 edition, which ran front-page coverage of the press conference at which 
King announced his intentions to resume his opposition to the war. Levison took special 
note of the fact the article was framed on the front page within a larger John Herbers 
report on the new black Republican Senator for Massachusetts, Edward J. Brooke, 
switching to support the war. Brooke, whose election in November 1966 made him 
America’s first black Senator elected by popular vote, had previously advocated for 
negotiations and the de-escalation of U.S. military action until a visit to Southeast Asia 
convinced him otherwise. The positioning of both stories on the front page
1
 clearly put 
Brooke in opposition to King, a fact reinforced by reporter John Herbers’ observation that 
Brooke’s support for the war “moved him away from many civil rights leaders who 
contend that the war against nonwhites is unjustified and draining off resources needed to 
attack social ills, particularly those afflicting the American Negro” (Herbers, 1967/3/24, 
p. 1). The report on King’s press conference served to deepen this contrast with details 
like “Dr. King said disenchantment over the war, ‘intolerable conditions’ in the slums and 
white backlash against civil rights programs were creating an atmosphere for turmoil” 
("Dr. King to Press Antiwar Stand", 1967, p.1). 
Levison was less concerned by the content of these reports, which were by no 
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means unfavourable to King, than he was with the overall effect of their layout on the 
front page. Levison took the placement of the report on King’s renewed opposition to the 
war within the dominant frame of Brooke’s decision to support it as an indication that the 
New York Times was literally framing Brooke as the responsible alternative over an 
increasingly radical and unpredictable King. Levison told King “I think I mentioned to 
you that after [Brooke] was elected they would develop him into the acceptable leader 
and just the position of the two articles, that is what they are doing. He is moving to the 
right on the war and you are moving in the other direction” (FBI, 3/25/67, 6/0870). The 
placement of reports on King’s antiwar activities in the New York Times frequently served 
to perpetuate King and Levison’s shared view that the paper was trying to isolate King 
and undermine his leadership in the black community. Both also saw editorial opposition 
to King’s views expressed in how a story was edited or the fact stories were written in a 
way that subordinated King’s response to his opponents in favour of their accusations. 
Evidence of this latter belief in the April 13 edition of New York Times, which again pitted 
King against a prominent member of America’s black Establishment, led an exasperated 
Levison to exclaim, “It’s not only rotten journalism, it’s rotten ethics because this is not a 
mistake... The war is affecting everything and the copy editor or rewrite man who does 
those stories doesn’t like your position. And you are running into this everyplace” (FBI, 
4/13/67, 7/0060). 
This perceived editorial campaign against King by the Times and other news 
media organizations was representative of Levison’s observation that the news media 
were starting to believe that he was “not so safe” anymore. As he told King, “You’re not 
just the man who’s saying you must love them – they’re getting the other part of the 
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message, [that] there are certain sacrifices involved” (FBI, 3/25/67, 6/0870). King’s 
increasing emphasis on dramatic nonviolent confrontations in pursuit of civil rights gains 
like open-housing in Chicago was combining with his plain-spoken views on government 
policies on Vietnam and ghetto poverty to produce what Levison described as “something 
of a metamorphosis” in him that the news media were picking up on: 
They can’t quite place you as conveniently as they used to be able to. And I 
think you’ll be getting a lot of attention, not all of it necessarily favorable. 
You’ll command attention, because they’ll know where to put most of the 
[black] leadership... They know where to put Stokely as well as they know 
where to put Whitney Young [of the National Urban League]. But I think 
they don’t know quite where to put you. And until they do, they’ve got to 
keep watching you” (ibid). 
 
Yet not all media were granting King extra attention, as King’s literary agent, Joan 
Daves, discovered while trying to place advanced chapters from his latest book, Where 
Do We Go From Here: Community or Chaos?, in national magazines. According to 
Levison, initial interest in the chapters from senior editors at Saturday Review and Look 
magazines was later overruled by the magazines’ publishers. Levison told King that 
Norman Cousins, publisher of Saturday Review, had allegedly told his editors that “he 
didn’t want to run anything of yours because the kind of position you’ve taken on peace 
is so wrong that in six months your name is going to be mud. And therefore it’s not worth 
running anything by you” (ibid). King, who was already aware of the incident, told 
Levison that SCLC Executive Director, Andy Young, had followed up with Cousins to 
clarify King’s motivations for speaking out on peace. According to King, Cousins said he 
understood King’s position but was more concerned that the peace movement was 
evolving into a “Hate America” campaign that was going to do “more harm than good; 
that they would bring about a climate that would really call for more escalation than de-
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escalation” (ibid). According to Levison, Daves encountered a similar situation at Look, 
where publisher Gardner “Mike” Cowles allegedly ordered interested editors to decline 
the new material from King (ibid). 
In an April 12 conversation with Levison, as public criticisms of his Riverside 
address reached their nerve-wracking climax, King acknowledged “the agony the ones 
who oppose [the war] go through... You take a stand against it and you get all these 
people coming out against you. It is a frustrating and very lonesome road that you have to 
go” (FBI, 4/12/67, 7/0047). And yet the perspective afforded by 12 years at the forefront 
of the civil rights struggle also taught King to see that determined opposition from 
“middle class Negroes and the power structure in the white community” (ibid), including 
the news media, was all part of the bruising process of “remolding a recalcitrant status 
quo” (King, 1968, p. 220), be it on race or war. Further buttressing King against the 
attacks of his opponents was the conviction that his position on the war was morally 
right. In response to Levison’s observation that he was “not so safe” in the eyes of the 
media and would likely be coming into unfavourable coverage, King confided: 
[A]t times you have to do things to satisfy your conscience and they are 
altogether unrealistic or wrong tactically but you feel better. I just know on 
the war I will get a lot of criticism and I know I can hurt SCLC but I feel 
better and I think that is the most important thing because if I lose the fight 
SCLC will die anyway. But if I have a feeling I am right, I can make enough 
contacts to raise the money. And I feel that we are so wrong in this situation 
that I can no longer be cautious about this matter. I feel so deep in my heart 
that we are so wrong in this country and the time has come for a real 
prophecy, and I am willing to go that road. (FBI, 3/25/67, 6/0870) 
 
While confident that King’s position on the war would not greatly affect the 
public’s financial support for SCLC, Levison stressed that tactical considerations were 
essential in order to both maximize King’s influence in the peace debate and protect him 
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from his opponents. “It is the tactics that concern me more than anything,” he told King. 
“That you take a stand that satisfies your conscience is of the most importance and, 
second, that you are using what you’ve got to the best advantage” (ibid). 
 
Media Strategy 
As deeply troubling as King’s forced retreat from the peace debate in 1965 had been for 
him, it had provided an education in media relations that King and Levison would apply 
in 1967. From the FBI’s recordings of Levison’s conversations with King and others in 
this period, it is possible to identify three principal changes in their tactical approach to 
media and public relations around King’s renewed opposition to the war: 1) Establish 
whom you are with; 2) Retain your support, move them along and move others along; and 
3) Assert the militant middle to neutralize criticism and radical optics.  
Establish whom you are with 
On September 12, 1965, an embattled King organized an eight-point conference call with 
his Research Committee to discuss the increasingly hostile opposition to his position on 
Vietnam in Washington and the news media. “I don’t think I have the strength to fight 
this issue and keep my civil rights fight going,” King said. “They have all the news media 
and TV and I just don’t have the strength to fight all these things” (FBI, 9/12/65, 5/0201). 
Convinced that the White House and the news media were uniting to “try to cut me 
down” (ibid), King believed his best defence was a show of support from other 
prominent, mainstream opponents to the war. “What can be done to give the national 
public a realization of the fact that I am not out here alone,” he asked his colleagues 
(ibid). The problem for King at this juncture, however, was the fact that few prominent 
Americans were speaking out against the war and King was essentially alone. This reality 
left King vulnerable to efforts to isolate and attack him and finally forced his withdrawal 
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from the peace debate altogether by the end of September 1965.   
While too late for King, prominent opposition to the war began to grow in late 
1965 and early 1966 as the estimated timeframe and costs of America’s rapidly deepening 
military involvement in Vietnam spiralled beyond the initial projections of both the White 
House and the Pentagon. In February 1966, with journalists “bothering” (FBI, 2/1/66, 
5/0524) him for commentary on renewed U.S. airstrikes against North Vietnam after a 
37-day pause, a wary King turned to Levison and Bayard Rustin for their advice on how 
to handle the requests. Central to this conversation was Rustin’s assertion that King’s 
priority should be “establishing first who you are with” by linking his opposition to the 
war with newly dissenting members of the Senate and U.S. military (ibid). This point was 
then developed by Levison, who described it as “terribly important,” not least of all 
because it proved King right in his lonely efforts the year before. 
This is enormously significant. Never before during a war has such a group 
of Senators taken a stand against it. It’s particularly marked in Martin’s case 
because when he came out on the issue he was pretty much alone except for 
the pacifists and the people you expect. And now he’s almost forgotten. So, 
it’s very good to keep in mind (ibid). 
 
Establishing whom King was with would continue as a central rule in Levison’s 
tactical playbook in 1967. Levison believed King’s association with the political 
Establishment’s powerful dissident doves like Senators J. William Fulbright, Jacob K. 
Javits and Robert F. Kennedy, brother of the late President John F. Kennedy, would serve 
the dual purpose of blunting if not protecting him from attacks by his opponents and 
advancing the political goals of the peace movement. As Levison advised King on Feb. 
18, 1967, “if progress is to be made in changing policy it must be done in alliance with 
people who have weight politically” (FBI, 2/18/67, 6/0744). Levison believed the best 
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use of the political capital that came with King’s status as the most influential black 
leader in America was to bring it to bear on pro-peace Congressmen and Senators in 
order to “push them along” (ibid). “The peace question will be solved when these forces, 
like the Javits, the Kennedys, the Fulbrights and the others have themselves found a 
direction and a kind of organization that makes them more effective. It is there that I 
think you can play a much greater role,” he said (ibid). 
Levison’s belief in the tactical wisdom of allying King with dissident politicians in 
Washington was reinforced by New York Times coverage of King’s first antiwar speech of 
1967, which he gave at a Los Angeles event alongside four pro-peace Senators. The 
Times’ front-page report put King front and centre and gave only passing coverage to the 
Senators’ comments. Of the article’s 17 paragraphs, reporter Gladwyn Hill dedicated ten 
to King and his views. “I never saw anything so impressive,” Levison said of the Times’ 
coverage in a conversation with King two days later. “They no longer say that you have 
no right to speak on Vietnam. This is the place for you to express your antiwar 
sentiments. When you are in this company, your voice is much bigger. When you are with 
four Senators, you are in the right place for somebody of your stature. Then you are 
recognized as someone with a spokesman’s right to analyze” (FBI, 2/27/67, 6/0786). 
Levison returned to this argument as King came under pressure to address a 
massive antiwar demonstration in New York City on April 15 that was being organized 
by James Bevel, a chief SCLC strategist who had taken a leave of absence to focus on 
peace initiatives. Levison opposed King’s participation in the so-called Spring 
Mobilization largely because he feared the optics of King sharing a microphone with 
Stokely Carmichael and other outspoken representatives of the peace movement’s radical 
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left. “You’ll notice they [the Senators] don’t get involved with that,” Levison told King. 
“I’m talking to you about Senators and people with big constituencies. They leave that for 
those who want to express themselves in that fashion. You can’t do both, and when you 
have to choose one, choose the one where you are making much more influence felt” 
(ibid). Levison expanded on this concern two days later in a conversation with Rachel 
Dubois, a prominent Quaker and pacifist, to whom he noted, “when [King] spoke with 
four Senators last Saturday the New York Times put it on the front page and put him above 
all the Senators. If [King] speaks with a lot of squabbling, pacifist, socialist, hippy 
collection that they have together [at the Spring Mobilization], his voice won’t even be 
important” (FBI, 3/1/67, 6/0797). 
King’s address at Riverside Church and the ensuing media fallout from it 
deepened Levison’s concerns that, rather than developing opposition to the war within the 
political Establishment, King was endangering his political capital by deepening the 
Establishment’s misgivings about him. “Martin has to realize that he’s dealing with the 
State Department and the Pentagon and not some stupid sheriff in the South,” Levison 
told fellow SCLC Research Committee member, Harry Wachtel (FBI, 4/6/67, 7/0018). 
Levison put these concerns directly to King in a tense conversation two days later. 
Levison expressed views reminiscent of those that he had voiced two years earlier in his 
April 1965 letter to King regarding the Establishment’s wariness of him after his Selma 
success and his call for an economic boycott of Alabama. Referring to King’s Riverside 
speech, Levison cautioned King that he was putting himself in opposition to powerful 
players in American society who had the resources to damage and isolate him: 
You launched into an attack on imperialism itself which is an attack on the 
system and not only the war... There are a number of persons who are anti-
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you and distort what you say. If the forces that control the press and TV don’t 
like what you say, they can distort what you say... I am afraid you will 
become identified as a leader of a fringe movement when you are much 
more. If mistakes are made, you can be cast in the light of someone [who] 
should be part of a fringe movement. (FBI, 4/8/67, 7/0025) 
 
King acknowledged that his speech was “probably politically unwise” but stood 
by it on moral grounds. “I think I have a role to play which may be unpopular. I would 
say I may not have been cautious enough... I don’t think careful thinking would have 
made me revise the speech” (ibid).  King did agree with Levison’s point regarding the 
capacity of the media to “distort” his views on the war and said he saw this reflected in 
the editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post, which he worried could 
“do damage by pushing me over to a particularly extremist position” (ibid). Levison 
added to this view, saying “that’s right, they would say that you don’t have good 
judgment... that you are a fine man but are being misled” (ibid). 
King’s post-Riverside experiences only served to deepen Levison’s belief in the 
Establish whom you are with principle. Levison felt that much of the trouble that King 
came into as a result of his speech could have been avoided had he united with prominent 
advocates of peace in Washington from the outset rather than going out on his own with 
only lesser known peace leaders for company. In a conversation on April 12, a day that 
saw public criticism of King’s antiwar position reach its peak, Levison told his friend, 
“The unity and solidarity of those who all have power and speak out would make much 
more of a difference” than King’s associations with Bevel and the “fringe element” that 
Levison considered the Spring Mobilization group to be (FBI, 4/12 /67, 7/0047). Reeling 
from successive days of bad press, King agreed with Levison’s assessment and voiced his 
desire to “pull away” from the Spring Mobilization crowd after his April 15 speech and 
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“move toward” the pro-peace Senators. The benefit of such a move, Levison added, was 
that it would put King “in this position where an attack on him becomes an attack on a lot 
of other powerful people and not an attack on easy marks” (ibid). King’s association with 
the Spring Mobilization grouping was problematic for this reason, because it “is so easy 
to attack,” Levison said. In this same vein, Levison observed that King’s vulnerability 
could have been at least partially prevented by organizing support prior to going public 
with his pronouncements against the war. The benefit of this tactic, Levison offered, was 
that King’s allies would have had their positions thought through and prepared in 
advance. Not doing so, he said, left King alone and exposed out front while people “think 
it out” (ibid). The value of such advice was made clear by the New York Times’ coverage 
of reaction to his April 4 Riverside speech. The first story to suggest King had any 
support was an April 15 news brief on a statement in his defence by the National Council 
of Churches. King had to wait an agonizing 10 days for his supporters to mobilize, during 
which time his opponents had the Times’ undivided attention. 
Retain your support, move them along 
If Levison seemed more concerned than King about the need for building ties with the 
doves of America’s political Establishment, it was due at least in part to King’s 
preoccupation with the second pillar of their public relations strategy: Retain your 
support and move them along. 
President Johnson’s signing of the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6, 1965, 
marked the beginning of a period of uncertainty and confusion in the traditional, i.e. 
Southern-based, civil rights movement. While prominent movement activists like James 
Bevel declared the movement “signed out of existence” (Herbers, 1965) by the Voting 
Rights Act, others like Bayard Rustin argued that it must now evolve into a political 
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movement for economic rights and genuine equality for America’s blacks. King’s 
deepening and increasingly outspoken concerns about the war in Vietnam at this time, 
which were echoed by the younger, more militant civil rights organizations, the Congress 
of Racial Equality (CORE) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC), led to yet another view that saw a merging of the civil rights movement with the 
nascent peace movement. Amid the uncertainty and confusion, one thing was clear to 
New York Times reporter John Herbers: The civil rights movement was “groping for new 
ways to achieve equality for Negroes” (ibid). As one unidentified black leader told 
Herbers, “when they get Southern Negroes registered and voting under the bill, there will 
be no need for Martin Luther Kings” (ibid). 
Accusations that King was “groping” for ways to maintain his leadership of 
America’s blacks, if not irrelevant in a post-Jim Crow and increasingly “riot”-ridden 
United States, dogged him for the better part of his remaining days. This skepticism grew 
in strength over the course of 1966 as King and the SCLC brought the civil rights 
movement north to the ghettos of Chicago, where their campaign for integrated housing 
and education was credited with few successes and more broadly labeled a failure. 
Adding to King’s leadership woes was the accelerating tempo and fury of ghetto 
uprisings and the emergence of Black Power in the summer of 1966 as a vigorous and 
existential threat to his influence in the black community – and among its increasingly 
restless, rebellious youth in particular. 
The stress of this reality was evident in a January 1967 conversation between 
King and members of his Research Committee. As the FBI duly recorded, “King sees a 
trend where people say his day is over and he cannot appeal to the people of the ghetto... 
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King says this trend bothers him. He was bothered and upset by it” (FBI, 1/19/67, 
6/0638). This concern was never far from the surface as King resumed his public 
opposition to the war in Vietnam, and it dominated a February 18, 1967, conversation on 
peace-related tactics between King, Levison, and SCLC Executive Director, Andy Young. 
As King and Levison had learned from the harsh experiences of 1965, King’s standing in 
the news media and Washington stemmed from the authority provided by his civil rights 
leadership. King stepped outside of this frame and took on issues outside of civil rights at 
his own peril; his authority on civil rights and the standing this engendered did not carry 
over to other issues, the war in Vietnam least of all. Levison thus cautioned King to avoid 
committing himself to peace at the cost of his status as a civil rights leader, warning King 
that doing so would leave him “ineffective in both movements” (FBI, 2/18 /67, 6/0744). 
As Levison later observed, “When you speak as a man whom 90 per cent of Negroes 
regard as their leader, that is a big voice. When you speak as a man whom scattered peace 
movements regard as their leader, that is not such a big voice” (FBI, 3/25/67, 6/0870). 
King, however, believed that combining peace and civil rights could resonate in 
the black community and saw “standing up for major issues” like Vietnam as a way to 
“re-assert” his leadership (FBI, 2/18/67, 6/0744). King said “there is more discontent in 
the Negro community than most people realize” and pointed to the positive reception his 
views on Vietnam were receiving in black colleges, where he said his audiences “go 
wild” when he speaks against the war (ibid). Levison, however, doubted that King could 
“carry great Negro masses to the peace movement” and believed that King would “lose as 
much as he would gain in the ghetto” (ibid). Yet Levison could not persuade King and 
Young to drop their enthusiasm for mobilizing the ghettos and adopt his preferred 
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strategic focus on the political Establishment in Washington. Though King did not 
disagree with this latter strategy, his Southern campaigns had convinced him that 
grassroots mobilization was also vital: “You have to have masses behind you before you 
can go to the President,” he said (ibid). With this in mind, King spoke of making a “series 
of speeches on Vietnam” in the ghettos and in universities in which he would “urge 
young men both black and white not to avoid the draft but to become conscientious 
objectors because this war is so evil, because our nation has become so insensitive to 
what it is doing” (ibid).  Levison, however, believed that King would “move ten times as 
many Negroes” if he was associated with Bobby Kennedy and other prominent, powerful 
Americans rather than the peace movement’s lesser-known leadership. 
Levison would continue to voice his doubts about the black community’s interest 
in mobilizing around the peace issue. Though he believed that blacks “are probably in a 
majority against the war,” he did not believe they would take to the streets to demonstrate 
this opposition (FBI, 3/1/67, 6/0797). “If they’re not demonstrating for their immediate 
interests – and they’re not right now – they’re not going to be joining demonstrations 
against the war,” Levison told Rachel Dubois. “They’ll be reached in different ways; 
they’re position will be articulated in different ways” (ibid). Given the pressure on King 
to prove the relevancy of his leadership, Levison’s doubts could only have caused him 
worry. It was thus with palpable relief that King reported to Levison that “a good 1,000 to 
1,500 Negroes, which we never had before” joined him as he lead his first ever peace 
march on March 25, 1967, in Chicago (FBI, 3/27/67, 6/0886).  
King versus the black Establishment 
In the wake of his April 4 Riverside Speech, King faced intense opposition to his views 
on the war from within the black community, from reporters and editorials of the black 
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press to the old guard of the civil rights movement. David Halberstam later provided 
insight into his inner-circle’s take on the black media’s opposition to his peace stand. 
Following a press conference at which a black reporter claimed black soldiers were 
against King’s position on the war, Andy Young told Halberstam that they were not 
surprised. “Every time we get the dumb question, the patriot question, it comes from a 
Negro reporter” (Halberstam, p. 565). A New York minister accompanying Halberstam 
and King observed that “it was the Negro middle class wanting respectability and playing 
it close on Vietnam. ‘They’re very nervous on Vietnam, afraid they’re going to lose 
everything else,’ the minister said, to which King added, “yes, they’re hoping the war will 
win them their spurs. That’s not the way you win spurs’” (ibid). Opposition to King’s 
views from prominent members of America’s black Establishment also came as little 
surprise. King had experienced their opposition in 1965, when his first pronouncements 
on the war had been denounced by Roy Wilkins, Executive Director of the NAACP, and 
Whitney Young, Executive Director of the National Urban League. As predictable as their 
renewed opposition to his antiwar statements was in 1967, a resolution by the NAACP’s 
Board of Directors calling efforts to merge the civil rights and peace movements “a 
serious tactical mistake” (“N.A.A.C.P.,” 1967, p.1) and its front page coverage in the New 
York Times infuriated King. He told his advisors that he was sure the NAACP waited to 
see what position the New York Times would take on his Riverside speech and then “came 
out with the same point” (FBI, 4/11/67, 7/0042). He accused the NAACP of “lying” by 
perpetuating the false notion that he was trying to bring the peace and civil rights 
movements together. “I have never advocated, in fact I’ve made it clear that we don’t 
have the resources in the movement” to fight for civil rights and peace simultaneously, 
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King said, referring to numerous personal and SCLC declarations to this effect since 
1965 (ibid). “I think the time has come to stop the lie and let them attack me on the basic 
points they want to attack me on and stop going around making something up” (ibid). 
King then acknowledged feeling as though “the cards are stacked against them as far as 
the press is concerned and efforts are being made to have the newspapers take a stand 
against” his position (ibid). However, King’s furor was such that he was willing to 
override his usual inclination to ride statesmanlike above such controversies and take the 
NAACP on directly through the press. Levison suggested that “in order to get maximum 
attention” for the fact he was not for such a merger, King should make a statement in the 
form of a press conference (ibid). King agreed to present a statement at a press briefing 
already scheduled for the next morning and said he wanted the statement to say that “he 
would like to urge [his opponents] to attack him on the rightness or wrongness of the war 
and not obscure the issue by creating a false impression and giving it to the American 
public” (ibid). 
King’s statement on the NAACP resolution asserted four key points: his credentials as 
a black leader; his ongoing prioritization of civil rights; the “incontrovertible” links 
between peace and civil rights; and the fact that King’s civil rights work continues despite 
the war. 
I live in the ghetto of Chicago and Atlanta and I travel tens of thousands 
of miles each month which takes me to dozens of Negro communities 
across the nation. My direct personal experience with Negroes in all 
walks of life convinces me that they in a majority oppose the war in 
Vietnam…They feel civil rights is well on its way to becoming a 
neglected and forgotten issue long before it is even partially solved… 
 
Only weeks ago in a formal public resolution, my organization, SCLC, 
and I explicitly declared that we have no intentions of diverting or 
diminishing in any respect our activities in civil rights and we outlined 
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extensive programs for the immediate future in the south as well as 
Chicago. I am saddened that the Board of Directors of the NAACP, a 
fellow civil rights organization, would join in the perpetuation of the 
myth about my views. They have challenged and repudiated a non-
existent proposition... I challenge the NAACP and  other critics of my 
position to take a forthright stand on the rightness and wrongness of 
 this war, rather than going off creating a non-existent issue... (King 
Papers, 1967/4/12) 
 
The New York Times ran King’s reply to the NAACP resolution the next day on 
page 32, as a secondary story to a new and, for King, even more upsetting attack on his 
public opposition to the war by NAACP board member Ralph Bunche, the black 
American winner of the 1950 Nobel Peace Prize and United Nations Under-Secretary for 
Political Affairs. In the report’s front-page lead, Bunche called on King to “positively and 
publicly give up” either his role in the peace movement or his leadership of the civil 
rights movement (Sibley, 1967, p.1). Bunche also took credit for the inclusion of the 
“serious tactical mistake” emphasis in the NAACP resolution, which reflected his belief 
that King’s position on the war “is bound to alienate many friends and supporters of the 
civil rights movement and greatly weaken it” (ibid). This was almost too much for King, 
who told his advisors that “the criticism and blasts and everything are getting out of 
hand” and said it was evidence that “a campaign is developing to undermine my 
leadership in the Negro community” (FBI, 4/12/ 67, 7/0747). This view was supported by 
his advisors, who concurred that the press was contributing to such an effort by 
“suppressing” (ibid) evidence of the black community’s growing opposition to the war. 
“They are afraid of a Negro people’s uprising,” offered labour leader, Cleveland 
Robinson (ibid). In a private follow-up conversation
1
, Levison and King took exception 
to the Bunche report on numerous levels. Levison saw both its positioning and even its 
                                               
1
 The complete FBI transcript for this conversation  is attached in Appendix B, starting at page 153 
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very inclusion in the Times as blatantly unethical because it gave front page coverage to 
Bunche’s perpetuation of what King’s statement inside the same issue clearly declares a 
“myth” (ibid). “[I]n the first part of the [Bunche] article it doesn’t even say that you deny 
that you are for a merger. You don’t learn that till you get to the second part, indeed you 
get the impression that Bunche is criticizing you for a stand you have taken,” Levison 
observed, adding that you couldn’t put the front page story on Bunche next to the report 
on King’s statement “and hold with the first story” (FBI, 4/13/67, 7/0060). Equally 
disturbing to Levison was Bunche’s argument that King’s antiwar comments were costing 
the civil rights movement friends and support. As the FBI transcript for April 12 records: 
[Levison] says this is sort of a fantastic position for Bunche to take because 
it’s really the old argument that a Negro leader shouldn’t say anything that 
might offend white folks. [Levison] says merely because people don’t 
agree with [King’s] position on peace is hardly justification for them to 
withdraw (from) a fight for justice and civil rights... It’s only when they 
think an issue might be unpopular that they say [King] has no right to 
speak (ibid). 
 
King admitted to being “really shocked” by Bunche’s criticism, especially because he 
believed Bunche shared his views on U.S. policy in Vietnam and would “welcome” his 
taking a stand against it (ibid). Levison suggested that the best possible response to both 
the NAACP resolution and Bunche was a “very clear statement” in support of King 
signed by thousands and printed in the New York Times. If the thousands signing it were 
75 per cent black, Levison believed it would be a “devastating answer” (ibid). Another 
option was commissioning a private poll designed to ascertain opinions on the war 
among black Americans. If they could prove that a majority of blacks opposed the war, 
this would “more effectively answer [King’s] critics than anything else” (ibid). In a 
moment of doubt as to whether this was indeed the majority opinion in the black 
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community, a rattled King also noted that “it would be a private poll that wouldn’t get out 
if it didn’t come out [in their favour]” (ibid). 
With the Spring Mobilization only days away, King believed the demonstration’s 
outcome would determine whether the black Establishment’s attacks against him would 
continue. As the FBI recorded him telling Levison, “[King] says he knows when Roy and 
Whitney and even Bunche will back up – when they think [King] has support... If the 
Spring Mobilization has 10,000 people, attacks will continue; if it has 100,000 they will 
begin to listen” (FBI, 4/12/1967, 7/0747). Wearily, King added: “it’s a fact of life – that 
people measure” (ibid). Yet he would not have to wait the three days to the Spring 
Mobilization for Bunche to reconsider his position. In a phone conversation with King 
the day his criticisms appeared in the New York Times, Bunche’s remorse was so obvious 
that King “felt sorry for him,” as he later told Levison. “He wasn’t telling the truth and he 
was trembling and all so I just got off of him,” King said. “[Bunche] claimed he didn’t 
know that this was going to get out and he misunderstood my position” (FBI, 4/13/67, 
7/0060). Bunche also confirmed King’s original belief that he was “absolutely opposed” 
to U.S. policy in Vietnam (ibid). King said he suspected that Bunche felt “the newspapers 
and all just used him” and “made him look bad” but it met with the approval of “certain 
people” whom Bunche did not feel comfortable pleasing (ibid). Bunche’s efforts to 
correct the situation in a press statement, however, did not disappoint King’s suspicion 
that the Times would bury it. As King put it to Levison, “you know they play that game” 
(ibid). Bunche’s statement, which read “so far as I am concerned – and I speak only for 
myself – Dr. King’s disavowal of any such intent [to merge the peace and civil rights 
movements] takes care of the issue to which my statement had been directed,” ran as a 
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brief on page 21 of the Times’ April 14 issue.   
The Spring Mobilization 
Given his expectation that the Spring Mobilization march would attract a “mainly white” 
crowd, King wanted to avoid any attempt to use it as a test of his antiwar position’s 
strength among blacks, which he knew would only feed the media-sponsored impression 
that it did not have their backing. However, in order to mobilize those members of the 
black community whom they could, Levison thought spot ads on New York City’s black 
radio stations the day before would have some effect: “To get those that will [mobilize] 
one reaches them by mass media like radio,” he said. Levison’s continuing doubts that the 
black community was going “to want to identify with this kind of mobilization” led him 
to caution against framing such radio spots around the message “follow Martin Luther 
King and show you’re behind him” (ibid). King agreed, and reiterated his desire to avoid 
giving journalists the impression that he was using the Spring Mobilization to gauge his 
peace stand’s popularity with his black constituency (ibid). 
Resigned to King’s participation in the upcoming demonstration, Levison urged 
him to make use of the opportunity to publicly assert that he was not “bidding for 
leadership of the peace movement” because he had “heavy tasks in civil rights work on 
which he was working and will be resuming with renewed energy” (ibid). Levison took a 
lead role in drafting King’s Spring Mobilization speech in the hopes of protecting King 
from a repeat of the Riverside controversy, which Levison attributed to an overstretched 
King’s lack of control over its largely ghostwritten text. Levison told King that it tried to 
deal with too many issues at once and was not representative of King’s typical thinking 
on the war. More than this, Levison believed his Riverside text was “too advanced” for 
his black base and not “what constitutes the widest appeal” (FBI, 4/8/67, 7/0025).  
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Coverage of the Spring Mobilization march in both the New York Times and the 
Washington Post played up black participation, and in doing so provided King with some 
respite from his media woes. Times reporter Douglas Robinson introduced King as one of 
the march’s leaders alongside the popular black singer Harry Belafonte and “several other 
civil rights leaders and religious figures” (ibid). Arm-in-arm they walked at the head of 
America’s largest-ever peace demonstration, which brought together “between 100,000 
and 125,000” people including “housewives from Westchester, students and poets from 
the Lower East Side, priests, nuns, doctors, businessmen and teachers” (Robinson, 1967, 
p.1).  The Times, which paid little attention to the content of King’s address to marchers 
at a packed UN Plaza, also noted that he spoke alongside Floyd McKissick of CORE and 
Stokely Carmichael, whose speech was punctuated by calls of “Black Power!” from the 
crowd. What Times’ readers did not learn was that these same Black Power advocates 
“shouted 'Down with Martin Luther King’ at several points during his speech,” as Leroy 
F. Aarons reported in the Washington Post (Aarons, 1967, p. A1). This disaffection with 
King was ultimately to his public relations benefit, however, as Aarons reported that 
many of these opponents also “carried the Red, Blue and yellow flag of the National 
Liberation Front (Vietcong)” (ibid). According to the Post, this “Harlem contingent” of 
1,500 marched down to the UN Plaza separate from the main demonstration, shouting 
“Hell no, we won’t go” and ejecting white students who tried to join their swelling ranks, 
which doubled in size as they wound their way south. “The procession was soon 
translated into a black power movement,” Aarons reported. “No Vietcong ever called me 
a nigger,” they chanted, and “when we fight for Uncle Sam, we fight for our slavery” 
(ibid). In doing so, they left little doubt as to whether the war was an issue in the black 
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community. Further benefitting King was the fact Aarons’ report gave itself over to 
generous coverage of his speech and highlighted the fact that he “also took pains to 
clarify his views on the alliance of the civil rights movement and anti-war movements, a 
position that has led moderates to exhort him to moderate or repudiate his stand” (ibid). 
Aarons quoted King telling the thousands massed before him at the UN Plaza “I have not 
urged a mechanical fusion of the civil rights and peace movements... There are people 
who have come to see the moral imperative of world brotherhood. I would like to see the 
fervor of the civil rights movement imbued into the peace movement to instill it with 
greater strength, but I am not urging a single organizational form” (ibid). 
This was music to the ears of both King and Levison, who over the next days 
spoke of his satisfaction with media coverage of the Spring Mobilization on a number of 
occasions. With King’s opponents backing off their attacks in the wake of the march’s 
historic turnout, Levison’s main concern was King’s need to re-assert his leadership in 
civil rights or risk losing his base. King, however, was now more convinced than ever 
that his opposition to the war was finding traction in the black community as a civil rights 
issue and believed it imperative that he press ahead on peace. King told Levison that in a 
recent Chicago meeting with ghetto representatives, they informed him that “the Negro 
community in the ghetto, they are just against the war” (FBI, 5/9/67, 7/0166). King also 
pointed to poll results in the Chicago Defender, a prominent black community newspaper 
that had earlier denounced King’s Riverside speech, which found the number of local 
blacks voicing opposition to the war had quadrupled. A Lou Harris poll published in the 
Washington Post on May 22 painted a less encouraging picture but nevertheless gave 
King reason to believe his peace stand was at least resonating with America’s black 
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citizens. While finding that 73 percent of Americans “disagree with Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. in his denunciations of the war in Vietnam” (Harris, 1967/5/22, p. A2) and 
another 60 percent said his statements were hurting civil rights, Harris found that the 
percentages among black respondents were significantly different. Those opposed 
dropped to 48 percent while 25 percent agreed with King and 27 percent reserved 
judgment. More significantly, Harris found that “no more than one-third” of blacks polled 
was “willing to endorse the view that Dr. King’s foreign policy stand will hurt their 
struggle for opportunity on the home front” (ibid). In light of these results, the pollster 
posited that “Dr. King may well have within his power a capability of influencing 
between one-third and one-half of all Negro voters behind a candidate he might endorse 
for President in 1968. It seems unlikely now that Dr. King will support Lyndon Johnson” 
(ibid). In other words, King’s peace stand now had him in the all-powerful position of 
potential kingmaker in the November 1968 Presidential election. 
One month after the Spring Mobilization, Levison expressed his confidence that 
King’s peace stand was not adversely affecting his “standing in the black community” 
(FBI, 5/16/67, 7/0214). In fact, SCLC’s economic initiatives in Chicago were enjoying 
unprecedented success. Levison highlighted this fact by pointing to the SCLC’s marquee 
job creation program for ghetto residents, Operation Breadbasket, which had just signed 
its biggest agreement yet. “There is no trouble with the Negro businessman,” Levison 
asserted. “There just isn’t evidence that [the peace] issue cuts deep in the Negro 
community” (ibid). If anything, King’s linking of peace and civil rights was beginning to 
penetrate and mobilize all levels of the black community and even whites. “This I swore 
he couldn’t do,” a humbled Levison admitted, but King “knew what he had” (ibid). As 
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evidence, Levison pointed to King’s recent efforts to defuse tensions between Cleveland’s 
black community and the city’s mayor, Ralph Locher, and avoid a repeat of the previous 
summer’s anarchy that left four dead in the city’s Hough ghetto. 
He came in and spent the day doing all kinds of things: going to the high 
schools talking to kids, combining peace and civil rights. He spoke to white 
and Negro groups. By the end of the day he had taken over the city. When he 
got there the morning editorials denounced him as an outsider who should 
stay out. The evening editorials said he had the most constructive solutions 
and praised him. The Negro power structure turned against the mayor... Then 
the white power structure turned against the mayor by the end of the day. 
Even the black Nationalists came around in order to drive away one lone 
picket who was picketing Martin on Vietnam. What I think was terribly 
significant was that he got this fantastic mass response with every group in 
the city while he continued to combine the war and civil rights. If you wanted 
a better example in whether Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young are right, that 
you do damage to both movements, this was a beautiful example (ibid). 
  
Assert the militant middle 
King’s effectiveness at broadening black opposition to the war was facilitated by his 
position at what Levison identified as the “militant middle” between moderate middle 
class blacks and the left-wing advocates of Black Power. From this position, King was 
able to reinforce and even broaden his leadership base in the black community by pulling 
both its small “c” conservatives and elements of the more radical left towards his activist 
middle. King expressed the strategic value of this position to Levison in mid-May, in 
light of the Chicago Defender poll that showed support for peace had quadrupled in the 
ghetto: “I think my job is to stick with [antiwar activities] because I think we will have 
more leverage if we can get Negroes more opposed and more people to the center. I think 
if we can continue to escalate opposition to the war, I believe firmly that [Johnson] is 




In an address to his staff at a retreat on May 29, 1967, King expanded on the 
ideology of the militant middle. He explained that the major issue facing America at this 
juncture was “how to keep the tension alive between a legitimate conservatism, because 
you have something to conserve, and a pressing radicalism, because there are millions of 
God’s children who are living with conditions that they don’t want to conserve” (King 
Papers, 5/29/67). King said the troubles confronting America, in Vietnam and in its 
restive inner-cities, were products of the fact this tension has not been maintained. “This 
is where we, the civil rights movement, must speak to our nation,” King said. 
Maintaining this creative tension between what King described as “opposites strongly 
marked” (ibid) in American society was key to a healthy state of the union. As King 
noted, “what is wrong in life is that most idealists are not realists, and most realists are 
not idealists. Most people who are militant are not moderate and most people who are 
moderate are not militant” (ibid). America needed to learn, he said, “to be both 
conservative and radical” (ibid). 
As it related to Vietnam, Levison defined the militant middle as those “interested 
in active programs but are not New Left [i.e. radically opposed to U.S. policy], and are 
not eager to join the New Left, but are not eager to attack it, either” (FBI, 5/16/67, 
7/0214). He and King believed there were millions of Americans in this category who 
could be moved to actively support the right peace program. This translated into a 
strategic emphasis on what King and Levison believed to be activist yet pragmatic 
proposals for de-escalating the conflict and getting the belligerents to the negotiating 
table. This blend of idealism and realism, militancy and moderatism is exemplified in the 
text of King’s Spring Mobilization speech and its realpolitik assertion that the “sincere” 
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desire of many to see U.S. forces unilaterally withdrawn from Vietnam was unfortunately 
out of step with the will of a “majority of Americans” (FBI, 4/13/67, 7/0060). Instead, 
King said, “realism compels us to look for a program they [the majority] can support and 
which can end the fighting. I believe there is such a program, I believe almost a majority 
of Americans want the bombings ended” (ibid).   
The militant middle’s fusion of realism and idealism was not always easy for King 
to maintain and at times entered into conflict with his personal views on the war, which 
often leaned sympathetically towards the radical idealism of the New Left. Realism too 
often meant moderation and compromise, and the evil that King saw in the war left little 
room for either. Moderating his views on the war was also tantamount to accepting the 
limitations that he saw the New York Times, Washington Post and others setting for him – 
limitations that he had dedicated the previous decade of his life to expunging from 
American society. As he told Levison in response to their Riverside editorials, “The thing 
is I am to stay in my place and I am a Negro leader and I should not stray from a position 
of moderation. I can’t do that” (FBI, 4/8/67, 7/0025). Levison worried, however, that the 
views King expressed at Riverside were “too far out” for the “average person” (ibid), and 
this was the demographic he had to reach if he wanted to develop a truly mass movement 
against the war. It was thus imperative that King reassert the balance between idealism 
and realism, between satisfying his conscience and the tactics that could maximize his 
impact on peace. 
The militant middle and the news media 
Essential to achieving this maximal impact was a media strategy that ensured news 
coverage that reflected the militant middle’s strategic balance between moderates and the 
activist left of the peace movement. With rising media interest in King’s 
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“metamorphosis” as a leader, the right strategy had the potential to mobilize millions 
more against the war - and a message from the militant middle was key. King’s 
combination of moral militancy and pragmatic solutions for this issue of profound 
national concern proved a compelling mix that the news media could not afford to ignore, 
especially after his role in the history-making Spring Mobilization march. Prentiss Childs 
and Ellen Wadley, co-producers of Face The Nation, summed up this interest in a note 
thanking King for his appearance on the show in late April 1967: “Your new involvement 
in the peace movement in addition to civil rights certainly places you at the vortex of the 
conflicting forces in our society and makes your views of increasing importance for 
everyone” (King Papers, 1967/4/28). The “increasing importance” Childs and Wadley 
placed on King’s views at this time reflected and no doubt contributed to the public 
interest in King’s appearances that he claimed was unlike any he had ever experienced, 
“even at the best point of the civil rights movement,” Levison noted. “There’s never an 
empty seat or space in any auditorium where he speaks. And many of these are 
universities” (FBI, 5/16/67, 7/0214). Levison linked this to the fact that King was 
“representative of the militant middle. He’s neither regarded as New Left nor a passive 
figure” (ibid). This surging public interest in King’s position contributed to the emerging 
sense in the news media that he was evolving into something new and, to his opponents, 
threatening. Levison attributed this impression to the fact King’s previous antiwar 
statements had been just that – statements.  Now that King was addressing mass 
audiences, it was inherently more “dramatic” and thus seemed more militant, even though 
the content of his earlier statements and what he was now saying publicly were 
essentially the same. As Levison observed: 
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The press regards a statement as a formal thing that is not as serious as 
when you are speaking to masses of people. They feel that you are not only 
committing yourself but are moving people. There is no difference in 
quality, every time [King] made a statement on the war he was well-
beyond everybody else [in terms of] militancy. But now he’s getting 
attention because he’s speaking before audiences (FBI, 4/5/67, 7/0012). 
  
The radical frame 
This perception made the militant middle a position fraught with risk. To King’s 
immediate left were some of the peace movement’s more radical critics of President 
Johnson’s Vietnam policy and rubbing shoulders with them put King at constant risk of 
falling into the negative, “extremist” frame that the news media applied to them. 
Defending King against this was made all the more challenging by active efforts within 
the news media to push him into this frame, not to mention the equally active pull of his 
own sympathies toward the radical idealism of those to his left. The inherent tensions of 
his militant middle stand are evident in a conversation between King and Levison on 
media coverage of King’s first peace march in Chicago on March 25, 1967, and the 
speech that followed.  King expressed satisfaction that coverage mentioned his assertion 
of love for America, a detail that Levison agreed was vital. Given the fact that King’s 
involvement with the peace movement saw him “associated with a lot of young people 
who are rejecting society,” which Levison said “boils down to a rejection of the nation,” 
he cautioned King to avoid being tied to them. “I’m not talking opportunistically. It’s 
unsound thinking,” Levison said (FBI, 3/27/67, 6/0886). 
There is no small irony in the fact King’s Riverside speech was organized 
specifically to counter the controversial optics that his advisers feared his participation in 
the Spring Mobilization would entail. Levison and the vast majority of King’s Research 
Committee had grave misgivings about the other speakers he would be appearing 
 63 
 
alongside, not least of all Stokely Carmichael, whose Black Power radicalism and 
tendency to characterize the country’s leadership as “a racist named McNamara, a fool 
named Rusk and a buffoon named Johnson” (Davies,1966. p. 62) made him a favourite 
with the news media for all the wrong reasons. The only member of King’s inner-circle 
who supported his participation in the Spring Mobilization was James Bevel, who had 
taken a leave of absence from SCLC to chair the march’s organizing committee. Much to 
the chagrin of Levison and his Research Committee colleagues, who believed Bevel had 
also taken a permanent leave from reality (FBI, 2/18/67, 6/0744)
1
, King ultimately sided 
with his mystical, yarmulked friend. King felt that avoiding the mass march would make 
him seem a “coward” (FBI, 3/6/67, 6/0816) and cater to the morbid phobias of his red-
baiting, reactionary opponents. Levison countered this, believing his participation would 
lead him into a deeper association with the peace movement’s extremist fringe at the 
expense of his hard-earned status and influence in civil rights (ibid). To appease his 
advisers’ fears, King agreed to “neutralize” (FBI, 3/27/67, 6/0886) the potentially 
negative associations of his Spring Mobilization speech with an advance presentation of 
his antiwar views in a more “respectable setting” (Garrow, 1986, p.550). His address at 
the venerable Riverside Church to the clean-cut members of Clergy And Laymen 
Concerned About Vietnam seemed the ideal antidote to the “squabbling, pacifist, 
socialist, hippy collection” that Levison considered the Spring Mobilization to be (FBI, 
3/1/67, 6/0797). This need to “neutralize” King’s Spring Mobilization appearance was 
supported by allegations in a report by the House Un-American Activities Committee that 
the march was “principally the work of Communists,” as the Washington Post reported 
on April 1 (Levy, 1967, p.A6). The HUAC report charged that the involvement of King 
                                               
1
 Bevel openly attributed his antiwar activities to a visit from Jesus while he was doing his laundry. 
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and James Bevel was “evidence that the Communists have succeeded, at least partially, in 
implementing their strategy of fusing the Vietnam and civil rights issues in order to 
strengthen their chances of bringing about a reversal of U.S. policy in Vietnam” (ibid). 
Bevel “scoffed” at the HUAC allegations, calling its report “dishonest” and part of the 
government-sponsored “myth of conspiracy” (ibid). Rather, Bevel said that for the first 
time “civil rights groups, churches and universities are very concerned, serious and 
prepared for work” (ibid). Levison’s fears about the Spring Mobilization were further 
reinforced by Stokely Carmichael’s rumoured plans for ensuring that everyone including 
the news media would be talking about his speech after the Spring Mobilization, not 
King’s. “He’s going to try to steal the whole thing from Martin,” said Levison, who saw 
this as further evidence that Carmichael was becoming “a real danger” to King (FBI, 
4/14/67, 7/0071). Clarence Jones, SCLC’s lawyer and a member of King’s Research 
Committee, added: “he is going to have the effect of being the bomb-thrower to get the 
reaction off without any thought of its political objective or if it achieves one” (ibid). 
History, of course, saw the roles of the Spring Mobilization and Riverside 
reversed: King’s dignified, respectable presence at the head of the Spring Mobilization’s 
sea of upstanding, concerned citizenry served to neutralize its more controversial, radical 
aspects and quiet some of the public fallout from his Riverside speech. Both Levison and 
King expressed satisfaction with the media coverage of the march, which Levison felt 
highlighted and deepened King’s “moderate appeal” (FBI, 4/18/ 67, 7/0087). However, 
concern among King’s advisors and friends that the Spring Mobilization’s more radical 
elements wanted to use King’s participation in the march to “box” him in and “capture” 
him (FBI, 4/14/67, 7/0071; 4/22/67, 7/0103) were not misplaced, and Levison saw the 
 65 
 
New York Times facilitating their efforts. On April 22, the New York Times reported the 
intentions of the New Left-affiliated National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) to 
ask King to run for President in 1968 on a third party “peace ticket” with Benjamin 
Spock, the famous paediatrician and prominent opponent of the war in Vietnam. In a 
discussion about the article, Levison told King that such speculation was useful in the 
sense it gave the White House another reason to worry along with the Spring 
Mobilization’s massive turnout. Levison expressed concern, however, that “the 
aggressiveness of the New Politics group enabled King’s critics to talk about the “Leftist 
grouping that is parrying you along” (ibid). Reports of King’s participation in a closed-
door NCNP conference the following day produced further concerns that New York Times 
readers were being led to believe that King was in fact working with the New Left. 
Levison’s brother, Roy Bennett, said King wasn’t helping matters with his presence as the 
“only liberal” at the private and “exclusively New Left” meeting (ibid). Taken together 
with his leadership in the Spring Mobilization, Bennett worried that the Times was 
facilitating the conclusion that King “is making a decision and is joining the New Left 
community and becoming their leader” (ibid). Given the prominent coverage of the 
NAACP’s misleading resolution on a peace-civil rights merger, Levison believed that “it 
was probably by design” that the press was portraying King as holding positions that he 
in fact did not (ibid). Levison told King that this made it necessary to clarify his positions 
at every given opportunity in order for them to gain traction with the American public. 
This would take extra effort, however, given his view that the news media were “working 
against” King (ibid). 
On April 25, King held an Atlanta press conference at his home parish, Ebenezer 
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Baptist Church, to officially quiet any confusion over talk of his candidacy for President 
in 1968. King started out with a touch of humour, saying he was “quite surprised” by the 
various newspaper reports on the topic, and found it “very hard to take them seriously 
(King Papers, 1967/4/25). King said he understood the “stirrings” across America for “a 
candidate who will take a principled stand on the question of the war in Vietnam and the 
problems of the urban ghettos” (ibid). In declining that he was this candidate, King 
explained, 
I have come to think of my role as one which operates outside the realm of 
partisan politics, raising the issues and through action create the situation 
which forces whatever party is in power to act creatively and constructively 
in response to the dramatic presentations of these issues on the public 
scene. I plan to continue that role in the hope that the war in Vietnam will 
be brought to a close long before the 1968 elections and that this present 
Congress finds both the courage and the votes to once again move our 
nation toward a truly great society for every citizen. (ibid) 
 
 Efforts by the New York Times to portray King as a spokesman for the New Left 
were perceived once more by King and Levison in a July 9 article on the NCNP’s first 
national conference in Chicago. Headlined “New Left convention next month will seek 
strategy to defeat Johnson,” the article was accompanied by a picture of King, whom the 
articled billed as the convention’s “keynote speaker” (Jansen, 1967, p.38). Levison called 
King to discuss the article, which he found “very damaging” for the unmistakeable 
impression it gave that King was the leader of a New Left movement to oust President 
Johnson in 1968. King said the only information that he had about the conference was 
that he was to be one of the speakers, to which Levison replied “They have turned it 
around cleverly and made you the principle speaker” (FBI, 7/9/67, 7/0395). King 
mentioned that this had been the basis of a question put to him in an NBC interview 
earlier that day and it had caught him off-guard. The article’s potential for hurting King 
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was heightened by the inclusion of a quote from the “red-bearded” 25-year-old chair of 
the convention’s steering committee, Michael P. Wood, who told reporter Donald Jansen 
that “old left” organizations like the Communist Party had not been invited because they 
were “too conservative” (ibid). The deeper issue with the article, Levison offered, was 
that it put King in association with “people who do not know their politics,” which could 
only reflect negatively on him (ibid). King was especially troubled by the idea people 
would think that he was participating in a “Hate Johnson thing,” which he said he 
“wanted to be above” (ibid). Despite this new evidence of the paper’s suspected agenda 
against him, King nonetheless put forward the idea of approaching another reporter at the 
New York Times to cover a statement that Levison was going to draft in response to 
Jansen’s article. In a nod to their faith in John Herbers, Andy Young proposed him as the 
reporter they should approach to write it. 
 Levison’s carefully worded draft statement for King asserted that failing to correct 
the “unmistakeable impression” of King’s close association with the NCNP convention 
would be “misleading and a distortion” of their relationship on the part of the New York 
Times. 
I am solely related to the Convention merely as a guest speaker at its mass 
rally. My presence there is not an endorsement of any decisions made by 
the Convention, in none of which I shall be participating. In addition to 
having no relationship with the general policy or strategy of the 
organization, I am specifically not involved with any plans to start a third 
party with myself as its Presidential candidate. I excluded any such 
possibility last April and that decision remains unaltered. It would not be 
possible for the convention to make plans concerning me since I am in no 
way subject to its decisions. (FBI, 7/10/67, 7/0399) 
 
Such efforts at damage control did not get far, however. New York Times’ coverage 
of the meeting on August 31, 1967, affirmed King’s place amid the “2,000 radicals” in 
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attendance and their campaign to defeat Lyndon B. Johnson in November 1968. If King 
did in fact want to avoid a “hate Johnson thing,” his speech to the convention made little 
effort to go easy on the president. The Times portrayed King as “advising” convention 
delegates to make “the 1967-68 elections a referendum on the war” – “The American 
people must have an opportunity to vote into oblivion those who cannot detach 
themselves from militarism, those who lead us not to a new world but drag us to the brink 
of a dead world,” King is quoted saying (Weaver, 1967, p.15). The radical frame, 
however, was moderated somewhat by reporter Warren Weaver Jr.’s claim that organizers 
expected trouble from “black power advocates, some of whom do not regard [King] as 
sufficiently radical” (ibid). 
These concerns, however, were already becoming secondary to a more urgent 
issue on the domestic front: “riots.” On July 12, the arrest and beating of John Smith, a 
black cab driver, by police officers sparked five days of anarchy in the Central Ward 
ghetto of Newark, New Jersey. Twenty-one black civilians died, including two children 
hit by stray bullets, along with two whites. Things would get worse on July 22 in Detroit, 
where a police raid on a “blind pig” –  a private social club known for illegal after-hours 
drinking and gambling – flared into another five days of arson, looting and military 
intervention that left 43 people dead. The unrest in Newark and Detroit marked a 
dramatic escalation of the unrest in America’s ghettos and led King to see in this cycle of 
black uprisings and military suppression a fearsome trend that had to be confronted 
before it evolved into even more terrible violence and the establishment of fascist-like 
repression over America’s cities and black communities (King Papers, 1968/4/16, p.25). 
The moral disorder engendered by American policy in Vietnam was coming home to 
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roost, King believed, and his antiwar crusade was about to evolve into one for a radical 
reformation of the values of mainstream America that left the nation’s poor on the 









































THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN 
 
On August 11, 1965, the predominantly black neighbourhood of Watts in Los Angeles 
erupted in the first major ghetto uprising of the 1960s and one of its deadliest. Six days of 
arson and anarchy and their suppression by a deployment of 14,000 National Guard 
troops left 34 people dead, 33 of them black civilians (National Advisory Commission on 
Civil Disorders, 1968, p. 38). At a loss to bring calm to their community, black church 
leaders in Watts turned to King in the hopes his celebrity and moral influence might help 
convince their fellow blacks to put down their weapons and police and city officials to 
adopt much-needed improvements to racial policies (Garrow, 1986, p.439-40). King’s 
arrival in Watts on August 15, however, affected him much more than he did the 
situation. He was especially jarred by “joyous” ghetto youths who saw in the destruction 
of their neighbourhood and its national media coverage a kind of victory. As King 
recalled them saying, “we won because we made them pay attention to us” (King, 1968, 
p.133). While not unaware that the issues facing black residents of America’s Northern 
ghettos were different from those he had experience with in the South, Watts revealed a 
depth of nihilistic despair among Northern blacks that surprised and shook him (Garrow, 
1986, p.439). For the first time, he fully understood that bridging America’s racial divide 
was greater than a question of civil rights. His celebrated Southern victories improved the 
lives of middle-class blacks who could afford to eat and shop at desegregated department 
stores, but they did nothing for poor, unemployed ghetto blacks with no money and poor 
educations (Lewis, 1978, p.306).
 
Accordingly, many in Watts thought little of King, if 
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anything at all. Newsweek reported that King was even mocked by ghetto youths, who 
derisively referred to him as “Martin Luther Who?” (Lentz, 1990, p.185-6). Bayard 
Rustin, who accompanied King in Watts, said King was “undone” by his experiences 
there and came to see Rustin’s long-standing view that “the most serious issues facing the 
movement were economic problems of class rather than race” (Garrow, 1986, p.439). If 
King was indeed “groping” for a sense of direction for the civil rights movement in 
August 1965, as John Herbers of the New York Times alleged at the time, King found it in 
Watts. Seeing the fires and violence there as “the language of the unheard” (King, 1968, 
p.133), King took it as his duty to give it eloquent expression and use his moral influence 
to stir white America to conscientious action on their behalf. From Watts onward, King 
biographer David L. Lewis wrote, his “national role as a champion of massive federal 
assistance to the urban poor was henceforth a moral necessity” (1978, p. 307). 
A new challenge: dramatizing poverty 
On his return to the public debate on Vietnam in February 1967, King initially envisioned 
using his participation in the peace movement to mobilize mass support for rehabilitating 
America’s ghettos and economic rights for the nation’s poor. Though he would later deny 
his belief in any “mechanical mergers” between the peace and civil rights movements, 
King did speak privately of “tying the peace movement to the civil rights or vice versa,” 
as he told Levison and Andy Young (FBI, 2/18/67, 6/0744). “I don’t see getting out of 
civil rights but we could be much more successful if we could get the peace people to do 
it, to cooperate, to have a march on Washington around the cut backs to the poverty 
program,” King said (ibid). Accordingly, he used the news media’s heightened interest in 
his position on the war to sensitize their audiences to his conviction that America must 
reconsider priorities that put the morally-corrupting violence of Vietnam ahead of a life-
 72 
 
giving war on poverty in America. We can see this strategy at work in King’s June 19, 
1967, appearance on NBC’s The Arlene Francis Show: 
We spend approximately $500,000 to kill every enemy soldier in Vietnam 
while we spend $53 per person in the so-called War Against Poverty, per 
person for those who are categorized as poverty-stricken... So one can see a 
tremendous gap here, and it is my contention that if we can spend 
approximately $35 billion to fight what I consider an unjust, ill-considered 
war in Vietnam and about $20-billion to put a man on the moon, then our 
nation has the resources to spend billions of dollars to put God’s children on 
their own two feet right here on Earth. The problem is not that we don’t have 
the resources, it is that we haven’t yet had the will. Because once we have 
the will, the resources are available, and it does mean reordering our 
priorities (King Papers, 1967/6/19, p.3) 
 
King saw linking ghetto poverty to the growing peace movement as a possible 
solution to one of the key frustration of the SCLC’s Chicago campaign in 1966, which 
was its inability to generate significant public tension and drama around the much more 
subtle cruelties of Northern race relations. David Halberstam described King’s difficulties 
in this regard: 
His great strength in the old fight was his ability to dramatize the immorality 
he opposed. The new immorality of the ghettos will not be easy to 
dramatize, for it is often an immorality with invisible sources. The slum 
lords are evil enough, but they will not be there by their homes waiting for 
King and the TV crews to show up, ready to split black heads open. The 
schools are terrible, but there is no one man making them bad by his own ill 
will, likely to wait in the school yard with a cattle prod. The jobs are bad, 
but the reasons Negroes aren’t ready for decent jobs are complicated; there 
won’t be one single hillbilly waiting outside the employment agency 
grinding cigarettes into the necks of King and his followers (Halberstam, 
1967, in Reporting Civil Rights, 2003, p. 578). 
 
This reality, combined with the bustle and daily dramas of a major metropolis like 
Chicago that absorbed and minimized the impact of marches, left King and his organizers 
at a loss for recreating the kind of all-encompassing urban crisis that had been key to their 
direct action strategy in the smaller cities of the South. King outlined his evolving 
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understanding of this challenge in an address to his staff at an SCLC retreat in late May 
1967. As King saw it, the central difficulty was the fact the civil rights movement was 
now delving into issues of fundamental human rights, which tended to be more abstract 
than legal, Constitutionally-enshrined civil rights, and thus inherently more complicated 
to illustrate through direct action. 
You see, when we think of civil rights we are referring to those rights that 
are clearly defined by the Constitution – the denial of those rights can be 
dealt with by going to court, by demonstrating to dramatize the denial, or 
by an Executive Order from the President of the United States... But when 
you deal with human rights, you are not dealing with something clearly 
defined by the Constitution... Although the Constitution guarantees the 
right to vote, it does not guarantee the right to an adequate liveable 
income. Although the Constitution guarantees the right to have access to 
public accommodations, it is not clearly stated in the Constitution that a 
man must have a decent sanitary house in which to live. Although the 
Constitution guarantees the right to attend an integrated school, it does not 




A Revolution of Values 
Further complicating King’s efforts to sway public opinion in favour of his poverty fight 
was the perceived decline in white support and sympathy as the civil rights movement 
evolved from a reform movement into a revolutionary mobilization for full racial 
equality. As he told his staff, many Northern whites who supported their Southern 
campaigns did so more out of revulsion for the thuggish violence of racist white 
authorities than out of any desire to achieve genuine equality for blacks in America. “A 
lot of people who supported us, supported us because they were against extremist 
behaviour toward Negroes, but they never intended for us to live next door to them. They 
never intended to lift the Negro out of poverty. They never intended to make adequate, 
quality, integrated education a reality in all its dimensions” (ibid). Given the fact that 
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such a level of equality required a “radical redistribution of economic and political 
power” (ibid), King knew achieving it would be met with deep resistance on behalf of the 
white community, which enjoyed a virtual monopoly on both. “We must recognize that if 
we are to be given our God-given rights now, principalities and powers must be 
confronted and they must be changed,” he said (ibid). In its reformist stage, the civil 
rights movement sought to improve adherence to the existing “rules of the house” as 
prescribed by the Constitution, King said. Now, as the civil rights movement entered an 
“era of revolution,” fundamental questions about America and the laws that governed her 
had to be asked: 
 Now we are in a situation where we must ask the house to change its 
rules, because the rules themselves don’t go far enough. In short, we 
have moved into an era where we are called upon to raise certain basic 
questions about the whole of society. We are still called upon to give aid 
to the beggar who finds himself in misery and agony on life’s highway. 
But one day, we must ask the question of whether the edifice which 
produces beggars must not be restructured and refurbished. That is where 
we are now... this means a revolution of values and other things (ibid). 
 
 The values that King had in his sights were the inter-related “evils of racism, 
economic exploitation and militarism” that he believed were destroying America’s soul 
(ibid). The prevalence of these three evils, King said, meant America’s values needed to 
be much more than merely reformed; they needed to be “born again” (ibid). Speaking to 
the connection between these evils, King said 
somebody must say to America: America, you have contempt for life, if 
you exploit human beings in seeing them as less than human, if you will 
treat human beings as a means to an end, you thingify human beings. 
And if you thingify persons, you will exploit them economically. And if 
you will exploit persons economically, you will abuse your military 
power to protect your economic investments... So what America must be 
told today is that she must be born again. The whole structure of 





The Do-Nothing Congress 
King’s conviction that America’s corrupted values were leading to imminent social 
catastrophe helped fire his frustration with Washington’s diminishing interest in helping 
America’s poor. The hopes that King had invested in President Johnson’s Great Society 
initiatives, largely dashed already by the Administration’s preoccupation with Vietnam, 
reached a new low with the mid-term elections of November 1966, which saw numerous 
liberal Democrats fall to conservative Republican rivals. Their defeat left the balance of 
power in Congress with a coalition of Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats, 
known as Dixiecrats, and all predictions for the 90th Congress pointed to a rough ride for 
the anti-poverty programs at the heart of Johnson’s Great Society agenda. This became 
apparent on May 18, 1967, when Republicans and their Dixiecrat allies joined forces to 
halt Johnson’s rent supplement program, which provided subsidies for poor tenants. In a 
statement reflecting the depth of King’s disaffection with Washington, Stanley Levison 
described the vote as nothing short of provocative. 
A reactionary Congressional coalition has poured on the Negro’s burning 
indignation the combustible fuel of rejection and bitterness. When the 
question is asked 'who starts riots in the ghettos,’ the list of the true 
instigators can now easily be identified in the roll call of Congress. This 
was a historic opportunity for statesmanship and brotherhood; it emerged a 
snarl of meanness and social blindness. The tragedy is that the American 
people, who are not indecent, will pay for these social atrocities committed 
in their name (FBI, 5/18/67, 7/0236). 
 
 From mid-1967 onwards, King and Levison developed the 90th Congress into the 
symbol of immorality and cruelty that his ghetto campaign had thus far been lacking. 
King’s condemnations of Congress took on a new urgency as his fears came to pass and 
unrest mounted in the ghettos of America’s big cities through May and June 1967 and 
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culminated in the death and destruction of Newark and Detroit in July. On July 26, as the 
anarchy in Detroit entered its fourth full day, King sent a telegram to President Johnson to 
warn that “Negro rioting would spread” if Congress did not immediately enact “some 
creative and massive program to end unemployment” (“Dr. King Supports Troops,” 1967, 
p.19). “Revolts come out of revolting conditions,” his telegram to Johnson continued. “A 
riot is the language of the unheard. It is a suicidal act – that last desperate act – when the 
Negro says, ‘I’m tired of living like a dog’”(ibid). The next day, with Congress moving to 
adopt a repressive “anti-riot” bill inspired by exaggerated evidence that the uprisings in 
Newark and Detroit were part of a “national pattern or timetable” (Herbers, 7/27/67, p.1) 
of organized insurrection, the New York Times quoted King attributing blame for the 
unrest to “a very insensitive, irresponsible Congress” (“Dr. King Blames Congress,” 
1967, p. 17) instead. “We do not need measures like the ‘anti-riot’ bill, which has sailed 
through the House of Representatives; we need legislation like the ‘anti-rat’ bill and the 
rent-supplement proposal which were hooted down in the same chamber,” King told a 
Chicago press conference (ibid). “Congress has created the atmosphere for these riots. It 
has shown it is not concerned with rats, it is not concerned with the deaths of children in 
rat-infested slums” (ibid). 
 King was by no means alone in his opinions, which were reflected in commentary 
and editorials in the New York Times and other news media organizations in the wake of 
Detroit. In fact, King even re-emerged as a “moderate” in a number of articles in the New 
York Times alongside the N.A.A.C.P.'s Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young of the Urban League 
and A. Philip Randolph, a founding father of the modern civil rights movement. The 
Times was clearly pleased to see King’s name alongside these three representatives of the 
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civil rights movement’s old guard on a statement condemning the riots and calling for law 
and order and listed King ahead of them in its front page coverage of the statement, 
which was published in its entirety inside the paper. An editorial in the same issue called 
the statement “courageous and wise, a timely act of responsible citizenship that deserves 
the respect and active support of Negroes and whites alike” and praised the four 
“moderate” leaders for making a “clean break with the extremists and the latter's 
mindless followers” ("The Voice of Negro Leadership,” 1967, p.34). King, however, was 
far from thrilled about his return as a “moderate” in the pages of the Times, not least of all 
because he had not authorized the final version of the statement in question. In a 
conversation with King that same day, Levison expressed concern that the “moderate” 
frame and the statement, which he said dealt “nine-tenths with the culpability of the 
Negro community,” was creating a “fuzzy picture” in light of King’s earlier statements on 
the situation that blamed Congress and the white community for creating the conditions 
that ghetto blacks were rebelling against. In a letter to the Times to which King gave his 
full consent, Levison did his best to correct the frame and reassert King’s militant middle 
credentials: “The rioters have behaved irrationally, but are they any more irrational than 
those who expect injustice eternally to be endured? To do too little to relieve the agony of 
Negro life is as inflammatory as citing a riot. To put an Asian war of dubious national 
interest far above domestic needs in order of priorities and to pit it against reforms that 
were delayed a century is worse than blind policy. It is provocative policy” (FBI, 7/29/67, 
7/0479). 
Civil Disobedience 
Three weeks later, King used the occasion of the SCLC’s 10th anniversary convention in 
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Atlanta to set out his plans for the coming year. In his annual report, King said SCLC had 
to “develop a program that will drive the nation toward a guaranteed annual income and/ 
or full-employment” (SCLC, 1967/8/16). In his August 15 address to convention 
delegates, King outlined his emerging belief that the only way to get a callous Congress 
to enact such a program was a campaign of massive civil disobedience. “Our real 
problem is that there is no disposition by the Administration nor Congress to seek 
fundamental remedies beyond police measures,” King told convention delegates. “The 
tragic truth is that Congress, more than the American people, is now running amok with 
racism. We must devise tactics, not to beg Congress for favors, but to create a situation in 
which they deem it wise and prudent to act with responsibility and decency” (King 
Papers, 1967/8/15, p.6). King framed civil disobedience as a militant middle path 
between suicidal “riots” and reckless talk of “armed insurrection,” on the one hand, and 
the futility of “obsequious pleas to an insensitive government” on the other (ibid, p. 9). 
However, for civil disobedience to be effective in the major cities of the North, it had to 
be on a large enough scale to avoid being absorbed as “merely transitory drama” by the 
“normal turbulence” of city life (ibid). 
To raise protest to an appropriate level for cities, to invest it with aggressive 
but nonviolent qualities, it is necessary to adopt civil disobedience. To 
dislocate the functioning of a city without destroying it can be more 
effective than a riot because it can be longer-lasting, costly to society but not 
wantonly destructive. Moreover, it is more difficult for government to quell 
by superior force. Mass civil disobedience can use rage as a constructive 
and creative force. It is purposeless to tell Negroes not to be enraged when 
they should be. Indeed, they will be mentally healthier if they do not 
suppress rage but vent it constructively and use its energy peacefully but 
forcefully to cripple the operations of an oppressive society. Civil 
disobedience can use the militancy wasted in riots to seize clothes or 
groceries many did not even want (ibid, 10). 
 
 SCLC’s 1966 Chicago campaign provided the insight that, in order for civil 
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disobedience to prove effective in a metropolitan setting, its actions had to be sustained, 
multi-pronged and have mass support. “If they are developed as weekly events at the 
same time as mass sit-ins are developed inside and at the gates of factories for jobs, and if 
simultaneously thousands of unemployed youth camp in Washington... without burning a 
match of firing a gun, the impact of the movement will have earthquake proportions,” 
King told convention delegates (ibid). King said that such a plan of action would not be 
easy, that “to have effect we will have to develop mass disciplined forces that can remain 
excited and determined without dramatic conflagrations” (ibid, p.11). Effective leadership 
was essential, King said, noting that the ghetto uprisings while largely the responsibility 
of the white majority, were also partially caused by the failure of the civil rights 
movement’s leadership to organize their “slum brothers” effectively. “Our internal 
squabbling, compromising and capitulating for cheap gains leaves them essentially 
leaderless,” he said (ibid). By correcting this, by organizing the ghetto masses and 
channelling their righteous anger into nonviolent direct action, King was convinced that 
civil disobedience could serve to convert the negativity of riots into a positive tool for 
social change. 
This view was disputed by an August 17 editorial in the New York Times that set 
the tone for its coverage to come. King’s civil disobedience proposal, the Times posited, 
“seems certain to aggravate the angry division of whites and Negroes into warring 
camps” (“Formula for Discord,” 1967, p.36). Claiming that nonviolence was “losing its 
appeal,” the Times worried that King’s attempts to engage angry young ghetto blacks to 
act “peacefully but forcefully to cripple the operations of a repressive society” could go 
terribly wrong: “once the spark of massive law-defiance is applied in the present 
 80 
 
overheated atmosphere, the potentiality for disaster becomes overwhelming” (ibid). 
Furthermore, the Times asserted that King’s “perilous project,” whether it came off or not, 
would only serve to strengthen the “powerful Congressional elements already convinced 
that the answer to urban unrest lies in repression rather than expanded programs for 
eradicating slum problems” (ibid).   
The New York Times 
Though it disagreed with him on tactics, the New York Times and Martin Luther King 
were in fact not so far apart in terms of their outlook on the crisis facing America in 
August 1967. While he didn’t name the New York Times by name, it was certainly among 
the “very distinguished newspapers, magazines, commentators and TV programs” that 
King’s August 15 convention address commended for their insight into “the basic causes 
[of the ghetto unrest]” and their calls for “fundamental reform, not revenge or military 
might” (ibid, p.9). As the last sentence of the Times editorial suggests, the paper agreed 
with King’s view that Congressional support for repressive anti-riot legislation over 
expanded anti-slum initiatives was wrongheaded. In fact, the Times’ editorial even 
expressed what could be taken as a reversal of its original position that the war in 
Vietnam and the crisis in America’s ghettos were “separate and distinct.” As the editorial 
sympathetically noted, “It is easy to understand the frustrations that spur Dr. King, the 
depth of resentment at the lack of any sense of urgency in either the White House or 
Congress for applying to the problems of the racial ghettos the same energies and 
resources that are being expended in Vietnam” (ibid). 
The New York Times’ perplexing position on Vietnam and its tendency to see peril 
rather than possibility in civil disobedience reflected the newspaper’s unwillingness to let 
condemnation of the status quo go too far. While many on its staff shared King’s 
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criticisms of the war and Washington’s irresponsible attitude toward the ghetto uprisings, 
and said so in print, they did so within the context of a paper long-defined by a perceived 
duty that “so far as possible consistent with honest journalism attempts to act and support 
those who are charged with responsibility for Government” (Salisbury, 1980, p. 30). Gay 
Talese described this as the Times’ role as “responsible spokesman for the system” (1969, 
p.460) and its twin pillars of “capitalism and democracy” (ibid, p.7). This function 
translated into an editorial policy founded on two imperatives that Roger Starr, a former 
editorial board member, said governed the Times’ approach to political and economic 
matters. The first imperative was to ensure that government programs supported “the 
efficient functioning of the private economic system” (Starr in McKenzie, 1994, vii), 
which the Times’ considered “the only way in which a satisfactory standard of living can 
be produced” (ibid) for all Americans. This dedication to capitalism worked in 
conjunction with a second democratic imperative, which Starr said was the corollary 
belief that economic policy had to “assure that an adequate share of goods and services be 
available to every American” (ibid). With this editorial policy, the Times filled the dual 
and often conflicting and confusing roles of defender of the capitalist Establishment and 
benevolent friend and spokesperson for America’s have-nots.  
The mounting chaos in America’s cities during the summer of 1967, however, 
pushed the New York Times toward an increasingly hostile view of Washington’s punitive, 
law-and-order response to the situation. When its August 9 editorial cited the celebrated 
black psychologist, Kenneth B. Clark, saying “I find myself becoming more and more 
extremist because of government inaction. I am becoming less moderate and less 
balanced” (“Slogans,” 1967, p.38), the Times was asserting its duties as both responsible 
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spokesman for the system and “early warning system” (Gitlin, 1980, p.52) for the 
Establishment, which had to know that Washington’s dereliction of its duty to govern 
responsibly was radicalizing even the system’s moderate critics. The intransigence of the 
White House and Congress on the ghetto uprisings was, in effect, endangering the system 
itself. 
 As King found out the next week, however, the New York Times’ impatience with 
Washington had its limits. Forcing Washington to alter course by way of massive civil 
disobedience went beyond the scope of legitimate protest. The “system” and the rule of 
law that supported it had to be respected, even if the elected government was resisting 
what the Times itself considered the best interests of the nation and imperiling the system 
itself.  
Civil disobedience and media Strategy  
The New York Times was by no means unique among U.S. news organizations in its 
concerns for massive civil disobedience. Two days before King went public with his 
emerging plans in his August 15 convention speech, the topic dominated the questions 
that he faced from host Lawrence E. Spivak and media panelists Simeone Booker, 
Haynes Johnson and Wallace Westfield on NBC’s Meet The Press. Spivak’s opening 
question went back to the April 2 edition of the New York Times in which it was reported 
that King was “weighing” the use of civil disobedience to protest the war in Vietnam if 
the conflict escalated (see page 33). Spivak wanted to know what King meant by that and 
whether King was now advocating civil disobedience in light of the fact the war had 
indeed escalated in the interim (King Papers, 1967/8/13, p.1). Haynes Johnson of the 
Washington Evening Star asked King: “Some of your strongest critics have charged that 
you yourself are responsible for part of the urban violence that afflicts us recently in the 
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riots, in that by advocating civil disobedience the logical and inevitable effect of that is 
civil disorder, that people who have no respect for law and authority then take things into 
their own hands. How do you answer such charges?” (ibid, p. 3) King called the 
allegation “absurd” and countered: 
I have never advocated anarchy, I have never advocated lawlessness, I 
have never advocated violence, I have never advocated arson, I have never 
advocated sniping or looting. I have only said, and I still believe this, that 
if one finds a law unjust, then he has a moral responsibility to take a stand 
against that law, even if it means breaking that law. But I have also gone 
on to say that he must break that law openly, he must not seek to defy the 
law, he must not seek to annihilate the law in the same sense that you 
would find the Klan doing, but he must do it openly and cheerfully and in 
the right spirit. It is still my conviction that he who breaks the law that 
conscience tells him is unjust and willingly accepts the penalty for 
breaking it is at that moment expressing the very highest respect for the 
law. So anyone who says that what we have done in the civil rights 
movement in the South, for instance, created an atmosphere of riots is 
misreading history and certainly dishonestly interpreting everything that 
we have done (ibid). 
 
 Johnson followed this with a question about the possibility of a “widening 
division” among blacks in America’s cities on the question of “whether to proceed in a 
nonviolent manner” (ibid). King replied that there was “no doubt that some Negroes are 
disenchanted with nonviolence... they feel that we haven’t made enough progress in 
general [through nonviolence] and as a result are talking more in terms of violence” 
(ibid). However, King said he still believed that the “vast majority” of America’s blacks 
believed nonviolence was the “best strategy, the best tactic to use in this moment of social 
transition” and claimed that only one percent of America’s blacks were actively involved 
in the uprisings in its cities (ibid, p. 4). Wallace Westfield of NBC News asked King 
whether it was true that the 99 percent of blacks whom he claimed believed in 
nonviolence “in a sense, tolerated, tacitly approved the violence of the [one percent]” 
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(ibid). King replied by reasserting his view that, while it was true that some blacks no 
doubt gained a kind of “psychological” satisfaction from the violence, most blacks “still 
believe that the best approach, the best way to really bring about the social changes that 
we are seeking will be through the nonviolent approach” (ibid, p.5). Haynes Johnson 
returned to this point after a discussion of King’s views on President Johnson’s policies in 
Vietnam and the talk of King running for President. Johnson asked King for his thoughts 
on how he could reach the “one percent – those who are committing violence and are the 
rioters themselves” given that he had not yet been able to convert them to nonviolence 
(ibid, p.6).  King offered that, while he would continue to emphasize that “riots... are 
socially destructive and self-defeating,” the way to reach them was not through 
“pronouncements and through preaching” but through firm commitments by the larger, 
white society to “social justice and progress,” which he called “the absolute guarantors of 
riot prevention” (ibid). 
As long as these intolerable conditions of poverty, terrible housing 
conditions and the syndrome of deprivation surrounding slumism – as long 
as these things exist, we have the dangerous possibility of people becoming 
so angry, so depressed and so caught up in despair that they will engage in 
this kind of misguided activity, and I think the best way to reach them is to 
get them jobs, is to give them a new sense of hope, a new sense of dignity, 
a new sense of self-respect as a result of a good, solid job, as a result of a 
decent sanitary home in which to live and as a result of good school, with 
quality and everything else, that their children can attend. (ibid, p.6-7). 
 
 King expressed confidence that “the forces of good will, white and black, in this 
country can work together to bring about a resolution to this problem” (ibid, p.7). 
America had the resources to solve the situation, but “at present we don’t have the will,” 
King said (ibid). This meant that the black community together with “decent committed 
whites” had to “work together to so arouse the conscience of this nation and at the same 
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time to so articulate the issue through direct action and powerful action programs, that 
our demands can no longer be eluded by the government or by Congress or all of the 
forces in power” (ibid). Given the fact that the civil rights victories of the previous ten 
years had done little to “penetrate the lower depths of Negro deprivation in the North,” 
King told the Meet The Press panel that nonviolence had to be escalated on a larger scale 
in Northern cities. “I think a powerful nonviolent movement can be just as effective in the 
North as in the South, and I think we can do it, we can disrupt things if necessary, 
militantly and nonviolently, without destroying life and property” (ibid). 
 The questions King faced on Meet The Press and in the New York Times reflected 
what he and his advisors knew was moderate, middle-class America’s profound fear of 
social unrest and its mounting intolerance for the lawlessness and disorder engulfing the 
ghettos. And yet, as King told Levison on August 22, 1967, he also saw “understanding” 
in the news coverage of his plans for civil disobedience (FBI, 8/22/67, 7/0537). Both 
King and Levison knew the challenge inherent to his plans was to develop this 
understanding by convincing middle class whites and blacks that civil disobedience could 
produce positive benefits, not least of all an end to the fearsome ghetto unrest. They took 
encouragement from a recent Lou Harris poll that found two-thirds of Americans “willing 
to take an aggressive step towards the elimination of the ghettos,” which Levison called 
“amazing because it puts Johnson and Congress in opposition to the will of the people” 
(ibid). King took the Harris poll as evidence that the time was ripe for “the dramatization 
of the poverty problem in a specific location” and a nationwide “appeal for legislative 
action” (ibid). Together they agreed that the specific location had to be Washington D.C.   
 Key to winning public support for a campaign of massive civil disobedience in the 
 86 
 
nation’s capital was the need to convince moderate, middle-class Americans that civil 
disobedience was the lesser of two evils, with the greater evil being not the ghetto 
uprisings but rather the interrelated evils of racism, militarism and a heartless brand of 
capitalism that took no responsibility for the plight of America’s 40-million poor. King 
endeavoured over the course of his remaining eight months to make the 90th Congress 
the personification of these corrupt values and convince Americans that this indifference 
to the desperation of America’s poor was producing the unrest in America’s cities and 
bringing the country to the edge of catastrophe. It was a radical message, but it was not 
out of place given the circumstances facing America in 1967 and 1968. Key to winning 
public support for what would become known as the Poor People’s Campaign (PPC) was 
a media strategy that employed the ongoing media and public influence derived from 
King’s militant middle position on the ghetto uprisings in three ways: 1) emphasize the 
positive, constructive nature of the PPC’s goals of jobs or income for America’s poor; 2) 
emphasize the urgency of the situation and the PPC’s goal of rescuing the country from 
greater unrest and social catastrophe; and 3) assert the continuing strength and appeal of 
King’s leadership and nonviolence.    
Disruptive acts, constructive goals 
On July 19, 1967, as America struggled to make sense of the anarchy and death toll in 
Newark’s Third Ward, King and Levison discussed the most effective contribution that 
King could make to resolving the crisis. King felt it imperative that his contribution be 
“dramatic” enough to cut through the hysteria and bring attention to the heart of the 
matter. “I can’t be merely condemning the riots,” he said. “I’ve got to be condemning the 
intolerable conditions leading to them, and the fact that not enough is being done” (FBI, 
7/19/67, 7/0426). As we read above, King understood that the ghetto uprisings were 
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expressions of the legitimate rage of black youths with no prospects in an essentially 
racist society that deprived them of quality education and job opportunities. Rather than 
alienating them further through a blanket condemnation of their actions, King wanted 
them to see him as an ally and win them over to nonviolence and constructive militancy. 
Furthermore, King wanted white Americans to understand that resorting to repression and 
law-and-order would not solve the problems and that “a massive act of concern will do 
more than the most massive deployment of troops to quell riots and still hatreds” (King 
Papers, 1967/8/15, p. 3).  
Given the SCLC’s difficulties dramatizing ghetto conditions by marches and other 
traditional tactics up to this point, Levison suggested that King put forward a program 
proposal “that may have a dramatic quality” (ibid). Given the general acceptance that 
unemployment in the ghettos was a principal source of instability, Levison advised King 
to call on the Johnson Administration to establish a massive federal job creation program 
in the spirit of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Depression-fighting Works Progress 
Administration. “You can make the dramatic point that when the country had no money, 
this was done and put millions to work, and removed a dangerous situation, so why isn’t 
it being done when we are sick with money,” Levison said, adding that it might resonate 
with Johnson, who got his start in the Roosevelt Administration (ibid). 
 Levison developed his proposal into a statement for King as the chaos in Detroit 
entered its second day. With the “flames of riot and revolt” illuminating “the skies over 
American cities,” Levison established King as the one with a constructive, sensible plan 
for saving America from further destruction: 
Every single outbreak without exception has substantially been ascribed to 
gross unemployment particularly among young people. In most cities for 
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Negro youth it is greater than the unemployment level of the Depression 
Thirties. Let us do one simple, direct thing – let us end unemployment 
totally and immediately... I propose specifically the creation of a national 
agency that shall provide a job to every person who needs work, young and 
old, white and Negro... I am convinced that a single, dramatic, massive 
proof of concern that touches the needs of all the oppressed will ease 
resentments and heal enough angry wounds to permit constructive attitudes 
to emerge (FBI, 7/24/67, 7/0442). 
 
 Levison, King, Andy Young and Manhattan lawyer Harry Wachtel, another of 
King’s close advisors, got together by conference call the next day to discuss what to do 
with the statement. With Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and the Urban League’s Whitney 
Young condemning the ghetto rebellions, Levison said it would be a “grave mistake” for 
King to be seen joining them in doing so. On the other hand, King’s silence up until this 
point was also starting to get noticed and it did not look good. Given the “overwhelming 
view of the press, which condemns the Administration and Congress for its own crimes,” 
Levison believed his statement would be welcomed because it “contains a specific 
proposal” (FBI, 7/25/67, 7/0453). Levison also reassured King that the constructive 
position on the uprisings that he was proposing was shared by “some very distinguished 
opinion-makers and a very large mass of people who have seen through to the real issue 
here” (ibid). As the four spoke, President Johnson came on television to address the 
nation about the situation in Detroit. All agreed that “Johnson sounds afraid” (ibid). This 
perceived fear was also seen to be affecting the white community, which meant King 
“may expect a certain amount of understanding rather than antagonism if he does not 
strongly condemn the looting and destruction” (ibid). Levison also believed that, if SCLC 
played its cards right, it could emerge as the “reasonable alternative” in the crisis. A 
gloomy King, however, was less optimistic, saying that America “is headed the way of 
the Roman Empire” as a result of “the riots, the war in Vietnam, excessive materialism” 
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(ibid). To Wachtel, however, this meant the ghetto uprisings had to be treated as a 
“sickness rather than a wrong” (ibid) and it was agreed their plan should be “not to point 
the finger but to put forward constructive acts” (ibid). As Wachtel pointed out, President 
Johnson had taken bold action recently to resolve a strike by the nation’s railway workers 
and might be willing to embrace King’s dramatic proposal if it meant calming the 
rebellion spreading through America’s cities. Accordingly, Wachtel believed it was 
crucial that King hold a press conference the next morning to answer President Johnson 
directly, whose “exhortations for law and order and his request that the Negroes ‘go back 
to your homes’... was not dealing with the problem” (ibid). King agreed to the press 
conference, which he would hold at his church in Atlanta, and asked Wachtel if he could 
help assure full coverage in the New York Times. Wachtel said he would contact John 
Oakes, the paper’s editorial pages editor, “and make a very special plea to him in this 
regard” (ibid). 
 Coverage of the press conference in the New York Times, however, was limited to 
a United Press International report that ran amid a two-page spread of stories detailing 
incidents of unrest in cities across America. Headlined “Dr. King supports troops in 
Detroit,” the first two paragraphs played up King’s response to a journalist’s question 
about his opinion on the deployment of U.S. army soldiers in Detroit. “I am very sorry 
that Federal troops had to be called in. There’s no doubt that when a riot erupts in has to 
be halted,” King said (1967, p.19).  Six of the report’s eight paragraphs, however, dealt 
with the contents of King’s statement and emphasized his claim that ridding the ghettos 
of unemployment would dramatically reduce the anger and resentment fuelling the 
uprisings. “I proposed specifically the creation of a national agency that shall provide a 
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job to every person who needs work,” it quoted King saying. In a conversation the 
following day, Levison and King agreed that his press conference got “much better 
treatment” (FBI, 7/27 /67, 7/0462) in papers in Chicago and Atlanta and in the 
Washington Post, all of which emphasized King’s call for a massive job creation 
program. Levison enthused that the Post “even saw the necessity of giving the job 
program a name and said ‘Dr. King called for a NATIONAL FULL EMPLOYMENT 
ACT,’ all capitalized” (ibid). Levison advised King to keep repeating the need for such a 
program, saying that “as time moves on it will become clearer that the only one who is 
not talking platitudes is you, that you are talking about something concrete. And because 
it is simple and direct, I think it will get through to a lot of people” (ibid).  
A Poor People's Campaign 
In a week-long mid-September SCLC retreat in Warrendon, Virginia, King met with his 
senior staff and advisors to discuss the organization’s strategic priorities and the 
implementation of King’s Washington campaign. Fairclough’s account of the meeting 
suggests that the emphasis on a federal jobs program was not only because it was “simple 
and direct,” but also because it was much easier to rally media and public support around 
than other possible actions, like James Bevel’s call for an all-out SCLC campaign against 
the war in Vietnam (Fairclough, 1987, p.358). According to Fairclough, King deemed 
Bevel’s proposal for a ‘stop the draft’ movement “impractical,” in part because he felt 
“the majority of the press was still behind the administration over the war” (ibid, p.359). 
Meanwhile, King noted that there was growing support in the news media and the 
American public for “a stepped-up attack on poverty” (ibid). King tried to reassure Bevel 
that compelling the government to “reassess its priorities” and take action on poverty 
would inevitably “weaken support for the war,” as well (ibid). The retreat concluded with 
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the decision to pursue a “go for broke” anti-poverty campaign targeting Washington 
(Garrow, 1986, p.578). 
On October 23, 1967, King was in Washington to testify before the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, the inquiry initiated by President Johnson to 
study the causes of the ghetto rebellions. Speaking to reporters after his testimony, King 
went against Levison’s entreaties that he not discuss the Poor People’s Campaign until his 
plans were more concrete, which Levison worried would leave King appearing “as if all 
he is doing is talking” (FBI, 10/2/67, 7/0647). King told the gathered journalists, 
however, that “the time has come if we can’t get anything done otherwise to camp right 
here in Washington... and stay here by the thousands and thousands until the Congress of 
our nation and the federal government will do something to deal with the 
[unemployment]” (King Papers, 1967/10/23, p.1). King said other activities would be 
considered “without destroying life or property but making it clear that the city will not 
function” (ibid). King then informed the gathered reporters of his proposals to the civil 
disorders commission: “My major point was that the time has come for a massive 
program on the part of the federal government that will make jobs or income a reality for 
every American citizen” (ibid, p.2). Furthermore, King said he was also proposing a 
massive program of “civil rights for the disadvantaged,” which he said would cost the 
government around $20 billion a year for the next 10 years to eradicate slums, 
unemployment, poor education and ultimately poverty itself through a guaranteed annual 
income. As King told the reporters, this was not a new program but one that he had 
promoted before. Since the summer of 1966, King had been calling for this “Marshall 
Plan” for America’s cities, after the massive U.S. aid package that rebuilt Europe after the 
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Second World War. However, given the lack of will in Congress for implementing such a 
program, King told reporters:   
I think the civil rights movement has a responsibility to bring about the 
pressure and the power so that Congress can no longer elude our 
demands... As long as the programs don’t emerge, the slums will get worse 
and unemployment will get worse and the despair and cynicism will get 
worse and I don’t see any change until our federal government has the will 
to emerge with a program that really goes all out to solve these basic 
problems (ibid, p.3). 
 
Countering the radical frame 
Three days later, an editorial in the Washington Post condemned King’s “vague proposal” 
and expressed its hope that he would, “on reflection, change his mind” (“King’s Camp-
in,” 1967, p. A20). Far from constructive and more militant than middle, the Post 
described King’s “deliberately contrived” plan as “intimidation” and “a massive invasion 
and sit-down... intended to cause the suspension of Government operations” (ibid).  
Whereas “any real democracy” had to accept the inconvenience of conscientious protest 
that “incidentally discommodes the operations of Government,” the Post said “any 
ordinary government must resist” King’s “appeal to anarchy” and its efforts to force 
Government compliance with “the dictates of a minority” (ibid). “Those who conjure up 
mobs to force the suspension of Government itself are talking about revolution – even if 
they call it ‘passive resistance’ or ‘civil disobedience’” (ibid). The Post concluded by 
warning King that such tactics were more likely to entrench the attitudes in Congress that 
he was trying to change and “invite... a reaction even from those broadly sympathetic to 
Dr. King’s larger purposes” (ibid). 
 Levison was undeterred by King’s rebuke in the Post. In a conversation recorded 
by the FBI on November 16, Levison turned to the latest issue of Newsweek magazine as 
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proof that important voices in the white community understood the need for the Poor 
People’s Campaign. The issue, entitled “The Negro in America: What Must Be Done” 
was dedicated almost in its entirety to the concerns of black Americans and what it billed 
as a “program of action” for addressing them.  Levison described Newsweek’s new 
embrace of advocacy journalism, which saw the magazine renounce its long-standing 
tradition of not taking an editorial position on issues, as “what has to be said by the white 
community” (FBI, 11/16/67, 7/0770). Taken together with other high profile voices in the 
white community that were calling for federal action on ghetto conditions, and the 
entrenched resistance of Congress to all of them, Levison called the situation “marvelous 
support for a campaign of civil disobedience in the spring” (ibid). Levison said it sounded 
“a note of desperation” from “white forces” that would help provide traction for King’s 
militant middle message, which Levison interpreted as “I am giving you a last chance on 
my terms and I am doing you a favor and not being vengeful” (ibid). 
The belief that there was high profile support in the white community for a major 
push on racism and poverty was underscored in the following issue of Newsweek, which 
ran a full page of letters applauding the magazine’s progressive prescriptions for bridging 
America’s racial divide. The various authors were a Who’s who of prominent white 
politicians spanning America’s left and right, including New York Governor Nelson A. 
Rockefeller, Zbigniew Brezezinski of the U.S. State Department, New York City Mayor 
John V. Lindsay, Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Senator Jacob K. Javits. Appearing 
alongside them was a letter from King, who congratulated Newsweek on its refusal “to 
hide behind a cloak of analysis” and its “commitment to things that are right and 




 That same week, a poll by Lou Harris published in the New York Times on 
November 20 provided King and Levison with further evidence of popular support for 
constructive federal programs in aid of America’s ghettos and its poor. The Harris poll 
found that a majority of Americans continued to favour “decisive Federal action to raze 
slums, establish work programs to provide jobs for the unemployed, create a Federal rat 
extermination program and provide summer camps for poor children” (Harris, 
1967/11/20, p.32). According to Harris, 57 per cent of Americans polled favoured “a 
Federal program to tear down ghettoes in American cities” (ibid) and 56 per cent 
supported “a Federal program to provide jobs for the unemployed of the ghettos” (ibid). 
Despite a drop in support from a previous poll on the same subject immediately following 
the uprising in Detroit, Harris reported that “the underlying opinion about correcting 
conditions in the ghettos remains unchanged” (ibid). 
 The Harris poll findings would prove central to King’s official announcement of 
the Poor People’s Campaign at a press conference on December 4, 1967. King told 
reporters that the coming spring would see SCLC “lead waves of the nation’s poor and 
disinherited to Washington D.C. next spring to demand redress of their grievances by the 
United States government, and to secure at least jobs and income for all... In short, we 
will be petitioning our government for specific reforms, and we intend to build militant 
nonviolent actions until that government moves against poverty” (King Papers, 
1967/12/4, p.1). He pointed to the Harris poll to frame the campaign as one seeking only 
what a “substantial majority of Americans” agreed was necessary – federal investments in 
job creation and the rebuilding of America’s slums (ibid, p.2). Furthermore, the Poor 
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People’s Campaign reflected the interests of “concerned leaders of industry, civil rights 
organizations, labor unions and churches” (ibid) who were also mobilizing in pursuit of 
“progressive economic measures at a national level” (ibid). King pointed to a growing 
number of mayors in major American cities who were willing “to carry out enlightened 
programs if only the federal government will provide the needed financial support” 
(ibid). Last but not least, King turned to Newsweek and its “sound proposals” for 
correcting race inequality to underscore parallel concerns in the news media. “I cite these 
facts merely to show that a clear majority in America are asking for the very things which 
we will demand in Washington,” King told reporters (ibid). 
 As the civil rights movement had learned from “hard and bitter experience” (ibid), 
Washington “does not move to correct a problem involving race until it is confronted 
directly and dramatically,” King continued. Seeking to frame the Poor People’s 
Campaign in the context of hallowed civil rights victories past, King told reporters: “It 
required a Selma before the fundamental right to vote was written into federal statutes. It 
took a Birmingham before the government moved to open the doors of public 
accommodations to all human beings. What we need now is a new kind of Selma or 
Birmingham to dramatize the economic plight of the Negro, and compel the government 
to act” (ibid). With “unrest among the poor in America, and particularly among Negroes” 
(ibid, p.4) escalating, national priorities that put “killing people 12,000 miles away” and 
the “glamour of multi-billion dollar exploits in space” ahead of the basic needs of people 
had to be reconsidered, King said (ibid). “Patronizing gestures and half-way promises” 
would no longer be tolerated, King said. For its part, SCLC would aim to constructively 
“channelize the smouldering rage and frustration of Negro people into an effective, 
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militant and nonviolent movement of massive proportions in Washington and other areas” 
(ibid). King justified the focus on the nation’s capital with the assertion that “The 
President and Congress have a primary responsibility for low minimum wages, for a 
degrading system of inadequate welfare, for subsidies for the rich and unemployment and 
underemployment of the poor, for a war mentality, for slums and starvation, and racism” 
(ibid). In order to “move our nation and our government on a new course of social, 
economic and political reform,” King said SCLC would “use any means of legitimate 
nonviolent protest necessary” (ibid). Doing so was SCLC’s duty as an “organization 
committed to nonviolence and freedom” (ibid). King finished by calling on all Americans 
to join SCLC in its efforts to bring creative, positive social change to the nation. “In this 
way, we can work creatively against the despair and indifference that have so often 
caused our nation to be immobilized during the cold winter and shaken profoundly in the 
hot summer,” King said (ibid). 
 King’s rationale for the Poor People’s Campaign did little to convince the New 
York Times that massive civil disobedience was a justifiable tactic. Echoing the 
Washington Post’s earlier rebuke, a Times editorial on December 6, 1967, condemned 
King’s plans as a violation of “the principles of responsible protest” (“Responsibility for 
Dissent,” 1967, p.46). The Times said King’s “proclaimed goal of massive dislocation” 
belied his “profession of peaceful intent” (ibid) and warned that such dislocation “would 
probably involve some overt violence” while violating “the rights of thousands of 
Washingtonians and the interests of millions of Americans” (ibid). All things considered, 
the Times declared that the “means are not justified by the end” (ibid). 
To heal a sick nation 
The condemnation of King’s threat to shut down Washington with massive civil 
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disobedience by the New York Times and the Washington Post was countered by King’s 
view that such a tactic was legitimized by the resistance of the 90th Congress and the 
Johnson Administration to widely supported programs that would bring quality to the 
lives of millions of poor Americans and peace to the nation’s cities. One of the best 
expressions of King’s rationale is found in a lecture that he gave as part of the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation’s Massey Lectures series in November 1967. Entitled 
“Nonviolence and Social Change,” King likened civil disobedience to an ambulance 
going through a red light as it rushes to the hospital: 
Massive civil disobedience is a strategy for social change which is at least 
as powerful as an ambulance with its siren on full... The emergency we 
now face is economic. For the 35-million poor people in America – not 
even to mention, just yet, the poor in other nations – there is a kind of 
strangulation in the air. In our society, it’s murder, psychologically, to 
deprive a man of a job or an income. You’re in substance saying to that 
man that he has no right to exist. You’re in a real way depriving him of 
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, denying in his case the very 
creed of society (King, 1967, in The Lost Massey Lectures, 2007, p. 199-
201). 
 
A “sick" Congress 
From his official announcement of the Poor People’s Campaign in December 1967 until 
his assassination five months later, King made an increasingly dramatic and patriotic case 
for his belief that the Poor People’s Campaign was the nation’s last chance at a 
nonviolent solution to the ghetto unrest before the arrival of a summer that he feared 
would bring unparalleled turmoil and military repression to its cities. As he told a press 
conference in Chicago on January 5, 1968, the Poor People’s Campaign was necessary 
because “this sick Congress keeps on going [in] its reckless ways creating the atmosphere 
for riots and violence, so we have to go to Washington” (King Papers, 1968/1/5, p.3). 
What is important to note here is the fact that, when talking to the press, King usually 
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qualified civil disobedience with the tension-ratcheting threat “if necessary.” Among 
other examples, we see this dramatic tactic at work in a press conference on January 16, 
1968, in which King told gathered reporters “we are willing, if necessary, to fill up the 
jails in Washington, and surrounding communities” (King Papers, 1968/1/16, p.8). King 
always made it clear that whether it went that far was up to Congress. Rather than King 
being the source of anarchy, as claimed by the Washington Post editorial from the 
previous October, he continually framed the 90th Congress as the instigators of disorder 
and PPC participants as patriotic, responsible citizens no different from the dignified civil 
rights marchers of the past decade. King would often establish Congressional 
responsibility for the ghetto unrest with a favourite quote from Victor Hugo’s Les 
Misérables: “If the soul is left in darkness, sins will be committed. The guilty one is not 
he who commits the sin, but he who causes the darkness” (King, 1967, in The Lost 
Massey Lectures, 2007, p.169). In the August 15 convention address in which he first 
proposed a campaign of civil disobedience, King followed this quote by asserting that 
the policy makers of the white society have caused the darkness; they have 
created discrimination; they created slums; they perpetuate unemployment, 
ignorance and poverty. It is incontestable and deplorable that Negroes have 
committed crimes [in Detroit, etc.]; but they are derivative crimes. They are 
born of the greater crimes of the white society. When we ask Negroes to 
abide by the law, let us also declare that the white man does not abide by law 
in the ghettos. Day in and day out he violates welfare laws to deprive the 
poor of their meagre allotments; he flagrantly violates building codes and 
regulations; his police make a mockery of law; he violates laws on equal 
employment and education and the provisions for civic services. The slums 
are the handiwork of a vicious system of the white society. Negroes live in 
them but do not make them any more than a prisoner makes a prison (ibid). 
  
The approaching flashpoint 
Working alongside his efforts to establish the racism of the white power structure as the 
true source of disorder in American society was a parallel assertion that civil 
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disobedience was necessary because America was running out of time. In the months to 
come, King’s speeches and press statements were peppered with foreboding references to 
his belief that the ghetto uprisings were pushing America toward the precipice of anarchic 
social meltdown and the establishment of a right wing law-and-order regime. This view 
lay at the heart of Levison’s draft statement for King on the uprising in Detroit discussed 
above, which concluded: “I regret that my expression may be sharp but I believe literally 
that the life of our nation is at stake here at home. Measures to preserve it need to be 
boldly and swiftly applied before the process of social disintegration engulfs the whole of 
society” (FBI, 7/24/67, 7/0442). Three weeks later, in his convention address on civil 
disobedience, King said “the time we have is shorter than many of us believed. Patience 
is running out and the intransigence and hostility of government – national, state and 
municipal – is aggregating grievances to explosive levels” (King Papers, 1967/8/15, p. 7). 
In a January 5, 1968, press conference, King told reporters: 
I think we’re drifting [as a] nation at this point with no basic sense of 
purpose, priorities or policy and if we continue down this road I have no 
doubt that we could [go] the same way as so-called empires and 
civilizations of the past. I must honestly say that when I go back to reading 
The Decline and Fall of The Roman Empire I find myself saying that the 
parallels are frightening. Until we find in America [a] new sense of 
purpose, a new sense of priorities and policy where persons are more 
valuable than property and where the ends for which we live are as 
important as the means by which we live and where we make love rather 
than war we are going to destroy ourselves with our abuse of power (King 
Papers, 1968/1/5, p. 4). 
 
 
The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
 
On March 1, 1968, King’s foreboding outlook on America, and his prescribed remedies 
for pulling the nation back from the brink, were echoed by the final report of the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, which put the blame for the ghetto uprisings 
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squarely on the shoulders of America’s white majority. “White racism is essentially 
responsible for the explosive mixture which has been accumulating in our cities since the 
end of World War II,” the report read (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 
1968, p. 10). “Discrimination and segregation have long permeated much of American 
life; they now threaten the very future of every American... To pursue our present course 
will involve the continuing polarization of the American community and ultimately, the 
destruction of basic democratic values” (ibid, p.1). Vitally, the Commissioners – led by 
Illinois Governor, Otto Kerner, and drawn primarily from the white political and business 
Establishment – called for radical reforms to race relations in America that they saw 
dividing the country into “two societies: one black, one white – separate and unequal” 
(ibid, p. 1). Healing this dangerous cleavage, the Commission concluded, required “a 
commitment to national action on an unprecedented scale” in order to “shape a future 
compatible with the historic ideals of American society. The great productivity of our 
economy, and a federal revenue system which is highly responsive to economic growth, 
can provide the resources. The major need is to generate a new will – the will to tax 
ourselves to the extent necessary to meet the vital needs of the nation” (ibid, p.23). 
Federal action – including the creation of two million public and private sector jobs over 
three years, new federal funds to desegregate and improve the education system and 
nationalized welfare standards that would provide a minimum floor of assistance no 
lower than the federally set “poverty level” – were necessary to “fulfill our pledge of 
equality and to meet the fundamental needs of a democratic and civilized society – 
domestic peace and social justice,” the report asserted (ibid). 
 The next day, the front page of New York Times ran a report on responses by King 
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and other black leaders to the Commission’s findings. Though he welcomed the 
Commission’s recommendations, King found it hard to be too enthusiastic given the fact 
they “have been made before almost to the last detail and have been ignored almost to the 
last detail” (Zion, 1968, p.1). As reporter Sydney E. Zion wrote, King said that the 
Commission’s report “confirmed what he had been saying all along: that the United 
States faces ‘chaos and disintegration’ if the Negro is not brought into the mainstream of 
American life” (ibid, p.14). King called the findings both “timely” and welcome support 
for SCLC’s call “on all Americans to go to Washington [this spring] to demand that 
Congress address itself to this problem” (ibid).   
At King’s request, Levison dictated a statement on the Commission’s findings for 
a March 4th press conference. The statement, recorded and paraphrased by the FBI, said 
the Commission “deserved the gratitude of the nation because they had the wisdom to 
perceive the truth and the courage to state it” (FBI, 3/4/68, 8/0185). Levison said the 
Commission’s findings, that “white racism” was the “chief destructive cutting force” that 
was cleaving America into two “hostile societies,” reflected the conclusions of none other 
than Thomas Jefferson, who “would have no respite from his fear” that the “killing 
disease of white racism” would destroy America in the end (ibid). Levison underscored 
the importance of Congressional action on the Commission’s findings, which he warned 
“should not just be filed away as other White House conferences and reports... the duty of 
every American is to solve this problem without regard to cost” (ibid). As King had 
remarked in the Times, the likelihood of Congress shelving the report provided dramatic 
new impetus for the nation-saving Poor People’s Campaign: 
The people must now take charge of the preservation of the nation. We will 
not permit the government to uncover the truth and rebury it. An America 
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split by white racism is an America on the threshold of doom... The highest 
patriotism demands the end of the Vietnam war and the opening of a 
bloodless war over racism and poverty. We will try through militant mass 
pressure to transform the Commission’s report from recommendations to 
national policy. The final answer must come from Congress and the White 
House (ibid). 
 
 Speaking to Andy Young after the press conference, which Young said “went very 
well” (ibid), Levison enthused that the Poor People’s Campaign and the National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders were now essentially putting forward the same 
proposals for federal action on the ghettos and poverty. In light of this, Levison suggested 
that it would be “much cleverer” for SCLC, rather than running with its own draft 
program, to now base PPC strategy around a message like “Administration, these are 
your recommendations, of your Commission, and we are coming to Washington to 
demand that you implement your program” (ibid). Levison observed: “We will be the 
only organization that has an action program in support of these recommendations 
because we are already in motion” (ibid).  
Convincing the middle-class 
King’s assertion that the report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 
provided a “timely” justification for SCLC’s Washington plans reflected what he knew 
was the vital need to link the Poor People’s Campaign to the concerns and sympathies of 
mainstream, middle-class America. As Levison advised King shortly after the December 
press conference at which he made public the details of the campaign, “we’re going to 
have a real job of interpretation for the middle class whites and middle class Negroes... 
They’re going to have trouble with [civil disobedience]” (FBI, 12/13/67, 7/0841). If 
middle-class Americans were inclined to dismiss King’s tone as fear-mongering or 
extremism, the dire assessment of race relations in America by the respectable members 
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of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders suddenly made it that much 
more difficult to do so. As columnist Tom Wicker wrote in his introduction to the New 
York Times edition of the report, the composition of the Commission, with its mix of 
liberal Democrats, fiscally-conservative Republicans, and representatives of police and 
business, made it impossible “to doubt the urgency of the case, the shock of the findings, 
the truth of the need” (ix). 
 In Levison’s opinion, the Poor People’s Campaign was gaining traction with 
middle class Americans through February and into March 1968. On February 24, Levison 
told SCLC lawyer, Clarence Jones, that contributions from SCLC’s primarily middle-
class donors lists were “running way ahead of last year,” and repeated “way ahead” for 
emphasis (FBI, 2/24/67, 8/0162). Levison took this as an endorsement of the Poor 
People’s Campaign because the fundraising letter that people were answering was “very 
carefully gotten up to center it on the mobilization and explain the rationale for it. So 
what we’re getting is a vote on the mobilization... it’s a real test of the middle-class, 
intellectual, most concerned type of people” (ibid). This middle-class response combined 
with what Levison said were reports from SCLC field organizers in Mississippi, Alabama 
and Philadelphia that people there were “raring to go” (ibid). Taken together, Levison 
said “You got a real response from the Negro community and you got white 
understanding that this must be done. And this is something new” (ibid). In a 
conversation with muckraking Village Voice journalist Jack Newfield, whom Life 
magazine had assigned to write a 3,000 word feature on the Poor People’s Campaign, 
Levison enthused that the mobilization was “developing very well – the response in the 
South is tremendous, and the response among the white middle class has been much 
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better” (FBI, 3/8/67, 8/0198). Off the record, Levison told Newfield that income from 
SCLC’s white middle class contributors was better than the previous year. 
On March 15, Adele Kantor of SCLC’s New York office reported to Levison that 
the Poor People’s Campaign was attracting “a lot” of contributors from 1964 and 1965, 
when King was at the height of his popularity and moral influence as a result of his Nobel 
Peace Prize and the SCLC’s dramatic voting rights campaign in Selma, Alabama. Kantor 
took this as an indication that “people are realizing the correctness of Dr. King’s position” 
(FBI, 3/15/68, 8/0213). Four days later, Levison told Harry Wachtel that the Washington 
Jewish Community Council had endorsed the Poor People’s Campaign, on the condition 
that SCLC notifies the police of its every move. Levison said the Council was the voice 
of the “Jewish Establishment” in Washington and the “real power boys” who represented 
Jewish Community Councils all around the country (FBI, 3/19/68, 8/0224) – “When they 
don’t take a Roy Wilkins position then you know that sentiment is running in your favor,” 
Levison observed (ibid). Further evidence that King’s message was resonating positively 
among Washington residents was word that 3,000 local families had offered to house 
Poor People’s Campaign participants if necessary, which Levison noted was “important 
public relations-wise” (FBI, 3/26/68, 8/0251). On March 28, Levison told Tudja Crowder, 
the new head of the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), one of the 
country’s leading peace organizations, that the Poor People’s Campaign had “a 
remarkable amount of white support that I didn’t expect” (FBI, 3/28/68, 8/0263). Levison 
noted, however, that middle-class whites were still “a little bit wary: they’re afraid that 
this type of action could provoke violence. And we’ve never been more convinced that it 
won’t. The government doesn’t want it in an election year and our people just don’t do it 
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when King is around. But you can’t convince people. They’re just going to have to see it” 
(ibid). 
Asserting King’s Leadership 
Leading those proving difficult to convince that the Poor People’s Campaign could 
remain nonviolent were the middle-class representatives of the news media. Despite 
King’s efforts to focus attention on his constructive proposals and the dire urgency of the 
situation that many Americans were clearly coming to understand, significant media 
coverage of his plans continued to emphasize their risk of violence. Nonviolence, the 
media narrative went, was a relic in this new age of violent ghetto uprisings and 
revolutionary Black Power with its popular if empty rhetoric of guerrilla warfare in 
America’s streets. Where it was once celebrated for its ability to unify blacks, nonviolent 
direct action was now condemned as a “formula for discord,” as the New York Times 
described King’s plans it in its August 17, 1967, editorial. While acknowledging the 
validity of King’s desire to “defuse the rage that erupts in riots and also prevent 
leadership of the Negro community from passing by default to such advocates of black 
separatism and violence as Rap Brown
1
 and Stokely Carmichael,” the Times concluded 
that “nonviolence is losing its appeal” and civil disobedience could very well spark 
“disaster” (“Formula for Discord,” 1967, p. 36). Given King’s stature both nationally and 
internationally as the living symbol of nonviolence, it was impossible not to take the 
Times’ assertion of nonviolence’s diminished influence as a comment on King himself. 
Showdown for Nonviolence 
King and his advisers knew that massive civil disobedience had to be attempted if 
nonviolence was to re-establish its tactical and moral value and bring the violence 
                                               
1 H. Rap Brown succeeded Stokely Carmichael as the national director of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in the summer of 1967. 
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overtaking America’s ghettos, and those encouraging it, to heel. In the wake of Newark 
and Detroit, King also understood that such a campaign was an important test of the 
strength of his leadership in the black community. King expressed this understanding in 
an article entitled “Showdown for Nonviolence” that Look magazine published just after 
his murder: “We believe that if this campaign succeeds, nonviolence will once again be 
the dominant instrument for social change – and jobs and income will be put in the hands 
of the tormented poor. If it fails, nonviolence will be discredited, and the country may be 
plunged into holocaust – a tragedy deepened by the awareness that it was avoidable” 
(ibid, p. 24). 
 In order to reinforce King’s leadership status in America’s volatile ghettos and 
defend against his critics, Levison believed it imperative that King get media coverage 
for his civil rights work, namely his Herculean efforts through the fall of 1967 to get 
Cleveland’s black community registered to vote in that city’s mayoral elections. As 
Levison saw it, news coverage of King’s activities was still too focused on his 
involvement with the peace movement and it was creating the impression that King 
himself was prioritizing such issues over his work with ghetto blacks. On September 27, 
1967, Levison told Andy Young of his concern that King had “not been in the news on 
civil rights in any sustained way for quite some time” (FBI, 9/27 /67, 7/0625). Levison 
noted that this absence was ceding too much room in the news media to the 
inflammatory, insurrectionist rhetoric of Stokely Carmichael and his new replacement as 
Chairman of SNCC, H. Rap Brown, and leaving nonviolence open to questions about its 
appeal as a result. Levison’s view reflected that of journalist Earl Caldwell, who in the 
August 20 edition of the New York Times wrote that the violent summer of 1967 had left 
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King and his fellow “moderate” leaders of the civil rights movement struggling to 
“recapture the impetus in the movement” from the likes of Carmichael and Brown. “’It’s 
time for us to start calling the shots,” an unnamed “moderate” source told Caldwell 
(Caldwell, 1967, p. E3). 
Fight for recognition 
Ironically, part of the problem as Levison saw it was his belief that the New York Times 
was ignoring King’s efforts to build a constructive counter-narrative to Brown’s “burn, 
baby, burn” provocations. While he acknowledged healthy coverage in other news media, 
Levison felt the nation’s paper of record was not giving King credit for his role 
organizing black voters behind Cleveland lawyer, Carl Stokes, in his bid to become the 
first black mayor of a major American city. In a conversation with King, Levison pointed 
to a news analysis of Stokes’ Democratic nomination victory by New York Times reporter 
Gene Roberts that mentioned Stokes’ relations with the NAACP and the Urban League 
but conspicuously left out King’s high profile contributions to getting out the black vote 
for him. Levison told King: “Did you see that – no mention... I suspect that the guy who 
wrote this had a view and did not want to see you” (FBI, 10/9/67, 7/0662).  The glaring 
nature of the omission was underscored by King’s assertion that Stokes “won because of 
SCLC and me” (ibid, p.2) and that Stokes even told King that SCLC’s work organizing 
and registering voters in the black community had been instrumental to his victory. 
Levison told King that the scenario highlighted the need to “fight for recognition, not out 
of immodesty but out of necessity” (ibid) because elements in the news media were 
framing his work in the Northern ghettos as a failure. Alluding to King’s yeoman service 
educating Cleveland’s ghetto residents on the power of the vote and the futility of 
expressing their frustrations through violence, Levison called Cleveland “a magnificent 
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answer” (ibid) to those who were declaring King’s influence and nonviolence “dead and 
buried” (ibid). If they couldn’t get this point across through the media, Levison said they 
at least had the SCLC’s well-organized contributors and mailing lists through which to 
promote this emerging story, which, he added, “was always important” (ibid). 
 King believed that the story was an especially important one to get out because 
his efforts in Cleveland proved his ability to gain the confidence of the ghetto’s “Black 
Nationalist” leaders, and the restless youngsters who looked up to them, through 
“dialogue and listening to them” (ibid, p.3). “I told them I wanted their cooperation and 
made it clear that we could share philosophies and told them we are all brothers,” King 
said (ibid). Referring to Fred Ahmed Evans, the influential Black Nationalist leader in 
Cleveland’s Hough ghetto, King said he got Ahmed to help him think “in terms of 
programs which are militant yet not violent” – “Ahmed’s reaction was ‘we will 
cooperate’ and the interesting thing is that he was not agreeing with me philosophically 
but in communication with me spiritually and psychologically,” King said, noting that the 
very fact he took time out to speak one on one with Ahmed helped to win his support. 
What was vital, King told Levison, was that he was able to convince Ahmed to see the 
tactical and pragmatic value of nonviolence. “We told him in substance that [Ralph 
Locher, Cleveland’s incumbent Democratic mayor] wants us to burn the city down 
because that would assure his re-election,” King said. “Then [the Black Nationalists] 
started saying some very practical things. When the boys would get out of line, Ahmed 
would call them in and tell them that was not the way they were doing this. I think the 
major thing was that I was neutralizing them, not changing them on violence” (ibid). 
King added that the last time he saw Ahmed and his young followers “they were happy as 
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could be” because they had seen “one or two victories” through nonviolent direct action. 
Levison drew from this a strategic lesson that he thought would help affirm King’s 
militant middle position in the community: the need to establish “achievable goals” that 
would move both Black Nationalists and more conservative elements of the black 
community like its preachers. “When you achieve goals which are real, everyone is 
impressed,” offered Levison (ibid).  
Neutralize Black Power/Black Nationalists 
King’s desire to see his work in Cleveland reported in the national news media 
underscored the pressure he was feeling to validate the continuing efficacy of 
nonviolence and the strength of his popular appeal in the ghettos. “These things are said 
in [the Cleveland press] yet the nation does not realize what has taken place there in 
terms of our work,” King told Levison. “It would be unwise to say SCLC did it alone but 
my presence there kinda pulled it together and gave the Negro hope... I know I walked 15 
miles a day before the election: stopping in bars, pool rooms and everywhere [I] could 
find people: it is an interesting story that needs to be told” (ibid, p. 4-5). Levison agreed, 
adding cynically that there was “no use trying to get the Times or a magazine to do it 
because they don’t have a conception of what a story there is here” (ibid). Levison said 
that getting publicity for the story would be easier once the news media realized that it 
was connected to their two chief preoccupations at the time: “elections and riots” (ibid). 
Given King’s positive reception by ghetto residents, whom he said referred to him as a 
“mellow dude” (ibid) and joined him as he walked and drove the ghetto streets, Levison 
said it was a crucial point to publicize considering his many detractors who were 
claiming that King had no appeal in the ghetto (ibid). 
 Neutralizing the Black Power / Black Nationalist opponents of nonviolence and 
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affirming his ability to influence restless ghetto youngsters became vital components of 
media strategy around the Poor People's Campaign. In his press conferences, statements 
and published work, King stressed the intensive training in nonviolence that SCLC was 
providing to the first wave of 3,000 participants from the ghettos of 10 Northern cities 
and poor rural regions of five Southern states. These original 3,000 participants would 
then act as marshals responsible for ensuring the nonviolent discipline of successive 
waves of participants. As King told a January 16, 1968, press conference: “We feel that if 
a pattern is set in the beginning, people will fall into line... We cannot be responsible for 
everyone in the country, but certainly we are going to be responsible for and to the people 
who are involved in the demonstration” (ibid, p.8-9). King said he would visit each 
organizing region himself and meet with local leaders, including Black Nationalists, in 
order to explain his plans and extract from them a pledge to respect SCLC’s philosophy 
of nonviolence. If they could not agree on nonviolence, King said he would negotiate at 
the very least their non-interference in SCLC plans. “We don’t expect anybody to be 
disrupting or attempting to disrupt our plans,” King told the press conference. “Our staff 
are very well trained in this kind of thing. We’ve worked in communities before where 
nationalists have existed; where persons who believe in violence have existed, and yet 
we’ve been able to discipline them” (ibid, p.9). As he often did, King underscored this 
point with the example of Chicago’s Blackstone Rangers, a violent ghetto street gang that 
he was able to convert to nonviolence for his open-housing demonstrations in the city's 
all-white neighbourhoods. “They never retaliated with a single act of violence,” King 
said. “It’s my contention that people can be amazingly nonviolent when they find 
themselves in a nonviolent situation, where there is a commitment to tactical nonviolence 
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on the part of the group” (ibid). 
A more thorough analysis of SCLC’s strategic defence of nonviolence at this time 
is found in the text that Levison drafted for King’s CBC Massey Lecture entitled 
“Nonviolence and Social Change.” Acknowledging that “many people feel that 
nonviolence as a strategy for social change was cremated in the flames of the urban riots 
of the last two years,” Levison argued that the unrest in fact revealed a de facto 
commitment to nonviolence among most participants in the unrest: “The violence, to a 
startling degree, was focused against property rather than against people... the vast 
majority of the rioters were not involved at all in attacking people. The much-publicized 
‘death toll’ that marked the riots, and the many injuries, were overwhelmingly inflicted 
on the rioters by the military” (King, 1967, in the Lost Massey Lectures, 2007, p. 201). 
Levison offered that this violence against property was “a demonstration and a warning... 
directed against symbols of exploitation, and it was designed to express the depth of 
anger in the community” (ibid, p.202). Levison called this “a core of nonviolence towards 
persons” that should not be overlooked nor dispelled but rather developed. King’s 
experiences in the Southern states and Chicago revealed that even men of “very violent 
tendencies” can be disarmed and turned into disciplined foot soldiers of nonviolent direct 
action. “I am convinced that even very violent temperaments can be channelled through 
nonviolent discipline, if the movement is moving; if they can act constructively, and 
express through an effective channel their very legitimate anger” (ibid, p.203). The 
greater question, Levison argued, was whether the government and the status quo would 
accept responsibility for the unrest and heed the just demands of the Poor People’s 
Campaign. Noting that the Johnson Administration’s “only concrete response was to 
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initiate a study and call for a day of prayer,” Levison declared that such actions by a 
government that “commands more wealth and power than has ever been known in the 
history of the world” was “worse than blind, it is provocative. It is paradoxical, but fair to 
say, that Negro terrorism is incited less on ghetto street corners than in the halls of 
Congress” (ibid, p.204). 
 Alongside a whirlwind series of visits by King to the ghettos where his field 
organizers were recruiting participants for the Poor People’s Campaign, SCLC set about 
organizing broadcasts of his speeches on black radio stations serving ghetto communities 
in order to educate listeners on the campaign’s goals in Washington and extend the reach 
of King’s nonviolent message into the ghetto. By January, King’s program was being 
aired on at least 11 stations across the United States with a combined audience of an 
estimated two million people (FBI, 1/12/68, 8/0039). In a conversation with King, 
Levison said his program on two stations in Detroit and New Orleans saw their normal 
audiences figures double (ibid). Levison believed the program was crucial because ghetto 
blacks tended to get their news and information via the radio rather than newspapers. “On 
a program like this you are reaching a large group of them,” he said. King said many 
people on his travels across the country had mentioned hearing him on the radio, which 
led him to see the medium as a worthy substitute for television in terms of reaching 
ghetto audiences. Levison said several stations had complained of not being invited to 
King’s speaking engagements in their cities and it was crucial that SCLC draw up a list of 
local radio stations and keep their news departments informed about King’s local visits.  
They agreed that SCLC’s Public Relations department had to put more effort into 




On February 6, 1968, a King-led SCLC delegation held a key meeting with Stokely 
Carmichael, Rap Brown and other Black Power / Black Nationalist representatives in 
Washington in a bid to ensure either their nonviolent participation or their pledge not to 
interfere in the Poor People’s Campaign. Despite tensions between the two sides, 
including a brief shouting match that heard SCLC organizer Hosea Williams accuse 
Carmichael of trying to “screw” King and SCLC (FBI, 2/8/68, 8/0121), the meeting 
produced a pledge of non-interference from Carmichael. In a phone call to Levison the 
next day, SCLC Executive Director, Bill Rutherford, said Carmichael adopted the attitude 
that if SCLC “flunk out in Washington, we’re going to get a lot of new recruits, but if 
[SCLC] make it in Washington, we are going to be in trouble because we are not going to 
get any new recruits” (ibid). Carmichael understood what Levison knew well and 
expressed in a conversation with fellow Research Committee member, Harry Wachtel, on 
March 19: “A victory in terms of countable jobs would do magnificently in my opinion 
for Martin: It would be a first real victory on the economic front” (FBI, 3/19/68, 8/0224). 
 King’s strategic concerns with Carmichael and his Black Power associates were 
discussed in a conference call with his advisors that King organized to think through 
questions that he might face on his aforementioned Meet The Press appearance on August 
13, 1967. All on the call agreed that Carmichael and Rap Brown’s talk about the ghetto 
uprisings being dress-rehearsals for guerrilla warfare in the United States gave the white 
community and Congress an excuse for avoiding their root causes of poverty and 
unemployment. “Stokely is now being used to hide and confuse the real issues,” Levison 
said (FBI, 8/12/67, 7/0509). King added that their incendiary rhetoric freed whites “who 
would otherwise be ashamed of their anti-Negro feelings” from any guilt and even 
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facilitated calls for armed repression of the ghetto rebellions (ibid, p.3). However, given 
the widespread respect for Carmichael in the black community, and his appeal among 
black youths in particular, it was also understood that attacking him would only serve to 
alienate the very audience that King needed to reach most with his message of 
nonviolence. King settled on the idea that the best approach was not to condemn 
Carmichael himself but his “call to violence” instead (ibid, p.4). King’s Washington 
advisor, Walter Fauntroy, later added the possible question “Don’t you think Rap Brown 
and Stokely have set back the Negro cause” (ibid, p.8). While Levison thought King had 
to say that he disagreed, King ventured instead that it was Congress and the white 
community who had in fact “pulled the rug out from under nonviolent leaders by not 
responding” to their pleas for funding for the ghettos. The impression this gave, he said, 
was that nonviolence didn’t work and rioting was the only way to get anything (ibid). 
 The appeal of Carmichael and Rap Brown’s talk of armed revolution among 
disaffected ghetto youth led King to seek the group’s views on the expected question 
“Does this trend not reveal that your leadership is being rejected?” (ibid, p.4). Levison 
and Andy Young encouraged King to take the position that the “existence of nonviolence 
does not wipe out violence” (ibid, p.7), that violence has always existed alongside 
nonviolence and this does not make nonviolence irrelevant. King ran with this idea, 
suggesting the massive civil disobedience was necessary because nonviolence had to be 
“stepped-up on a larger scale, to be escalated” in order to have a greater impact than the 
ghetto violence (ibid, p.7).   
 Media coverage of SCLC’s Washington summit with Black Power representatives 
revealed two duelling tendencies: While continuing to cast doubts on King’s ability to 
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maintain nonviolent discipline among his followers, news reports also reflected an 
emerging understanding that King’s success in Washington would be a major blow to 
opponents of nonviolence. This tension was evident in an article by reporter Walter 
Rugaber in the February 11, 1968, edition of New York Times that navigated between 
fears of the campaign generating “rioting” on one hand and the claim of an unnamed 
“observer” of the civil rights movement that “most Negroes will move” toward King and 
nonviolence if Congress takes action on the PPC’s demands for jobs or income (Rugaber, 
1968/2/11, p. E4). As Rugaber noted, “many [PPC] sympathizers warn that some 
progress is essential” (ibid). This emerging understanding also had the effect of shifting 
the tone of the Washington Post’s editorial response to King’s evolving plans for the PPC. 
While still refusing to in any way countenance massive civil disobedience as an 
acceptable response to Congressional inaction on poverty, the Post conceded that seeing 
King re-established as “the major spokesman for discontented Negroes... in light of the 
alternatives, may be as important to the Nation as a whole as it is to Dr. King” (“The 
Spring Campaign,” 1968, p. A20). 
A trouble-obsessed news media  
In a column published four days later, the Washington Post’s William Raspberry wrote 
about King’s frustration with what he took to be the news media’s preoccupation with the 
PPC’s potential for violence and failure rather than the issue of poverty in America that 
the campaign sought to highlight. According to Raspberry, King felt the PPC’s goals held 
little interest for media representatives next to the chaos they worried the campaign could 
produce, which he alleged had been “magnified... all out of proportion” (Raspberry, 1968, 
p. D1). King’s concerns were later echoed by New York Times reporter, Ben Franklin, in a 
letter written to Executive Editor, Harrison Salisbury, during the last days of the Poor 
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People’s Campaign. Franklin expressed concern that his paper’s coverage had not been 
up to what he considered “the standards of the Times” (Franklin in NYTC, 1968, p.2) and 
charged that both he and the rest of the Times staff who worked on the PPC “suffered 
from a pretty total preoccupation with the comic-tragic-Amos ’n Andy malfeasance of the 
Movement, to the detriment of the truths in it about hunger and poverty and the 
disinherited” (ibid). While not advocating that the Times alter its long-standing policy 
against “crusades,” Franklin wrote that the paper “could have done a contemplative job 
right on the hunger issue (and in spite of Abernathy’s Follies1) and laid it to rest 
journalistically, at least, as true or false, or something in between” (Ibid). Franklin also 
told Salisbury that he was sorry to detect what he felt was the Times’ “relaxing interest” 
in the poor “without ever having ever gotten very far past the arrests, the mud of 
Resurrection City
2
 and the rhetoric... (I) (we) should have done better” (ibid). 
 Levison had an intrinsic understanding of this tendency in the news media, which 
he expressed in a March 23 conversation with SCLC Executive Director, Bill Rutherford. 
Rutherford told Levison of his concern that SCLC’s organization of the PPC seemed to 
be based largely on a governing faith that everything would fall into place once they 
arrived in Washington, including how to cover the campaign’s spiralling costs and house 
its 3,000 participants in Washington. This news led Levison to reply, “It is one thing to 
proceed on faith but to launch into something this important that will get a lot of 
publicity, there isn’t any margin for having it go wrong... all the publicity will be on the 
                                               
1  Ralph Abernathy, Vice-President of SCLC and King’s best friend, succeeded King as President after his 
assassination. Abernathy lacked King’s influence, political sophistication and leadership skills, which 
Levison and others blamed for the disorganization and in-fighting that overtook the Poor People’s 
Campaign and produced its lack of results. 
2 Resurrection City was the name given to the collection of plywood A-frame shacks erected by the 
SCLC on the National Mall in Washington to house PPC participants. 
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period of floundering” (FBI, 3/23/68, 8/0242). Five days later, the news media’s 
relentless search for signs of weakness in King’s leadership and the disorganization of an 
over-stretched SCLC met head on in Memphis, Tennessee. 
Memphis 
On March 18, King accepted an invitation to address the black community in Memphis in 
support of a five-week-old strike by black sanitation workers protesting discriminatory 
practices by the city’s government. King – physically and emotionally drained by the 
stress of organizing, promoting and defending the Poor People’s Campaign – addressed 
an enthusiastic crowd of 15,000 at the city’s Mason Temple and found in the Memphis 
campaign a spark that gave new meaning and hope for his Washington crusade. As he 
told Levison in a conversation on March 26, “I’ve never seen a community as together as 
Memphis” (Garrow, 1986, p.606; FBI, 3/26/68, 8/0251). King noted, however, that the 
Memphis strike had not received much coverage in the news media, but Levison assured 
him that this would change with his scheduled return there two days later to lead a mass 
march in support of the striking sanitation workers. Levison compared the situation in 
Memphis to King’s 1956 campaign in Montgomery, Alabama, which received scant 
coverage at the start but from which he emerged a household name in America. “I think 
by your going there and leading this march you may very well turn that around from a 
publicity standpoint and people will start to pay attention,” he told King. “I think it’s 
excellent for you to be identified with an action that is a solid, all-community action” 
(ibid). 
King’s return to Memphis on March 28 did focus the news media’s attention on 
the strike and his leadership there, but for all the wrong reasons. A flight delay saw King 
and his staff arrive an hour past the scheduled start of the march to a crowd of 6,000 
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demonstrators impatient to get going (Garrow, 1986, p.610). Within minutes of its start, 
with King at the front with his staff, local organizers and most of the marshals assigned to 
maintain order, youngsters at the unguarded rear of the march began smashing shop 
windows and running off with looted goods. Baton and Mace-wielding Memphis police 
quickly set in on looters and peaceful demonstrators alike. A shocked King was 
immediately hurried from the scene by his staff to a local hotel. The reports coming in 
from the riot zone that afternoon only served to deepen his woes: a 16-year-old black 
youth shot dead by Memphis police along with at least 50 injured and 120 arrested for the 
looting of an estimated 60 shops and other charges. That evening, Tennessee Governor 
Buford Ellington ordered 4,000 National Guard troops into Memphis to enforce a dusk-
to-dawn curfew (Rugaber in New York Times, 1968/3/29, p.1; Chriss in Washington Post, 
68/3/29, p.A1) 
At 8:10 pm, Andy Young placed a call to Levison and asked him to get in touch 
with King, whom he described as “very depressed about the incident in Memphis” (FBI, 
3/28/68, 8/0263). Levison rang the number Young provided and spoke briefly with King’s 
closest friend and SCLC Vice-President, Ralph Abernathy, who informed him that they 
had not been told of a “strong group of Black Power advocates” mixed in among the 
marchers (ibid, p.7). Had they known, Abernathy said, they would have insisted on taking 
them aside and training them in the tactics of nonviolence first. He admitted that “it was a 
mistake” not to have been better informed of the local situation (ibid). After getting 
another run down of the incident from King, who mentioned calling off the Poor People’s 
Campaign, Levison assured him that there was no reason to be on the defensive and 
encouraged him to take heart from the fact “the majority of people in the Memphis march 
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did not join in the rioting,” which Levison said proved the effectiveness of his leadership 
and nonviolence (ibid). The best position that King could take, Levison offered, was that 
his presence in fact prevented the wider chaos that similar events had sparked in other 
cities (ibid). As to its potential impact on the Poor People’s Campaign, Levison assured 
King that it would be minimal. SCLC would be the sole organizers in Washington and 
they had much more skill at promoting “the importance of nonviolence” than the 
inexperienced local leadership in Memphis (ibid). The FBI noted that King “agreed in 
every respect with Levison’s evaluation of the Memphis incident” (ibid). 
King awoke the next morning, March 29, to national coverage of the disastrous 
march, including front-page news stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post. 
Both reports described how a march “led” by King had turned into a riot of black 
vandalism and looting and extreme police violence (Rugaber, 3/29/68, p.1; Chriss, 
3/29/68, p. A1). Only the Times noted that the SCLC did not organize the march. 
According to the Post, King and “his monitors” were unable to fully control “the young 
militants who began shouting and jeering as the protest march began” (ibid, p. A6). The 
Times reported that King was “whisked away at the first sign of trouble” (ibid) while the 
Post asserted that he “fled” after being “hustled into a car by associates” (ibid). Though 
the Times report avoided associating the youngsters with the march itself, reporter Walter 
Rugaber did highlight the implications of their behaviour for the Poor People’s 
Campaign, namely the possibility of “violent forces infiltrating the ranks of [King’s] 
nonviolent protestors” (ibid). Rugaber reported that King “acknowledged that the 
Washington drive was ‘risky’ for this reason, but he said that his 3,000 demonstrators 
would be carefully trained in nonviolence and the destructive forces could be kept away 
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from the activities of his group” (ibid). 
 Desperate to control the damage, King held a press conference that morning at 
which he underscored the fact that he had no role in organizing the Memphis march and 
vowed to return to the city to lead one fully organized by SCLC. King also denied 
reporters’ efforts to frame the new march as a “second chance” for nonviolence (Rugaber, 
3/30/68, p.31). As to the Poor People’s Campaign, King put on a confident face in 
response to a chorus of Congressmen who wanted him to call it off. “Riots are here,” the 
Times reported King saying. “Riots are part of the ugly atmosphere of our society. I 
cannot guarantee that riots will not take place this summer. I can only guarantee that our 
demonstrations will not be violent” (ibid). SCLC’s staff were “eminently qualified” to 
keep the PPC’s participants in line, King declared, while underlining his conviction that 
the situation in Memphis, with its mix of race and poverty, proved the importance of his 
Washington campaign (Garrow, 1987, p.613).  
The "logic of the press" 
Levison called King after the press conference and found him a deeply-troubled mood.
1
 
With the “hostile, disparaging tone” (ibid, p. 614) of reporters’ questions still on his mind, 
King told Levison that “from a public relations point of view, and every other way, we 
are in serious trouble. I think as far as the Washington campaign is concerned we are in 
trouble” (FBI, 3/29/68, 8/0271). King said the violence in Memphis was bound to deter 
people from participating in the PPC for fear of a similar outbreak in Washington, and it 
was sure to dominate future media coverage. “It is a personal setback for me. Let’s face 
it, there are those who are vindicated now,” he said, pointing to Roy Wilkins, Bayard 
Rustin and others in the civil rights movement whom he accused of being “influenced by 
                                               
1
 The complete FBI transcript of this conversation is attached in Appendix B, starting on page 160 
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what they read in newspapers” – “You know their point, ‘I’m right, Martin Luther King is 
dead, he’s finished, his nonviolence is nothing, no one is listening to it,’” King said. 
“Let’s face it, we do have a great setback where my image and my leadership are 
concerned” (ibid). Levison countered that it would be a “profound error” to “accept their 
definition” of failure and tried to assure King that the present crisis would blow over. 
King, however, was convinced that he needed to mount a powerful action that would 
“somehow, affirm what the press will refuse to affirm,” i.e. that he possessed the 
influence necessary to ensure the nonviolent discipline of his followers in Washington. 
Levison, however, challenged King’s submission to what he called the “logic of the 
press,” which dictated “100 per cent adherence to nonviolence even by those who are not 
your followers” – “How can you ever get that,” Levison asked (ibid). He warned King 
that subscribing to such logic would put nonviolence in a hopeless “box or a trap” 
because it was virtually impossible to achieve and would only serve to immobilize the 
nonviolent movement. Even if he could guarantee nonviolent discipline among his own 
followers, “the other side can always find a few provocateurs to start violence no matter 
what you do,” Levison said, referring to the strike-breaking tactics of anti-labour forces 
in the 1930s. King believed, however, that his status as “a symbol of nonviolence,” as one 
whose life and leadership was dedicated to the philosophy, made him uniquely 
susceptible to the undermining effects of violence. “The press is not going to say what 
you are talking about,” he told Levison. “Everything will come out weakening the 
symbol. It will put many Negroes in doubts. It will put many Negroes in a position of 
saying, ‘Well, that’s true – Martin Luther King is at the end of his rope.’ So I’ve got to do 
something that becomes a kind of powerful act... of unifying forces and refuting the 
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claims of the press” (ibid). King said there was no way to stop the media from imposing 
the logic Levison described, telling him “You watch your newspapers. Watch the New 
York Times editorials. I think it will be the most negative thing about Martin Luther King 
that you have ever seen. There will not be one sympathetic – even with friends, it won’t 
be there” (ibid). Levison tried to offer some hope to King, telling him that it was not 
“absolutely inevitable that the truth is going to get buried,” to which King replied “It will, 
Stan, unless I do something now” (ibid). Levison assured King that doing so would only 
perpetuate the news media’s “logic that there cannot be one percent that are violent 
without destroying your position. We have to find a way in which we don’t accept this” 
(ibid). As to the Poor People’s Campaign, King pondered what he felt was the 
contradictory claim that SCLC could control the demonstrations but not 100 per cent of 
the violence. Levison offered that the way around this was to assert his ability to control 
his followers, just as he had done at the press conference that morning and had been 
doing since he announced the Poor People’s Campaign. “You are not undertaking to 
control everybody else,” Levison said. He cautioned King to avoid a position that would 
leave him responsible for controlling all violence, which would leave him “destined to 
fail” (ibid). “You can take a position that your followers are nonviolent and that your 
followers will do as they must. It is not up to you to control others,” he repeated (ibid). 
The editorial pages of both the New York Times and the Washington Post 
addressed King’s disastrous Memphis march the next morning.1 Both editorials turned to 
the experiences of King’s hero, Gandhi, and his willingness to suspend his civil 
disobedience campaigns if they erupted into violence in order to enforce his followers’ 
discipline. Both papers asserted that King would be well-advised to follow Gandhi’s lead. 
                                               
1
 See Appendix B, pp. 167-168 for the complete texts of both editorials 
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Only the Post, however, saw this as a temporary delay until King could assure the 
nonviolent discipline of his followers. “No aspect of the march can be left to chance or 
improvisation,” the Post said in urging King not rush into a campaign that it now 
acknowledged “could be a gain for the Nation” if planned and conducted properly (“On 
the March,” 1968, p.A10). The Post’s new, cautious support for the Poor People’s 
Campaign contrasted the Times’ inability to see the mobilization as anything but 
“counterproductive” (“Mini-riot in Memphis,” 1968, p.32). Erroneously asserting that 
King organized the Memphis march, which “left store windows on Beale Street smashed 
and one Negro youth dead,” the Times claimed that the “mini-riot” only served to prove 
that conditions in America were too dangerous for King’s Washington plans. “None of 
the precautions [King] and his aides are taking to keep the capital demonstration peaceful 
can provide any dependable insurance against another eruption of the kind that rocked 
Memphis,” the Times declared. Embracing the logic that Levison and King discussed the 
night before, the Times condemned nonviolent protest as the source of trouble rather than 
the “rowdy elements bent on violence” that used it for cover (ibid). While acknowledging 
that “no more than fifty teen-agers” out of 6,000 marchers were responsible for the 
vandalism and looting and that Memphis police responded with excessive, indiscriminate 
force, the Times’ still found King ultimately accountable for the results, including the 
expected white backlash against the strikers demands for fairness (ibid). Likewise, the 
Times asserted, King will be to blame for “an April explosion in Washington” (ibid). 
Fightback 
In a tense ten hour meeting the same day the editorials appeared, SCLC staff overcame 
their stricken leader’s inclination to cancel the Poor People’s Campaign and their return 
to Memphis and won King over to their conviction that SCLC could bring both off 
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successfully. “Martin had a minority position and we corrected his position,” Levison told 
his friend, Alice Loewi, the following day (FBI, 3/31/68, 8/0282). “We can’t let a couple 
of kids keep mass action from being our weapon,” he said (ibid). Levison’s conversation 
with Loewi also provided insight into SCLC’s emerging strategy for the PPC: King 
would work to control violence-prone youths by going through the high schools to 
convince them that “the Establishment wants them to [riot]” – “once they grasp that, 
there isn’t a chance of it happening,” Levison stated (ibid). SCLC’s main concern in 
Washington was “a double cross from Stokely Carmichael,” who might renege on his 
promise not to interfere in the campaign or encourage its disruption. Levison said King’s 
response in such an event would be that “our job is not to stop violence but to be 
nonviolent ourselves... We are not going to get out of the streets because it may start 
some violence” (ibid). This thinking was also behind a shift toward a harder SCLC line in 
response to questions about the PPC’s potential for sparking “riots.” The SCLC’s new 
line held that riots were Washington’s problem, not theirs. As Levison said “why should 
we worry about what upsets them. They are the ones who are afraid of violence, we are 
not” (ibid). 
 A confidential internal memorandum circulated to SCLC staff by Public Relations 
Director Tom Offenberger on April 1 laid out the organization’s three-point response to 
the media’s coverage of the Memphis riot. While recognizing that it was a “particularly 
soul-searching time for us,” the memo said that SCLC would work to reframe the issue 
away from the media’s fixation on the effectiveness of nonviolence toward a renewed 
emphasis on the PPC’s root issues of racism and poverty. “Rather than proving that 
nonviolence is no longer an effective tactic, Memphis illustrated the emergency state of 
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just those conditions which we are attempting to abolish through our demonstrations” 
(SCLC, 1968/4/1, p.1). SCLC would also return to Memphis, which it considered a test 
run for the Poor People’s Campaign. “[The campaign in Memphis] concerns jobs and 
poverty and racism and a community that wants to correct all three injustices. We do 
realize, however, that the community wants training for more effective nonviolent action” 
(ibid). Accordingly, the SCLC would dispatch its top organizers to Memphis to lay the 
groundwork for a second King-led march on April 5. Lastly, the memo asserted that the 
SCLC’s plans for Washington were still on track and events in Memphis only 
underscored the urgent need for the Poor People’s Campaign. In a follow-up press release 
issued that same day, the SCLC proclaimed that “the nonviolent movement will not be 
intimidated by violence. And we will not be stopped by those in positions of power who 
have failed to deal with poverty and racism” (SCLC, 1968/4/1, p.1). 
 King took this message to reporters the day after his staff meeting. As he told a 
press conference in Washington, the Poor People’s Campaign was coming to the nation’s 
capital “to re-establish that the real issue is not violence or nonviolence, but poverty and 
neglect” (Franklin, 1968, p. 20). The Times’ Ben Franklin reported that King offered to 
call off his Washington campaign in exchange for a “positive commitment” from the 
White House for assistance that summer for America’s slums, though he admitted that he 
did not see it forthcoming. If such commitments were not produced by the Poor People’s 
Campaign in Washington, King promised to take SCLC’s campaign for economic rights 
for America’s poor to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago that August. 
“They will have a real awakening in Chicago,” King said, adding that SCLC would also 
confront the Republican National Convention in Miami (ibid). The press conference 
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followed King’s sermon to a capacity audience at the 3,000 seat Washington National 
Cathedral, which another 1,000 people listened to over loudspeakers outside the church. 
King’s sermon called for a “national awakening” (ibid) that would make the American 
dream a reality for all its citizens, including its poor. King told the congregants gathered 
before him that he knew SCLC’s Poor People’s Campaign was facing “a Goliath” yet 
expressed his belief that “it will make a difference”  (SCLC, 1968/4/2, p.3). They would 
confront this giant of Congressional indifference with a “massive show of determination” 
that, if it accomplished nothing else, would “call attention to the gap between promises 
and fulfillment” and “make the invisible visible” (ibid).  In a glimpse of the global 
movement for poor rights that King saw the civil rights movement joining, he told his 
audience that “the destiny of the U.S. is tied up with the destiny of every other nation... It 
behooves America to show compassion on hungering millions, particularly in light of 
millions of dollars spent annually to store foodstuffs which the poor direly need” (ibid). 
























DISCUSSION & CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
There is no denying the importance of media coverage to any social movement. As 
Harvey Molotch observes, “social movements represent those portions of society that lie 
outside the ordinary routines of exercising power and influence. For them, the mass 
media represent a potential mechanism for utilizing an establishment institution to fulfill 
non-establishment goals” (Molotch in Zald and McCarthy,1979, p.71).  This was 
especially true in the case of the black civil rights movement in the United States. 
The struggle for “meaning” 
Effective social movement media strategies seek to link the desired social change to 
fundamental values or what we might call “common sense” in a target audience or, more 
broadly, the public at large. The ascription of such “meaning,” as Stuart Hall called it, is 
primarily indebted to the modern mass media, which Hall said “circulate meaning 
between different cultures on a scale and with a speed hitherto unknown in history” (Hall, 
1997, p.3). 
 This preoccupation with the transferal of meaning through the mass media is 
made clear in David Garrow’s examination of the academic literature on protest strategy 
in Protest at Selma. As Garrow illustrates, any effective media strategy must successfully 
project the link between core social values, i.e. the right to vote, and the protest in 
question. This link is vital to what E.E. Schattschneider called the process of conflict 
“socialization,” in which a contestant in a struggle works to broaden the struggle’s scope 
beyond their opponent in an effort to win undecided public opinion to their cause (cited in 
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Garrow, 1978, p. 214). It is therefore of central importance that protest movements 
employ a media strategy that results in the symbolic association of their protest with 
values that are broadly perceived as legitimate and worthy by target audiences. 
Schattschneider observed that contestants trying to socialize a conflict are most likely to 
link their protest to values like equality, justice, liberty, freedom of association, etc. (ibid). 
“These concepts tend to make conflict contagious; they invite outside intervention in 
conflict and form the basis of appeals for such intervention” (ibid). Garrow cites James S. 
Coleman’s early understanding of this fact. Writing in 1957, Coleman observed that the 
strategic question every protest leader must determine is “the relative strengths of 
different values” (ibid, p.213) so that the values projected by the protest have a broader 
appeal than the values represented by its opposition (ibid). In order to communicate their 
association with these values to their target audience or audiences, Harvey Seifert 
observed in 1965 that protesters must gain the attention of the news media through 
activities that were “thought unusual enough” (ibid, p. 215) to deserve coverage. 
However, protest leaders have to consider their activities and tactics very carefully. A 
majority of Americans, Seifert noted, considered the very act of protesting of “dubious 
legitimacy” (ibid) – “A problem of the resister is to keep to a minimum the defection of 
[possible] support due to his nonconformity,” he wrote (ibid). Particularly noxious from 
the point of view of public sympathy and support was violence. “When anyone goes 
beyond the bounds of tolerated behavior, society tends to be alienated from his cause,” 
wrote Seifert (ibid). If protesters’ actions are perceived as going too far by the audience, 
repressive measures taken against them may in fact be seen as justified. Audience support 
will tend to favour protesters over the agents of such violence if they are able to project 
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the image that they are the “undeserving victims” of such repression. And “every 
additional brutality helps to convince those on the fence” that the protester’s cause is just. 
Furthermore, “as enemies of the resisters become more violent, [supporters of the 
protesters] become more numerous and outspoken,” observed Seifert (ibid, p. 216). 
 Garrow writes that Michael Lipsky’s studies on protest strategy in the late 1960s 
were the first to clearly outline the news media’s importance to a protest movement’s 
efforts to win public support for its cause. “If protest tactics are not considered important 
enough by the media or if newspapers and television reporters or editors decide to 
overlook protest tactics, protest organizations will not succeed. Like the tree falling 
unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected” (ibid, 
p.217). Accordingly, Lipsky noted that protest leaders must understand the media and 
what makes the news: “Protest leaders must continually develop new, dramatic 
techniques in order to receive their lifeblood of publicity” (ibid). In order to accomplish 
this, protest leaders must have a profound and detailed understanding of the news media’s 
attitude and interests regarding protest movements. 
The news media and protest 
 For a newsroom perspective on the media’s attitude toward protest and social 
movements, Herbert Gans’ Deciding What’s News is an invaluable ethnographic study on 
the outlooks and ideologies at play within America’s mainstream news media 
organizations. It is especially useful for the purposes of this study since Gans conducted 
the bulk of his research between 1965 and 1969. While his research focused on national 
American newsmagazines and television news programs, the attitudes and values that 
Gans identified apply to national newspapers like the New York Times as well. 
 On the topic of protest movements, Gans observes that demonstrations, marches 
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and other forms of protest are “almost always” treated as “potential or actual dangers to 
the social order” (53). The news, Gans says, “keeps track” of protests, especially those 
involving a large number of people, in a way that treats them as a “threat to public peace” 
and potential sources of “trouble” or violence (ibid). Stories on protest fall into the 
category of “moral disorder” news, a frame mainly occupied by “ordinary people, many 
of them poor, black, and/or young” (60). This, Gans says, reflects the news media’s 
tendency toward a conception of order rooted in upper-class and upper-middle-class 
values and the social order of the middle-aged and old and the white male (61). “The 
news,” Gans writes, “deals mostly with those who hold the power within various national 
and or societal strata; with the most powerful officials in the most powerful agencies; 
with the coalition of upper-class and upper-middle-class people which dominate the 
socioeconomic hierarchy; and with the late-middle-aged cohort that has the most power 
among groups” (62). Gans notes, however, that the news is not “subservient” to these 
groups and monitors their behaviour as well “against a set of values that is assumed to 
transcend them” (ibid).  Gans calls these transcendent values the news media’s “enduring 
values” of which he identifies eight: ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible 
capitalism, small-town pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order and national 
leadership (42). These values are the basis of what Gans calls the news media’s unique 
conception of the “good social order” and the guidelines with which all behaviour in 
society is judged, from the president on down. “The news,” he writes, “is not simply a 
compliant supporter of elites or the Establishment or the ruling class; rather, it views 
nation and society through its own set of values and with its own conception of the good 
social order” (62). The news media’s concept of “good social order” is structured by what 
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Gans calls a “paraideology” that does not adhere to one side of the traditional ideological 
spectrum, i.e. left / liberal and right / conservative, but tends toward all things “moderate” 
(52). As Gans notes, “individual stories and journalists can span various parts of the 
spectrum, although their values rarely coincide with those on the Far Right or the Far 
Left,” Gans writes. “Even the news media as a whole, and the news, analyzed over time, 
are not easily classified, for the paraideology reflected in the enduring values moves 
within the boundaries of conservative and liberal positions” (68).  
In his 1970 essay “A world at one with itself,” Stuart Hall suggests that 
journalists, while ostensibly independent, subscribe to an “unwitting bias” toward the 
Establishment. Hall describes this bias as an “institutional slanting, built-in not by the 
devious inclination of editors to the political left or right, but by the steady and 
unexamined play of attitudes which, via the mediating structure of professionally defined 
news values, inclines all media toward the status quo” (Hall in Cohen and Young, 1973, 
p.87-88). This “informal ideology” reveals itself through the typical arguments put forth 
by journalists when interviewing what Hall calls “unaccredited” sources representing 
non-Establishment views. “Unofficial strikers are always confronted with ‘the national 
interest,’ squatters with the ‘rights of private property,’ civil rights militants from Ulster 
with the need for Protestant and Catholic to ‘work together’…” Hall is careful not to 
suggest that such questions should not be asked. Rather, he is more interested in the 
assumptions behind such lines of questioning, which he claims “are coincident with the 
official ideologies of the status quo” (89). Hall calls this the news media’s “hidden 
consensus” (ibid) with the Establishment, which translates into the news media’s 
inclination toward defending the social, economic and political structures that perpetuate 
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Establishment power. This arrangement, Hall says, renders the news media “consistently 
unable to deal with, comprehend and interpret” (ibid, p.90) groups in conflict with this 
consensus. The resulting “nervousness” (ibid) in the news media’s tone with these groups 
reflects what Hall says is “the basic contradiction between the manifestation which the 
media is called on to explain and interpret, and the conceptual/evaluative/interpretive 
framework which they have available to them” (ibid) 
Media standing  
Hall’s views on the news media’s treatment of “accredited” versus “unaccredited” 
sources reflect William Gamson’s writings on the concept of standing. Gamson defines 
standing as “the endpoint of a contest over which sponsors of meaning will have an 
opportunity to appear in a mass media forum that defines membership in terms of 
political power” (Gamson, 2006, p.116). While traditional authority figures like the 
president and other representatives of government are granted automatic standing by the 
news media, non-Establishment actors like social movement leaders have to prove they 
have the “organization, resources, and media sophistication” to gain standing as a serious 
challenger (Gamson and Wolfsfeld, 1993, p.121). Through the very act of ascribing 
standing or not, Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld say “journalists act as self-appointed 
surrogates for political elites” through their “assuming, perhaps unconsciously” whether a 
source should be taken seriously (ibid). As a result, the media’s perception of a source’s 
standing determines how they frame that source’s message. Uncontested standing makes 
it more likely that a source’s “preferred meaning” will be conveyed to the news medium’s 
audience, often unchallenged through direct quotations (119). The frames attached to 
contested standing, on the other hand, render efforts to control one’s representation in the 
news media “difficult, perhaps unimaginable,“ according to Todd Gitlin (1980, p.3): 
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Just as people as workers have no voice in what they make, how they make 
it, or how the product is distributed and used, so do people as producers of 
meaning have no voice in what the media make of what they say or do, or in 
the context within which the media frame their activity. The resulting 
meanings, now mediated, acquire an eerie substance in the real world, 
standing outside their ostensible makers and confronting them as an alien 
force. The social meanings of intentional action have been deformed beyond 
recognition (ibid) 
 
 As we have seen, however, protest leaders have no choice but to court media 
attention. And, Gitlin notes, “the media do amplify” issues promoted by movements and 
“expose scandal in the State and in the corporations” (4).  However, Gitlin contends that 
they do so within boundaries defined by the hegemonic order. Antonio Gramsci’s concept 
of hegemony, which Gitlin defines as “a ruling class’s domination through ideology, 
through the shaping of popular consent” (9), is central to his analysis of the news media’s 
approach to protest movements. Movements that are perceived as a threat to dominant 
interests are subjected to the various means of persuasion at the disposal of the ruling 
class for minimizing opposition and maintaining popular consent to the status quo. This 
persuasion, however, is seldom perceived because it is communicated through the 
common language of shared ideologies naturalized as ‘common sense’ through 
upbringing, class and education. Journalists are not immune to ideology and contribute to 
this process of persuasion under the guise of what Gitlin describes as their “bounded but 
real independence” (12). This autonomy is vital because it serves to “legitimate the 
institutional order as a whole and the news in particular” (ibid). It also facilitates some 
opposition to the status quo, which further legitimates the system and, in doing so, 
“serves the interests of the elites as long as it is ‘relative,’ as long as it does not violate 






Hegemonic crisis = opportunity 
Successful protest movements are those that manipulate or exploit differences between 
elites and disputes over the core values themselves in order to achieve their goals. Gitlin 
notes that at such moments of hegemonic crisis “journalism itself becomes contested” 
(12) and openings are produced in the news media for outsiders seeking to socialize their 
challenge to the established order: “Society-wide conflict is then carried into the cultural 
institutions, though in muted and sanitized forms,” he posits (12). Such threats are 
ultimately “tamed” and “domesticated” by the institutional order (13). 
 Stephanie Greco Larson and Harvey Molotch both apply this thinking to the civil 
rights movement under the leadership of Martin Luther King, Jr. Larson observes that 
“protest seen as consistent with American principles were acceptable to the elite, the 
media, and the public... The dominant ideology supported some moderate reforms (voting 
rights, abandoning forced segregation), but it was not open to a wholesale critique of 
racism in American economic and social institutions” (161). While the civil rights 
movement certainly challenged the status quo, the reforms it sought between 1955 and 
1965 did not extend beyond the Establishment’s comfort zone, or what Larson calls the 
“sphere of legitimate controversy” – “Reforms advocated by the civil rights movement... 
were not radical in a national mainstream. Instead, they were part of the emerging 
ideology that would soon become the dominant one” (161). 
 Such moments of hegemonic or ideological shift can produce what Harvey 
Molotch labels the “Bedfellow Dialectic” between social movements and the 
Establishment media. This dialectic sees the news media avail themselves to a social 
movement seeking changes to the status quo with which they happen to agree. Molotch 
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observes this dynamic at play between the news media and both the early civil rights 
movement and the antiwar movement in the early 1970s, when “the movements 
increasingly had the same news needs as the media” (89). In both cases, cleavages 
between elites on race and U.S. policy in Vietnam were reflected in the news media and 
produced openings for oppositional movement voices. In such moments of movement-
media synergy, media coverage greatly facilitates a movement’s ability to win 
concessions from the Establishment by socializing the movement’s efforts to bring the 
legitimacy of the established order into doubt, as King did so successfully on the issue of 
race relations in the Southern states. “Important segments of northern opinion saw the 
continued exposure of blatant inequities as damaging to the larger legitimacy of U.S. 
institutions,” Molotch writes. Consequently, “Martin Luther King, Jr... became 
legitimized as a figure with whom reconciliation should occur” (90). Yet such standing is 
narrowly defined and usually limited to a single issue. Molotch says King’s legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Establishment lost its traction as he expanded the civil rights movement’s 
scope to take on de facto segregation in Northern cities and the war in Vietnam. “At that 
historical stage, King – erected in large part as a public celebrity by northern media – 
was using his celebrity in a counterproductive manner. That is, he was not being useful 
by feeding the news needs of those guarding the national status quo,” writes Molotch 
(90).  
 
Discussion: Martin Luther King, Jr. versus the media? 
This study has tried to avoid the error of portraying the news media as monolithically 
united against King. As we saw in Chapter One, for example, news organizations like the 
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New York Times were riven by internal differences over the war and, accordingly, I have 
taken pains to qualify “elements” and “efforts” within the news media that worked in 
opposition to him in a conscious bid not to attribute the actions of some to all. Therefore, 
as I hope to make clear in what follows, I believe it is important to avoid an over-
emphasis on a macro/structuralist point of view. Certainly, vested interests in the 
hegemonic order at newspapers like the New York Times played a determining role in how 
King’s opposition to the war in Vietnam and his Poor People’s Campaign were framed 
and represented. However, it is my contention that an overriding emphasis on structure 
incorrectly limits and downplays the agency and positive contributions of individual 
journalists at these organizations, many of whom covered King fairly, if not favourably. 
While King and Levison clearly believed a media bias was working against King during 
his last 16 months, it is also crucial to note their many references to favourable coverage 
during this same period. The contributions of sensitive, professional journalists like 
David Halberstam are the essence of Molotch’s vital observation at the start of this 
chapter that “the mass media represent a potential mechanism for utilizing an 
establishment institution to fulfill non-establishment goals.” To ignore this fact and focus 
solely on corporate media’s vested interest in undermining movements opposing the 
status quo disregards their very real potential during times of hegemonic shift to serve as 
vital allies in the struggle for social change. Despite their suspicions of bias, King and 
Levison actively solicited media coverage and worked to shape it for their own ends. 
The “vortex of conflicting forces” 
During the last 16 months of his life, King had privileged access to popular mainstream 
television shows and influential print journalists like David Halberstam and many others 
of the era through whom he gave eloquent expression to the antiwar movement and the 
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“unheard” millions in America’s ghettos. As harsh as King’s tone was through 1967 until 
his assassination, it did not deter Merv Griffin, the popular talk show host, from 
introducing King to his audience on June 7, 1967, as “one of the great voices in America” 
(King Papers, 1967/6/7, p.1). Through the likes of Griffin, Halberstam and others, King’s 
“new radicalism” was heard from the television sets and read in the morning paper in 
millions of middle class homes across America. While elements within the news media 
clearly became increasingly hostile toward King in his last sixteen months, many of their 
peers continued to lend significant weight to his opinions. As Prentiss Childs and Ellen 
Wadley, co-producers of CBS's Face The Nation, wrote to King after his April 1967 
appearance on the show: “Your new involvement in the peace movement in addition to 
civil rights certainly places you at the vortex of the conflicting forces in our society and 
makes your views of increasing importance for everyone” (King Papers, 1967/4/28). 
 King understood that it was from precisely such a position that a movement leader 
drew his strength and ability to influence social change. This understanding is evident in 
the interpretation of civil disobedience that he offered one gathering of journalists on 
October 23, 1967: “Civil disobedience is standing in the midst of an unjust law, an unjust 
system and engaging in an act nonviolently, openly and cheerfully in order to dramatize 
the issue, in order to bring the community to the point of seeing that the situation is so 
crisis packed that the problem must be dealt with” (ibid, p.6). Over the course of his 
thirteen year leadership of the civil rights movement, King and his advisers used moral 
persuasion and the coercion of nonviolent direct action tactics like civil disobedience to 
creatively manipulate ideological tensions in American society, and within its political 
Establishment and news media in particular, on the issues of racism, war and poverty in 
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an effort to build the national consensus required to end them. King’s position at the 
“vortex” of ideological conflict afforded him the dual status of militant field marshal for 
the have-nots contesting the status quo and their eloquent, respectable emissary to 
America’s political and media Establishment. This fine balance between revolutionary 
black leader and “good friend” to White America was key to King’s leadership and his 
early civil rights successes between 1955 to 1965 and led to historian August Meier’s 
perceptive description of King as the civil rights movement’s “conservative militant” 
(ibid, p.454).   
 Between 1965 and 1968, America’s rapidly escalating war in Vietnam and the 
fury of ghetto uprisings in cities like Los Angeles, Newark and Detroit inspired new and 
profound anxieties in American society. Both developments also deeply affected King, 
who saw them as symptoms of a morally and spiritually sick society that he would spend 
his last 16 months working to heal. Like any good doctor, King understood that the 
nation’s anxiety not only signalled fear and danger but also served to alert it to the 
realization that a change in course was necessary. The trick was to develop this unease 
with the status quo and the accompanying openness to social change, and media strategy 
was a vital means to this end. This process had been central to the SCLC’s southern 
campaigns, where its exposure of racist violence in the South through national and 
international news media evoked anxious national soul-searching and broad public 
support for the civil rights movement’s two crowning legislative achievements – the 1964 
Civil Rights Act and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In much the same way, King hoped 
to develop and leverage the evolving national crisis of conscience over Vietnam and the 
ghetto uprisings into an end to the war and a federal package of economic rights for 
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America’s poor. As King told journalists on October 23, 1967, on the topic of Vietnam, 
demonstrations and direct action tactics were necessary tools in these efforts: “They 
educate the population, they force people to think about the issue. I’m sure they appeal to 
the conscience of some people and people are forced to look at the war situation and 
respond with a yes or no answer in their own minds” (ibid, p.4). 
Mainstreaming King’s “new radicalism” 
This appeal to conscience was central to King’s media strategy on both Vietnam and the 
Poor People’s Campaign and represented his keen intellectual understanding that protest, 
in order to be successful, had to petition society’s core values. Through 1967 until his 
murder, King exploited the news media’s attention to his perceived “metamorphosis” 
from moderate / conservative militant into radical to raise popular awareness of both the 
social values falling victim to and the social values facilitating America’s massive 
military intervention in Vietnam and its indifference towards its 40-million poor. King’s 
go-for-broke opposition to the war and poverty in his last 16 months lent his rhetoric a 
dramatic edge that journalists could not resist nor their Establishment-friendly colleagues 
ignore. Through their heightened coverage of King’s outspoken nonconformity on these 
top national issues, his call for a radical “revolution of values” found its way into the 
national mainstream consciousness.  
 This means to socializing protest was not without its perils, however. While likely 
to appeal to radicals and progressives, King and Levison understood that the harshness of 
his nonconformity ran the risk of alienating the great mass of “average,” moderate 
Americans that King ultimately needed to reach and convince with his petitions on peace 
and poverty. Ensuring media coverage that communicated the legitimacy of King’s views 
and linked them to core social values was therefore essential and the three-point public 
 140 
 
relations strategies on both Vietnam and the Poor People’s Campaign developed in the 
two previous chapters sought to do precisely this. On Vietnam, efforts to establish King’s 
links to pro-peace Senators like Robert F. Kennedy and to underscore his influence and 
leadership in the black community while positioning himself at the activist middle of the 
peace movement had one common purpose and that was to frame King’s protest against 
the war as undeniably respectable, responsible and patriotic. On poverty, King’s efforts 
to downplay the disruptive potential of civil disobedience in favour of its constructive 
ends of jobs and income, while underscoring the urgency of the situation and, above all, 
the strength of his nonviolent leadership, worked together to convince moderate, middle-
class Americans that the Poor People’s Campaign, and its threat of massive civil 
disobedience, was a legitimate and necessary means to solving the fearsome unrest in 
America’s cities. Furthermore, through its emphasis on jobs and income, King sought to 
link the Poor People's Campaign to core American values with his claim that depriving 
the poor of such fundamental necessities amounted to a denial of life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness – “the very creed of society,” he said (ibid). 
 It is impossible to judge conclusively whether these strategies succeeded in any 
quantifiable way. King and Levison’s observations regarding public responses to both 
issues, taken at face value, show that they believed they were having an effect. On 
Vietnam, King told Levison that mail from the public was running “10 to 1” in favour of 
his position (FBI, 4/11/68, 7/0042). King’s intuitive sense of the black community’s 
opposition to the war, and his prioritization of moving blacks toward more active 
opposition, translated into polls that found a coincident rise in antiwar feeling among 
black Americans. Contemporary national polls, however, suggest that national public 
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opinion on the war did not shift dramatically after King’s return to the peace movement 
in 1967 but rather settled into a polarizing and, for King, depressing split. However, he 
did live to see a sharp rise in antiwar feelings in America after the massed Tet Offensive 
by North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces in February 1968 led a majority of Americans 
to conclude that the United States was losing the war. On the Poor People’s Campaign, 
Levison’s multiple assertions of middle-class support for the mobilization, as suggested 
by indicators including donations that were running “way ahead” of the previous year, 
were evidence that SCLC’s aggressive, if disorganized, efforts to connect the PPC with 
middle-class concerns and values were having an effect.
1
  Adele Kantor of SCLC’s New 
York office perhaps said it best as she noted the renewal of donations from people who 
hadn’t contributed to SCLC since the height of King’s public celebrity in 1964-65: 
“People,” she said, “are realizing the correctness of Dr. King’s position” (FBI, 3/15/68, 
8/0213). 
The news media and King’s “new radicalism” 
King’s ability to gain what Gamson called ‘preferred meaning’ for his protests against the 
war in Vietnam and poverty was complicated by what he and Levison believed was a 
campaign by forces in the news media – and the New York Times in particular – to 
negatively portray his positions and undermine his influence in the last 16 months of his 
life. While the research required for properly investigating and assessing the validity of 
their suspicions is beyond the scope of this study, their allegations and the evidence they 
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 While it falls outside the scope of this thesis, evidence from the FBI wiretap on Levison suggests that 
King’s assassination, rather than undermining the Poor People’s Campaign, served to in fact rally both 
public and media support behind the SCLC’s efforts. Despite the widespread criticism of the news media’s 
coverage of the PPC at the time and since, a view supported by New York Times reporter, Ben Franklin, in 
the previous chapter, Levison attributed most of the blame to the incompetence of King’s successor, Ralph 




pointed to correspond with many of the observations by Gans, Hall, Gamson, Gitlin, 
Larson and Molotch described above. Since this thesis is not able to determine if forces in 
the news media did in fact want to undermine King in his last 16 months, it will conclude 
with a consideration of the reasons why they might have felt discrediting King was 
necessary.  
 Critical to any understanding of King’s relations with the news media in his final 
16 months is Stanley Levison’s aforementioned observation in April 1965 that King’s 
emergence as “one of the most powerful figures in the country, a leader not merely of 
Negroes but of millions of whites in motion” was striking fear in the heart of the 
American Establishment. As Levison saw it, King’s danger stemmed from the fact that he 
was one of the “exceptional” few in America to attain “the heights of popular confidence 
and trust without having obligations to any political party or other dominant interests” 
(ibid, italics added). The “independence and freedom of action” (ibid) afforded by this 
unique position meant the Establishment and its allies in the news media had to keep a 
close eye on King to ensure that he did not use his influence to challenge their “sacred 
structures” and enduring values like capitalism or for ends that they otherwise considered 
illegitimate. Added to this was Levison’s belief that elements within the Establishment 
were “apprehensive” that an independent and influential King could “err in judgment” 
and cause “major, irreversible error” (ibid). This desire to control King and keep him in 
line with Establishment interests and values, Levison believed, lay at the heart of the 
news media’s vocal opposition to his call at that time for an economic boycott of 
Alabama.  
 This interest in limiting King to what Larson above called the “sphere of 
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legitimate controversy” was clearly at play in media coverage of King in the last 16 
months of his life. What emerges in this timeframe is a struggle between King and 
Establishment-oriented members of the news media to define the limits of legitimate 
debate and action on the war in Vietnam and crisis in America’s ghettos. This struggle 
grew in intensity as King’s “new radicalism” and its revolutionary challenges to the 
‘enduring values’ identified by Gans resulted in more aggressive efforts within the news 
media to curtail his influence. This resulted in frames for King’s leadership that portrayed 
him as radical and out of touch with his black constituency on the war and, on the Poor 
People’s Campaign, weak and therefore dangerous given the nature of his plans for 
Washington.  
 Of the eight clusters of ‘enduring values’ that Gans identified in mainstream news 
coverage – ethnocentrism, altruistic democracy, responsible capitalism, small-town 
pastoralism, individualism, moderatism, social order, and national leadership – King’s 
peace stand and the Poor People’s Campaign entered into direct conflict with at least six: 
ethnocentrism, moderatism, national leadership, social order, altruistic democracy, and 
responsible capitalism. King’s opposition to the war, with its emphasis on the “higher 
patriotism” of Christian love and universal brotherhood, was not welcomed by an 
ethnocentric news media that freely referred to North Vietnamese and National Liberation 
Front forces as “the enemy.” This tension was exacerbated by his expression of so-called 
“radical” opposition to U.S. policy, not least of all his public condemnation of the U.S. 
government as “the greatest purveyor of violence in the world today.” With this and other 
attacks on the legitimacy of U.S. policy and the national leadership during a time of war, 
King struck at the very roots of what Gans says is the news media’s preeminent value of 
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social order and social cohesion, both of which are intimately linked to the political order. 
This was also true for the Poor People’s Campaign, with its rhetorical focus on Congress 
and its tactical threat of bringing the operations of government to a standstill through 
massive civil disobedience in the nation’s capital. The emphasis on Washington, where 
King had earned fame as a beacon of altruistic democracy with his famous “I have a 
dream” speech on August 28, 1963, only underscored how his once shining symbol of 
respectability and moderation had metamorphosed into a looming, radical threat. Finally, 
while it did not assert itself as a dominant concern in the news coverage of King, his 
frequent calls for a “radical redistribution of economic and political power” and his 
criticism of American foreign policy serving exploitative investment practices overseas 
could only have run afoul of the news media's commitments to free market capitalism 
and private enterprise.  
 With King using his “independence and freedom of action” to launch what 
amounted to an all-out assault on the “sacred structures” of the American Establishment 
and the enduring values of the news media, coverage of King brought the news media’s 
tendency toward the Establishment out into the open. This bias is evident in the New York 
Times’ concentrated coverage of King’s peace stand in the three-month period between 
the end of February and the end of May 1967. Taken as a whole, the 53 articles published 
during this period clearly indicate an overall negative frame, one led by the newspaper’s 
lead editorial on April 7 that warned King to drop his criticisms of the war. King’s 
subsequent refusal to heed the Times’ advice to, as he interpreted it, be a responsible 
“Negro leader” and “stay in my place… and not stray from a position of moderation” saw 
the paper pay special attention to King’s associations with radical opponents of the war 
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and President Johnson and their efforts to recruit King as a third party “peace” candidate 
in the 1968 Presidential election. Given the New York Times’ well-known concerns with 
the war, which even earned it the nickname the New Hanoi Times with pro-war hawks in 
Washington, it is a wonder that the paper did not welcome the addition of King’s 
influential voice to its own. One theory to emerge from this study is that the New York 
Times offered King as a kind of sacrifice to counter what Gitlin says were accusations on 
America’s right of a left-wing bias at the Times that was seen to be encouraging the peace 
movement and effectively preventing the Johnson Administration from employing the 
kind of decisive force needed to win the war. According to Gitlin, if America lost in 
Vietnam, the Times feared it would be held accountable. That the Times’ negative 
treatment of King followed so closely on the heels of Harrison Salisbury’s explosive 
reports from North Vietnam cannot be overlooked. Salisbury’s Hanoi exposés had rocked 
the political order and criticizing King would have provided a convenient counterpoint to 
the impression of the Times’ ideological dissent against the war. Sacrificing a radical 
King was, in effect, an easy price to pay for the greater good of Harrison Salisbury. 
 Opposition within the news media to King’s dissent on the war was often framed 
as a matter of standing. This was clearly the case in 1965, at which time media criticism 
revolved around King’s lack of credibility on matters of foreign policy. Such criticism 
clearly established the idea that King’s media standing was limited to civil rights and 
matters related to the black community. Beyond such issues, King did not have the 
accreditation necessary for favourable framing, regardless of his Nobel Peace Prize. With 
the exception of the New York Times, media criticism of King's antiwar stand in both 
1965 and again in 1967 tended toward a satiric, scornful tone, which Gans says is 
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characteristic of news media moderatism and its treatment of behaviour perceived as 
extreme or that of an “over-simplifying popularizer” (51). From King's point of view, the 
mocking conformity also betrayed a desire to keep him “in his place.” Bayard Rustin, as 
we saw, interpreted this tone as proof that black Americans in 1967, no matter what their 
credentials, were still expected to defer to the wisdom of their white superiors.    
 A key clue to the news media’s shifting attitude toward King in light of his “new 
radicalism” is indicated by the New York Times editorial response to the violence that 
overtook the Memphis demonstration on March 28, 1968. King, the Times declared, had 
become “counterproductive” (ibid, italics added). Whereas nonviolent protest had served 
a useful purpose in the first decade of the civil rights movement, it was now little more 
than a “cover for rowdy elements bent on violence” (ibid). Why the Times reached this 
conclusion is suggested in the Washington Post's response to this same event, which 
reflected a marked shift from its earlier, slightly hysterical claims that the Poor People’s 
Campaign was tantamount to “anarchy,” “intimidation” and “mob” rule. By March 30, 
1968, this view had given way to the Post’s belief that the Poor People’s Campaign 
could, in fact, be a “gain for the Nation” if King could assure the nonviolent discipline of 
his followers.  
 Taken together, the two editorials bring into sharp focus the fractured hegemony 
that King was exploiting to advance the goals of the Poor People’s Campaign and, 
ultimately, to see American society “born again.” Whereas the New York Times saw King 
as a threat to social order, the Washington Post joined the many prominent Establishment 
voices that were coming to see the status quo as the source of disorder and accepted the 
need for change. King, despite his “new radicalism,” once again was emerging as “the 
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figure with whom reconciliation should occur.” The Post editorial expressed the 
spreading recognition within society’s elites that the consensus on which social order is 
dependent had been smashed by the ghetto uprisings and fixing it necessitated the kind of 
concessions that King, via the news media, was inserting into “sphere of legitimate 
controversy.” This understanding clearly began to expand within the Establishment after 
the chaos in Newark and Detroit in July 1967, a fact that was evident in news coverage 
that followed the uprisings. Of crucial concern to the news media was the idea that 
Washington’s resistance to poverty relief programs in America’s ghettos and its embrace 
of reactionary law-and-order measures was radicalizing normally moderate black leaders 
and creating a situation that was endangering the legitimacy of the political order itself. 
Concessions were needed – for the poor, yes, but also to secure the ‘system.’  
 This fear among society’s elites as voiced through the news media was not lost on 
King, who applauded the “very distinguished newspapers, magazines, commentators and 
TV programs” calling for “fundamental reform, not revenge or military might” in his 
address to SCLC’s annual convention in August 1967. The addition of Newsweek’s new 
militancy on racism and poverty in November, and the Who’s Who of America’s political, 
business and religious communities who applauded it, provided further proof that the 
white Establishment was “desperate,” as Levison observed, and accepting of the need for 
a new consensus with America’s poor. This idea was developed in King’s press 
conference announcing the Poor People’s Campaign on December 4, 1967, at which he 
pointed to “prominent leaders of industry, civil rights organizations, unions, and 
churches,” mayors of major American cities and, of course, Newsweek to “show that a 
clear majority in America are asking for the things we will demand in Washington.” In 
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doing so, King worked to both underscore the legitimate controversy of the Poor People’s 
Campaign, and delegitimize Congressional resistance to its demands. 
 Working both for and against King in terms of media coverage was his threat of 
massive civil disobedience. While its inherent drama attracted media attention, the very 
idea of it being exercised in the streets of Washington in a bid to bring the operations of 
government to a standstill went against the news media’s enduring values of moderatism, 
national leadership and social order. Massive civil disobedience was an undeniable threat 
to all of them and was framed as such. Those opposed to it in the news media saw it as a 
flagrant and unjustifiable attack on the rule of law – the very basis of social order and 
even social cohesion itself. Worse was its potential for being taken over by violence – the 
most anti-social of behaviour – that spurred news media efforts to delegitimize King. 
Levison and King perceived this effort to discredit his leadership in the New York Times' 
purposeful neglect of King’s pivotal role in black Cleveland lawyer Carl Stokes’ 
campaign for mayor in favour of Stokes’ relations with the moderate and more 
‘responsible’ NAACP and Urban League. With this determined embrace of moderatism, 
the Times turned a blind eye to King’s very real capacity for neutralizing the potential 
threat of violence by Black Power advocates and their young followers in Washington. 
 King's threat of civil disobedience also provided those opposed to his radical 
vision for America with a ready excuse for undercutting his evolving power and 
influence. Efforts in this regard within the New York Times met the full light of day with 
its editorial on March 30, 1968. With its emphasis on the possibility of violence taking 
over the Poor People's Campaign, the New York Times ignored the potential power of 
King’s nonviolent message that David Halberstam, the Washington Post and others had 
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come to clearly see. Instead, the Times embraced the fear of black mob violence that the 
likes of Stokely Carmichael and Rap Brown hoped to sow into the hearts and minds of 
the white community but had no real intentions of acting on. This imagined violence was 
their power, and gave the white community a taste of the fear and psychological violence 
that blacks had for so long endured in America. By perpetuating this largely mythical 
threat, the Times lent its weight to determined efforts to undermine the emerging potential 
of King’s success in Washington.1    
 If the Times' preoccupation with violence was rooted in a genuine concern for 
peace and social order, it was the “rowdy elements” using nonviolent protest as a cover 
and the extreme police violence that met looters and peaceful demonstrators alike in 
Memphis that it should have condemned as “counterproductive,” not King. The Times’ 
real concern, however, was that King had become counterproductive to the Times’ 
conception of social order, which his Poor People’s Campaign sought to fundamentally 
reform. King’s opponents within the newspaper understood that he was not merely 
seeking concessions from the Establishment on behalf of the poor but rather a radical 
redistribution of economic and political power and a revolution of values that saw 
profanity and inhumanity in many of the “sacred structures” that the Times, as responsible 
spokesman for the system, took as its duty to protect. With King’s refusal to conform to 
the Times’ efforts to bring him to heel through its insistent calls for moderation, it 
declared the days of nonviolent protest, and Martin Luther King, Jr., over. 
                                               
1 The New York Times later acknowledged this in an internal assessment of its coverage of the black 
community commissioned by National editor Claude Sitton and written by reporter Doug Kneeland. 
Reflecting on his interviews in the community, Kneeland wrote “Most people in the field agree, for 
instance, that we have done a disservice in the past by making it appear that the likes of Stokely, Rap 
and the Black Panthers had the power to do the things they were threatening instead of making it clear 
that they were more a manifestation of a disorganized anger that certainly exists among black youth. Of 
course, we should keep an eye on them, listen to them and understand the anger they are reflecting, but 




Notes on Methodology 
 
Scope and bias 
Given the massive volume of original documents and media coverage produced during 
the sixteen month timeframe of this study, I have tried to provide as representative an 
account of the historical record as possible within the limited space allowed for this 
study. However, given this study's primary interest in responses by King and his advisors 
to media coverage, there is an obvious weighting of the record toward their views and the 
media coverage that concerned them. Providing a global impression of media coverage of 
King in his final 16 months was simply not possible given the limitations of this study. 
 Despite these limitations, this study has endeavoured to be as thorough as possible 
in order to preserve the integrity of the original sources used. The admittedly heavy use 
of block quotes reflects this concern. This study has been especially preoccupied with 
maintaining the integrity of newspaper sources and strove to avoid removing citations 
from their original context. Aware of my intellectual bias toward King's views, I was 
especially preoccupied with treating negative coverage of his activities fairly. This effort 
to use newspaper sources responsibly also guarded against the tendency to attribute 
intention to a journalist based on the content of a report. As far as possible, I left 
assumptions of intention to King and his advisors. 
 
Using archives 
This study is based primarily on material derived from five different archival collections: 
the King Papers and the Records of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 
housed at the King Library and Archives in Atlanta, Georgia; The FBI's King-Levison file 
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(on microfilm); The records of the New York Times Company, housed at the Manuscripts 
and Archives Division of the New York Public Library; and digital back issues of the New 
York Times and Washington Post, obtained through Proquest (available  at 
library.concordia.ca). Three of these archives – the Records of the SCLC; the FBI's King-
Levison file; and the New York Times Company records – are accompanied by digital 
finding aids, which I was able to access online and allowed me to pinpoint my research 
before entering the physical archives. A finding aid for the King Papers exists but is not 
digitized and only available on-site in paper format. However, the basic organization of 
the King Papers into two parts, Correspondence (Personal and General) and the 
chronologically-ordered Sermons and Speeches, allowed for easy research. 
 The scope of my research was mercifully narrowed by both the sixteen month 
timeframe of my thesis (January 1967 to April 1968) and the fact I was specifically 
interested in documents dealing with media relations and organizational communications 
around Vietnam and the Poor People's Campaign. Beyond these boundaries, the scope of 
my research was left open. While this entailed a great amount of reading, it also provided 
for a number of useful, serendipitous discoveries. This extensive reading also provided 
me with a detailed understanding of the circumstances in which King was operating and 
the complexities of the issues that he was facing, not to mention an appreciation of the 
enormity of the problems facing American society in 1967. This original reading also 
fleshed out the academic literature that I was using as guides to the topic and led to the 
insight and intuition required to determine which secondary materials preserve the spirit 





My research of the FBI transcripts was initially limited to those dealing with Vietnam and 
the Poor People's Campaign, as indicated by summaries found in the accompanying PDF 
guide to the microfilm. However, as my research progressed, I eventually read through 
each transcript between January 1967 and King's death (and beyond). I also included the 
transcripts of conversations dealing with Vietnam between March and September 1965. I 
began my research with the microfilm edition of the FBI transcripts at the Schomburg 
Center for Black Studies in Harlem in May 2011 and continued at Concordia in July 2011 
with copies obtained via Inter-Library Loan. Whereas microfilm viewers at the 
Schomburg were only equipped to make photocopies, those available at Concordia allow 
researchers to make scans. This greatly facilitated my ability to compile and organize the 
transcripts for home reference. 
 Using the FBI transcripts requires extreme caution: not only are they full of typos 
and obvious misunderstandings, they are in many cases verbatim records that reflect the 
natural ebb and flow of human conversation and, as such, are replete with sentence 
fragments and unfinished thoughts cut off by the interjections of others. Accordingly, 
researchers have to be careful not to misconstrue or infer what King and his advisors 
meant to say. That said, between the FBI transcripts, King's papers, his published works 
and newspaper archives, it is possible to piece together these narrative fragments into a 








FBI transcripts and newspaper clippings 
 
The following are examples of the FBI transcripts and four of the central newspaper 
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